


JPRS-SSA-85-086

13 September 1985

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

13 September 1985

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

- FRG Aid for Hydroelectric Projects Reported  
(FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT,  
5 Jul 85)..... 1

## GHANA

- Ministry of Trade's Export Division Undergoing Reorganization  
(Charles Neequaye, Raymond Abang; GHANIAN TIMES,  
13 Aug 85)..... 3
- Mobisquads To Be Formed in All Schools  
(Joe Bradford Nyinah; PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC, 14 Aug 85).. 4
- Briefs  
Europeans Deported for Racism..... 5

## LIBERIA

- Businessmen Call for Greater Security  
(G. Kparcon Mardoh; NEW LIBERIAN, 12 Aug 85)..... 6
- Briefs  
Sirleaf Trial Report Reactions..... 7

## MOZAMBIQUE

- Portuguese Artists Aid Starving  
(WEEKEND POST, 20 Jul 85)..... 8
- Refugees Fall Prey to Lions in South Africa's Kruger Park  
(Neil Hooper; SUNDAY TIMES, 4 Aug 85)..... 9

## **NAMIBIA**

On Lack of Media Freedom (Udo Froese; AFRIKA POST, Jun 85).....	10
--	----

## **SIERRA LEONE**

New Currency Guidelines for Travelers Issued (NEW LIBERIAN, 12 Aug 85).....	13
--	----

## **SOUTH AFRICA**

U.S. Disinvestment Moves Examined (Karl P. Magyar; INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN, No 1, 1985).....	14
---	----

Further Reactions to Botha's Natal National Party Congress Speech (SUNDAY TIMES, 18 Aug 85).....	32
---	----

Ken Owen	32
Percy Qoboza	33
Lawrence Schlemmer	34

Police Name 25 Arrested Under Emergency (SAPA, 27 Aug 85).....	36
---	----

Police Namelist of Arrests, Releases (SAPA, 30 Aug 85).....	38
--	----

Continuing List of Names of Those Released, Arrested (SAPA, various dates).....	42
--	----

40 Arrested	42
271 Arrested	43
Detainee Total at 2076	50
Police Arrest Another 59, Release 81	52
94 More Arrested	55
90 More Detained	57

Cape Town Relatives Ask Whereabouts of Detainees (SAPA, 26 Aug 85).....	60
--	----

Text of Order Concerning Attendance at Funerals (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 31 Jul 85).....	61
---	----

Report on How Funerals Are Turned Into Political Happenings (Allan Soule; SUNDAY TIMES, 18 Aug 85).....	63
--	----

Treurnicht Warns of Potential White Resistance To Reform (BUSINESS DAY, 15 Aug 85).....	65
--	----

<b>Buthlezi Said To Be Building Up White Constituency</b> (Hannes de Wet; THE STAR, 13 Aug 85).....	66
<b>Whites Likely To Sacrifice More in New Order</b> (Peter Wallington; BUSINESS DAY, 21 Aug 85).....	67
<b>Inkatha Still Striving for Change Without Violence</b> (THE STAR, 17 Aug 85).....	68
<b>Thembisa Businessmen Detained, Shops Closed</b> (SAPA, 30 Aug 85).....	69
<b>Shops Boycott Also Hits Black Traders</b> (Sam Mabe; SOWETAN, 14 Aug 85).....	70
<b>Body To Monitor Indian, Black Contact</b> (EVENING POST, 13 Aug 85).....	72
<b>Afrikaner Youth Leaders Reject NP Policy</b> (Hans Pienaar; SUNDAY TIMES, 18 Aug 85).....	73
<b>Soweto Mayor Says Curfew Might Endanger Residents' Lives</b> (THE STAR, 17 Aug 85).....	74
<b>SASJ Accuses Botha of Attempting To Discredit Press</b> (THE STAR, 17 Aug 85).....	75
<b>Significance of Conservative Party Discussed</b> (David Braun; THE STAR, 17 Aug 85).....	76
<b>Legal Expert Criticizes Illegal Policy Activities in Wits Campus</b> (Estelle Trengove; THE STAR, 22 Aug 85).....	77
<b>Teaching Colleges To Reduce Student Intake</b> (Susan Fleming; THE STAR, 21 Aug 85).....	79
<b>Conservative MP Voices Fears About Communist Influence</b> (THE STAR, 16 Aug 85).....	80
<b>Mixed Couples in Wrong Areas Can Be Reported to Police</b> (Norman West; SUNDAY TIMES, 18 Aug 85).....	81
<b>Soweto Resident Describes Life in Township for Non-Violent Majority</b> (SUNDAY TIMES, 18 Aug 85).....	82
<b>Local Government Urged To Deal With Black Housing</b> (THE STAR, 19 Aug 85).....	84
<b>According to Police, Unrest is Waning</b> (THE STAR, 20 Aug 85).....	85

Churches Differ in Reaction to Meeting With Botha (Estelle Trengove; THE STAR, 20 Aug 85).....	86
Conflicting Reports of Unrest Disturb Black Township (Sol Makgabutlane, et al.; THE STAR, 20 Aug 85).....	87
More Criticism of Press on Reporting Unrest (Andrew Beattie; THE STAR, 20 Aug 85).....	89
Township Describes Police Abuses (McKeed Kotlolo; THE STAR, 21 Aug 85).....	90
Report on Costs of Failed Influx Control (James Clarke; THE STAR, 14 Aug 85).....	92
Resettlement Scratched for 2 Transvaal Communities (SAPA, 27 Aug 85).....	93
Liberal Spirit in Nation Praised (Dirk van Zyl; WEEKEND POST, 20 Jul 85).....	94
Study of Traveling Time Spent for Homelands Commuters (THE STAR, 3 Aug 85).....	96
Geldenhuys Heads Committee To Review Full Military Machine (Peter Honey; BUSINESS DAY, 14 Aug 85).....	98
Defence Force Sets Up Emergency Radio Network for Civilians, Military (Andrew Walker; THE STAR, 13 Aug 85).....	100
New Role for Air Force in Urban Areas (WEEKEND POST, 27 Jul 85).....	101
Briefs	
SBDC Applications	102
Australian Sanctions	102
Black Unemployment	102
Food Supply Vital	103
Rand Curtails Travel	103
Timber Agreement Threatened	103
Economic Emergency	104
Two Airlines Needed	104
Denmark's EAC To Stay	104
Late Recovery Forecast	105
Civil Servants Cost	105
Equipment for South America	105
Secret Red Meat Deal	106
Fruit Exports	106
400 Lose Jobs	106
Rule of Privilege Query	107
Brazilian Rebuff	107

#### ZIMBABWE

Analysis of Elections Results (AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, 17 Jul 85).....	108
--	-----

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FRG AID FOR HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS REPORTED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German  
5 Jul 85 p 2

[Text] In Togo, an important hydroelectric project is currently under construction in Nagbeto at the Mono river, about 140 km north-east of the capital of Lome, in the vicinity of the town of Atakpame. The neighboring People's Republic of Benin will have an equitable share of this project. At issue is the construction of a 517 meter long and 41 meter high dam and a connected power station, which will have two groups of turbogenerators, each with an installed capacity of 31.5 megawatts. The power station is designed to generate 150 gigawatt-hours of electricity per year. The order for the supply and installation of the turbines has been awarded to Sulzer-Escher Wyss GmbH, Ravensburg, and for the generators to the Siemens A.G., Munich-Berlin, Erlangen plant. The dam equipment will be supplied and installed by Krupp Industrietechnik GmbH, Duisburg, and the French firm Neyrpic, a member of the Creusot-Loire-Group.

In August 1984, Hochtief A.G., Essen, was awarded a DM 110 million order for the construction of the dam and the power station building. Consulting engineering services are provided by the French firm Sogreah, Grenoble, and the Swiss company Elektrowatt A.G., Zuerich. They are responsible for detailed planning and the preparation of the bidding documents as well as for construction supervision. From the hydroelectric station, a 120 km long, 161 kilovolt long-distance line will be built which permits the connection to the integrated network of Ghana, Togo and the People's Republic of Benin. A Canadian consortium, consisting of the firms of Belt, Transtec and Sintra, was selected to construct this high-voltage line.

The FRG, among others, was a financial participant in this project which required the investment of about DM 363 million. In August 1984, it made available to Togo and the People's Republic of Benin through the Reconstruction Credit Institution and Loan Bank (KfW), Frankfurt, a subsidy of DM 22 million each to finance the electrical and electromechanical installations of the Nangbeto hydroelectric plant.

The CED [Communaute Electrique du Benin] is seeking to reduce the strong dependence of Togo and of the People's Republic of Benin on electrical energy supplies from Ghana, where the large hydroelectric plant of the Volta River

Authority (VRA), Accra, at the Akosombo River, and its installed capacity of 768 megawatt has become an unreliable source of energy as a result of a long-lasting drought period. The CEB sells the electrical power to national energy supply companies in Togo (Compagnie de l'Energie Electrique du Togo--CEET) and in the People's Republic of Benin (Societe Beninoise d'Electricite et d'Eau--SBEE) as well as to large customers in Togo (phosphate mining, clinker-brick plant and steel works).

The dam extends over a 15,680-square-km catchment area of the Mono river. The future water reservoir will be 47 kilometers long, and its surface will cover about 175 square kilometers. The reservoir will store approximately 1.5 billion cubic meters of water. The undertaking will also create the preconditions for agricultural and fishing projects. It could permit the artificial irrigation of an agricultural area of about 42,000 hectares.

7821

CSO: 3420/77

GHANA

MINISTRY OF TRADE'S EXPORT DIVISION UNDERGOING REORGANIZATION

Accra GHANIAN TIMES in English 13 Aug 85 p 3]

[Article by Charles Neequaye and Raymond Abang]

[Text]

**T**HE Export Division of the Ministry of Trade is being re-organized to make an effective contribution towards the export of Ghana's non-traditional products.

To this end, the Ministry has drawn up a programme under which a group of officers will be tasked to promote the exportation of certain specific non-traditional products.

Mr B. W. K. Caiquo, Secretary for Trade, announced this when he opened a three-week induction course for 14 assistant commercial officers in Accra yesterday.

The officers, he said, would be given the necessary support and encouragement to develop the supply base of the product and locate external markets in co-operation with

other Ministries, departments and agencies.

The Secretary said that the PNDC's basic strategy for achieving growth and development was to increase exports and channel the increased export earnings into the rehabilitation of the domestic sectors of the economy.

Such a strategy, he noted, required the mobilization of considerable resources to rehabilitate basic infrastructure in support of the export sector.

He said the PNDC since 1982, initiated programmes to rehabilitate the key export sectors and had also embarked on policies to improve the performance of the export sectors of the economy, and those, he said had yielded good results.

CSOL 3400/1015

GHANA

## MOBISQUADS TO BE FORMED IN ALL SCHOOLS

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 14 Aug 85 p 1

[Article by Joe Bradford Nyinah]

[Text]

**STUDENTS Mobilisation Squads (MOBISQUAD) are to be formed in all schools in the country as from next academic year to form the basis for the nation's youth and student mobilisation effort.**

Mr Kofi Dovi, Greater Accra Regional liaison officer of the National Mobilisation Programme (NMP) who disclosed this to the "Graphic" yesterday, said the students currently undertaking voluntary work in the country would be the basis of the schools mobisquad programme.

The liaison officer who was briefing the "Graphic" on progress of the students long vacation voluntary work in Accra, said he was overwhelmed by the enthusiastic response of the students and their zeal to work.

He said 500 students have so far registered and started work on various projects.

The projects include the desilting of drains, clean-up exercises in all polyclinics in Accra as well as the Children and Mental Hospitals.

Some of the students are also drilling a well at Asu-

fan near Ofankor with the assistance of volunteers from the Bank of Ghana, Mr Dovi indicated.

And as from today groups of 50 students would be camped at Mayera and Abokobi to undertake various voluntary exercises.

Another group of volunteers, the liaison officer said, were working on the national mobilisation farms at Manyia, Mayera and Abokobi.

Mr Dovi was grateful to the King of Kings Bus Services and the City Express for agreeing to pick the volunteers free of charge to and from their assignments.

He indicated that it was going to cost the City Express £90,000 per month to conduct the exercise.

Mr Dovi further disclosed that the Accra City Council provides tools and a tipper truck and lubricants daily for the exercise.

He said the National Mobilisation Committee and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church have also provided foodstuffs to feed the students.

The students are fed free of charge after work and there are plans to organise entertainments and lectures for them.

GHANA

BRIEFS

EUROPEANS DEPORTED FOR RACISM--Four Europeans have been deported from the country. A statement signed by the secretary for the interior, Mr Kofi Djin, named the four as Mr Dick Rijnbeck of KLM, Mr Helmut Kolakowski of (Aland) Limited, and Mr and Mrs Fry of Accra Brewery Limited. It noted that the behavior of these foreigners at their work places and in society at large has, over a period of time, demonstrated a racist and contemptuous attitude towards blacks. The statement said racism will not be tolerated in this country. [Text] [Accra Domestic Service in English 0700 GMT 26 Aug 85]

CSO: 3400/987

LIBERIA

BUSINESSMEN CALL FOR GREATER SECURITY

Monrovia NEW LIBERIAN in English 12 Aug 85 pp 3, 6

[Article by G. Kparcon Mardoh]

[Text] Businessmen on Benson Street in Monrovia have appealed to government to deploy adequate security men in the area to protect their businesses against miscreants.

Mr. Nabil M. Jawhary, manager of Nabil Beauty Salon who made the appeal on behalf of his colleagues in an interview with newsmen at the weekend, said adequate security men are needed in the area to curb increasing criminal activities.

He said he sustained an \$8,000 loss from burglary committed on his premises twice each year from 1981-84, out [of] which amount the CID was only able to retrieve \$1,500.

Mr. Jawhary said because the crime rate in the area intensifies especially during the Christmas and New Year seasons, the businessmen were appealing now so that government would provide security before this year's festivities.

He said these criminal activities occur daily on Benson Street inspite of personal appeals he has been making to the appropriate authorities to provide more security in the area.

He said they would appreciate were government to provide adequate security officers in the area to protect their businesses and customers alike.

CSO: 3400/992

## LIBERIA

### BRIEFS

SIRLEAF TRIAL REPORT REACTION--Reports just reaching us say the chairman of the Special Military Tribunals, Major General Alfred Gayflor, has reacted to the publication in today's edition of the FOOTPRINTS TODAY newspaper captioned: Trial of Mrs Sirleaf fails to Resume. In the edition, the paper reported that the tribunal did not resume hearing into the case involving former Finance Minister Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf due to the alleged failure of the three state witnesses to show up at the tribunal. FOOTPRINTS named the witnesses as Justice Minister Major Jenkins Scott, Foreign Minister T. Ernest Eastman, and Information Minister Carlton A. Karpeh. In his reaction today, Gen Gayflor described the publication as false and misleading to the public and added that no names of witnesses were released to the FOOTPRINTS newspaper. He then told the LIBERIAN NEWS AGENCY that the paper has been informed by the tribunal to name the reliable source that released information to the paper in the Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf trial. The tribunal chairman said disclosure of the reliable source will enable the court to determine whether the alleged source is authorized to release information pertaining to the activities of the tribunal. [Text] [Monrovia Radio ELWA in English 2000 GMT 27 Aug 85]

CSO: 3400/987

MOZAMBIQUE

PORTUGUESE ARTISTS AID STARVING

Port Elizabeth WEEKEND POST in English 20 Jul 85 p 22

[Text]

LISBON — More than 40 Portuguese recording artists have cut a disc to help famine victims in Mozambique, one of the organisers of the venture said this week.

The record, *Abraco a Mozambique* (A Hug for Mozambique), was due to be released this weekend along with a TV video, said Mr Joao Gomes, director of the charity organising the project.

Mr Gomes told a news conference the fund-raising drive would include a concert in Lisbon on Tuesday, expected to feature the "richest and most talented" Portuguese music stars.

The project has been organised by the Santa Casa de Misericordia de Lisboa, Portugal's leading charity organisation, with support from the State TV and radio networks.

Some 30 public figures, including writers and actors, are also due to make appeals for donations to the project on radio and television.

"Hunger in Mozambique is an atrocious real-

ity, aggravated by armed attacks that spread death, injuries, insecurity and panic," said Mr Gomes who recently visited Mozambique.

*Abraco a Mozambique*, written by Pedro Osorio, Jose Maria Branco, Jose Fanha and Dulce Fanha, features among other performers Lena D'agua, Paco Bandeira, Paulo de Carvalho, Manuel Freire, Sergio Godinho, Julio Pereira, Tonicha, Rui Veloso and Vitorino.

● The Post's London Correspondent reports that after the Live Aid series of concerts for famine relief, it's going to be Sports Aid.

Concert co-ordinator Midge Ure revealed that a sporting spectacular is being planned for later this year, starring ice skating stars Jayne Torvill and Chris Dean and athlete Daley Thompson.

But Bob Geldof, the musician whose brainchild Live Aid was, would not be so much involved.

"It's time for someone else to come forward," Ure said.

CSO: 3400/924

MOZAMBIQUE

REFUGEES FALL PREY TO LIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S KRUGER PARK

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 4 Aug 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by Neil Hooper]

[Text] THOUSANDS of Mozambican refugees — some falling prey to lions and other wild animals — have fled through the Kruger Park into South Africa.

This was revealed yesterday by Mr Johan Kloppers, who is in charge of nature control in the park, and confirmed by the head of the SAP Counter-Insurgency branch, Major-General Bert Wandrag.

Mr Kloppers said that several hundred refugees were crossing into the Kruger Park from Mozambique each week, often in groups of between 60 and 80 at a time.

Fighting between Frelimo and Renamo, unemployment and a drastic shortage of food, were the main reasons for the mass exodus.

General Wandrag said that in terms of an agreement between South Africa and Mozambique, those refugees who were intercepted were handed back to Mozambique.

### Lioness

The refugees are so desperate to get into South Africa that they brave the wild animals in the Kruger Park and at least two Mozambicans have been killed in recent months.

Mr Kloppers said: "They are not put off by the threat of wild animals in the park. It is difficult to tell how many have been killed, because we only come across the bodies by chance.

"A few months ago we found the body of a man who had been killed and eaten, and more recently a young boy was attacked by a lioness. He was alive when my men found him, but died later in hospital.

"To protect themselves against the wild animals, the refugees build fires at night and this has caused several veld fires in the park."

Mr Kloppers described the situation as "extremely tragic" adding that there was little South Africa could do to change it.

"The local population is caught up in the hostilities between Frelimo and Renamo. Frelimo wants the people to move to central camps in urban areas, where they will have greater control over them. This will also ensure that the local population does not aid Renamo rebels," he said.

"Renamo in turn has told the people to stay where they are, promising to give them protection if they do.

"What has made the situation worse was that the crops harvested so far were not very good and there is not enough food for the people to eat, and there is none to buy — even if they do have money.

"It is not a pleasant situation — it is our duty, as well as that of the police and defence force in the area, to intercept them and hand them over to Frelimo at Lebombo.

"Frelimo does not have the infrastructure to return these

people to their homes and they must do so on foot, often for hundreds of kilometers. And ultimately they stream back into the Kruger Park.

"Once inside the Republic it is impossible to detect them as they are of the same tribes as those living on this side of the border and speak the same languages.

"The intensity of the stream of refugees has increased over the last few months — a period when we expected it to drop as there were harvests in Mozambique for the first time in years. But this didn't happen and they keep coming.

### Tragic

Mr Kloppers said that there was no indication that the stream of refugees — mainly women, children and elderly people — was being used by terrorists to get into South Africa.

"We question all of them closely and it appears that Mozambique is sticking to their undertaking of not allowing terrorists to operate against South Africa from their territory.

"I fear that there is no quick solution to this problem.

"It is all very tragic and all those people who are trying to force their policies on southern Africa should come and look for themselves what they are helping to create," Mr Kloppers said.

NAMIBIA

ON LACK OF MEDIA FREEDOM

Bonn AFRIKA POST in German Jun 85 p 21

[Article by Udo Froese: "Press Freedom in Namibia"]

[Text] Time and again, freedom of the press has been a topic of worldwide discussion, especially in countries where it is ignored and often even abused.

Pretoria Governs with a Harsh Hand

In 1920, following World War I, the League of Nations mandated Namibia, formerly German South-West Africa, to the trusteeship of what was then the Union of South Africa. Since 1920, the territory has been administered as a C-mandate, i.e., as an underdeveloped, hence third-class area. So far, Namibia has not yet gained independence and to this day, the Cape government continues to administer it with a correspondingly harsh hand. Pretoria wants to prevent at all costs that the South-West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) attain power in Windhoek. For that reason, it governs with strict laws, making it almost impossible to report on what is happening in the country, such as, for instance, on mining and transportation. Laws have prohibited the publication of an English weekly because of its critical, even hostile attitude toward the South African administration. Among other things, the paper was accused that its "irresponsible news reports" were jeopardizing the country's security. The WINDHOEK OBSERVER, as the newspaper is called, was permitted to reopen after its publisher paid about DM 80,000 and put the political editor Gwen Lister "into cold storage."

Lister had published a letter from Lt Gen Zietsmann, head of South Africa's secret police, to the postmaster general of Windhoek. The document had been sent to the address of the journalist by mistake. However, by her action, Gwen Lister had violated South Africa's postal and security law. Picked up by three high-ranking security officers, she disappeared in jail for a weekend, was then released, but had to report to the police on a regular basis. Legal proceedings initiated against her were lifted at the last moment by Dr Willie van Niekerk, South African administrator for Namibia.

Radio and television in Namibia continue to be looked upon as the mouthpiece of the South African government. Only television is transmitting local news

in Afrikaans three times a week. As for radio, its news department consists essentially of white South Africans. The current-events section of Radio Windhoek's news department is headed by Johan Steenkamp, who reportedly is also a major in the military security service of the South African armed forces in Namibia.

Five years ago, the country's approximately 15,000-20,000 German-speaking inhabitants received a German-language transmitter. Since its establishment, the program of 130 transmission-minutes a week has grown to 6,180 transmission-minutes per week. Thus, the German program of the Namibian radio probably has been the fastest growing program of that body, and without doubt, it also has been the most diversified and comprehensive one. In addition, it was the only one producing its own broadcasts since the purely Afrikaans-speaking news department apparently was in no position to do so. The broadcasts were free of any subjective influence by South-African thinking and mentality, according to Juergen Hecker, former chief of the German department. As a result, the listeners considered the news broadcasts of the German radio program to be neutral and objective and to present both sides; and that was true not only for the German-speaking audience.

For instance, when an interview with Windhoek lawyer Anton Lubowski, the first white member of SWAPO, was transmitted, the broadcast caused considerable difficulties for the department head and hence the entire German section. The stated reason was that SWAPO must receive no publicity whatsoever. But at the same time, the editorial department, which strictly follows Pretoria's line, had to transmit political commentaries.

It would have been desirable if the radio management had shared the view of the German section, but this was not the case. Quite the contrary, the preferred objective evidently was to "knock into shape" the German program, which at the time overshadowed the other programs, and above all to severely restrict its independence in news broadcasting.

#### Out Of 13 Editors, Seven Have Left

It was even rumored in the news department of Radio Windhoek that the identity of the German section was to be eliminated. The program director told the editors that objective items would be undesirable if they ran counter to the broadcasting policy. In the meantime, Werner Talkenberg, the senior official and, with 66 years, at retirement age, was promoted to become chief and Hecker's successor. Seven of the German section's 13 professionals drew the consequences and left.

The level of reporting today rests on contributions the ARD [Working Group of FRG Broadcasting Institutes] is making to various magazine broadcasts and they are considered to be the best of what can be heard in Namibian radio. The new chief, a former pilot of the German air-force, continues to play in his "Military Marches and Brassband Music" broadcast hits such as "Bombs Over England" and other Third-Reich music.

Udo Froese [the author of this article] used to be an editor in the German-language section of Radio Windhoek until the spring of 1985. Today he is working in Stuttgart.

7821

CSO: 3420/77

SIERRA LEONE

NEW CURRENCY GUIDELINES FOR TRAVELERS ISSUED

Monrovia NEW LIBERIAN in English 12 Aug 85 p 2

[Text] A policy statement on foreign exchange transactions at the Lungi International Airport in Sierra Leone, has been issued by the Sierra Leonean Government.

A Foreign Ministry release issued here Friday, quoted the statement as saying that all persons entering Sierra Leone must declare the amount of foreign currencies held in traveller's cheques, bank drafts and other negotiable instruments, on a form known as "Control Form."

The release further quoted the statement as saying that upon completion, the form must be certified and stamped by a Bank of Sierra Leone official at the point of [word missing]

The police statement also said all foreign non-resident nationals and non-resident Sierra Leoneans with the exception of children under 16 years of age as well as diplomats and students returning home were to exchange upon arrival in Sierra Leone, a minimum of \$US100 or its equivalent in other convertible currencies.

Non-resident visitors and tourists, the statement said, were legally required to meet their expenses in Sierra Leone by exchanges at local banks or at authorized hotels in the country, and that the exchanges must in each case be recorded, stamped and endorsed by the proper authority on their [phrase missing]

On departure, the policy statement continued, a foreign visitor is entitled to reconvert excess leones held, if satisfactory evidence on the total amount exchanged and expended is produced.

Statement of hotel bills by foreign non-resident guests, the release further quoted the statement as saying, must be made in foreign currency.

CSO: 3400/992

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**U.S. DISINVESTMENT MOVES EXAMINED**

Johannesburg **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN** in English Vol 9, No 1 1985 pp 28-48

[Article by Karl P. Magyar, associate professor of political science and philosophy at the University of Durban-Westville: [The American Disinvestment in South Africa Debate: Short-Term Morality vs Long-Term Economic Development"]

[Text]

**I The Issues**

Virtually all nations of the world have been applying some form of political and economic pressures on South Africa in order to bring about the elimination of apartheid — the politics of separation of races — and to replace it with a system based on the world-wide evolving perception of social equality, human dignity and pluralistic integration.

These are morally-inspired goals which emanate as much from the Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations as from the technology-facilitated international communications network which is presently in the infant stage of developing cross-cultural and global attitudes on fundamental questions concerning the relationship between the rulers and the ruled — traditionally the concern of strictly internal philosophical debate.

South Africa's officially-inspired defence demands that the principle of national sovereignty be respected, as the United Nations Charter also requires — Is apartheid the only offensive doctrine in a world replete with offences against human rights? Besides, South Africa maintains it is embarked upon the path of reform, albeit at its own pace and its self-determined direction.

Most of the world's nations (however many have dubious claims to expertise on matters of social justice) respond that if left to her own devices, fundamental positive reforms in South Africa will never be attained and that during the intervening time, the minority white elite will only entrench itself further to assure its survival and its continually-accelerating prosperity. Short of declaring and waging war on South Africa in order to right these wrongs, it is postulated that external pressures can and must be applied to the extent that South Africa will calculate continued intransigence to be so costly that it will exceed the benefits to be derived by maintaining this antiquated historical system.

**II The Tactics**

The arsenal of non-belligerent weapons is very extensive. Tony Koenderman in reviewing such economic, political and cultural sanctions includes: the UN arms embargo, the Arab oil embargo, investment bans,

trade restrictions, loans or investment capital restrictions, bans on sporting ties, visa restrictions, diplomatic isolation, transportation restrictions on flights or shipping, expulsion from international organizations, bans on the sale of strategic weapons and other strategic commodities, the enforcement of labour practice codes by MNCs (multi-national corporations) and a host of cultural boycotts.<sup>1</sup>

Of these multifarious tactics, which are the most effective is open to question, but undoubtedly the many forms of economic sanctions are the most visible and they can also be to some extent quantified and measured.<sup>2</sup>

While most of the non-OECD countries would not be significant investors in South Africa under any circumstances, their concern lies mostly in trade restrictions of which the oil embargo is the most effective. But the leading Western powers *are* investors, hence the continued debate concerning restrictions on such capital movements is of great consequence as South Africa's own internal financial resources remain limited.

South Africa's economy is indeed highly internationalized. And it is very vulnerable. Mining and agriculture together account for over 90 per cent of foreign sales. Gold alone earns half the foreign earnings.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, agriculture has been adversely affected recently by severe weather conditions, while gold earnings have not fared well in the last few years. South Africa ranks 15th among world trading nations. Imports and exports constitute over 53 per cent of the South African GDP and this figure has not changed significantly for twenty years.<sup>4</sup> Foreign investments exceed R30 billion. Major economic partners are the Western European nations, Japan and the United States — countries whose imposition of economic sanctions could hurt South Africa severely.

Technically speaking, disinvestment, divestment, boycotts and embargoes all have specific connotations but collectively, the international focus of such activities has popularly come to be known as "disinvestment".<sup>5</sup> To promote trade restrictions by a foreign government is to interfere with the market mechanism and hence in effect, a deliberate decision is made to cut into one's own profitability. This strategy has its limits, even with the most vocal proponents of trade restrictions: the Sub-Saharan African states, carrying on a quite active but mostly clandestine trading relationship.<sup>6</sup> But disinvestment can win official backing more easily overseas, as many governments are not enthusiastic about the export of their capital, which they see in effect as being the export of jobs.

Regardless of the technical subtlety of the terminology, proponents of such measures link economic sanctions to political change. Private individuals make no distinction between the various forms of punitive economic measures, while governments must calculate and moderate the effects of those tactics which will produce a negative result in matters concerning their own interests. Hence in Western democracies, the resort to extra-parliamentary tactics will always be a viable option for non-governmental bodies and especially by organized pressure groups. As they are motivated by fundamentally political objectives, scant attention is paid by such private groups to the calculation of the economic costs of disinvestment measures.

The assumption of disinvestors is that a large economy such as that of the United States will not be as adversely affected, as the relatively small size of South Africa's economy and the price to be paid in order to stamp out this

blatant affront to human dignity is but a small one, in view of perceived gains. The first can be to some extent assessed, but not the second. The effect of sanctions could be counterproductive, in that (one) the aggrieved section of the community may suffer more in consequence and, (two) what of other political systems, equally repulsive, but ignored by the international community? Both arguments offer plausible validity. But this could be an inadvertent call for no action. What is needed is a comprehensively formulated principle to universalize the invocation of sanctions. In the absence of such universal principles, South Africa may almost be excused for accusing the rest of the world of reverse discrimination.

Nevertheless, the world has advanced beyond the United Nations principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states although organized world-wide political consensus mechanisms to deal with perceived moral attitudes are in their infancy. Resorting to legal and historical defensive arguments will hardly suffice to ward off such pressures. The accusing countries base their arguments on moral foundations, derived mostly from their own social and religious ethics. In effect, these list apartheid, along with a number of other offences, in the realm of human rights, but the identification of apartheid as requiring more pressing attention than, for example, limb amputations in some Muslim countries, or incarcerations in mental hospitals in the Soviet Union, or using children as combatants in Iran, derives from a purely emotional base. Perhaps South Africa is singled out precisely because of its substantial European population and consequent embarrassment to the West. The plethora of other offences occurring routinely in other distant Third World and Asian lands are to be "expected", due to the assumed but unmentioned general lack of civilisation as understood in the terms of the Judaeo-Christian ethos.

Economic boycotts and other forms of restrictions will remain as tools of change short of war. South Africa is merely a precedent for such policies to be universalized in future. Short of retaliation via war, an aggrieved country will have but two options available as responses: one, by fending off economic pressure by a demonstration of invulnerability or two, by succumbing to such demands and responding with fundamental reforms. The mounting cost of defending the economy will at some point reach a ceiling and will be exacerbated by the additional cost of developing a garrison state to ward off escalating internal pressures. Succumbing to pressures for fundamental reform will require a more economically acceptable response but at a very high political cost.

### III *The Economic Stakes*

South Africa's economy, which has become the focus of those advocating punitive sanctions, has traditionally had a built-in shock absorber which moderated the effects of world-wide recession via a corresponding increase in gold prices. But in 1984, South Africa experienced a rapidly-declining exchange rate between the Rand as against the US Dollar and European currencies, coupled with a steady drop in the price of gold, rising inflation and unemployment, and a host of other corresponding negative economic developments. For once, South Africa's vulnerability to external economic pressures was convincingly demonstrated.

Over half of South Africa's GDP derives from import and export activities. The country relies on a very narrow range of exports, mainly

primary products, while importing a very wide range of capital and consumer goods.<sup>7</sup> As of 1982, Germany, the US, UK, and Japan together provided 72 per cent of South Africa's imports while taking 56 per cent of her exports.<sup>8</sup> With reference to potential trade sanctions, a recently published account sympathetic to South Africa estimates that "an effective embargo would rapidly reduce the capacity of the economy to expand", and "after a time-lag, even the maintenance of the current level of output could become impossible".<sup>9</sup>

While the focus of those advocating sanctions against South Africa is on disinvestment, the effects of such measures have sometimes been overestimated by proponents. Little attention has been paid to the actual importance of foreign capital inflow into South Africa, the effects of substantial disinvestment on the South African economy and on the Black sector, and from the foreign shareholders' point of view the unfavourable economic costs of the sale of these portfolios to South African investors, who would almost certainly be able to acquire them at a fraction of the true asset values.

Direct and indirect foreign investments in South Africa doubled between 1975 and 1981 to R32 490 million. The growth of these investments has been slower than that of the GDP. And in 1983, over R1 300 million was disinvested—although not necessarily because of political reasons.<sup>10</sup> Jill Nattrass notes that only about 17 per cent of investment came from abroad during the 1966–75 period.<sup>11</sup> Of this figure, 55 per cent came from the EEC countries, 13 per cent from other Europeans, 23 per cent from North and South America, and 4 per cent from Asia. Altogether, Europeans—led by the United Kingdom—hold over two-thirds of all foreign investment in South Africa. Besides capital, foreign investment also encourages technological advances and helps to stabilize the balance of payments, both valuable concomitant benefits.<sup>12</sup> The impact of disinvestment would be felt, on the one hand, in terms of reduced growth rates and living standards but, on the other hand, would also stimulate domestic investment, production and technology—as the economic boycotts of Biafra and Rhodesia demonstrated.

Although the United States is neither the most important trading partner nor the major investor in South Africa, America's official response to private disinvestment pressures is most closely monitored by South Africa as a harbinger of trends that could soon spill over into her relations with Europe. Sweden has taken the most radical steps by prohibiting any new investments in South Africa but the miniscule commercial involvement by Sweden all but obscures the impact in South Africa.<sup>13</sup>

The most evident observation concerning South Africa's relations with the United States is the fact that within the context of America's overall economy, the commercial relationship with South Africa is very limited. South Africa's entire GNP is less than two per cent of that of the United States. America's direct foreign investment in South Africa hovers around 3 billion dollars, which is close to 20 per cent of foreign investment in South Africa. This figure constitutes about one per cent of US investment abroad. The United Kingdom by contrast provides close to half of the total foreign investment in South Africa and this represents 10 per cent of United Kingdom investment overseas. About 20 per cent of South Africa's imports

come from the United States, which in turn absorbs 14 per cent of South Africa's exports. For the United States, this represents about one per cent of its world-wide trade.

America's investment in South Africa has been increasing by about 100 million dollars annually but most of it actually comes from reinvested profits of established firms in South Africa. Returns on investment have been considerably above average, with South Africa being ranked very favourably in terms of investment risk. Four companies alone account for over half of American investment in South Africa.<sup>14</sup> About 350 American companies operate in South Africa and they employ some 150 000 workers, about one per cent of the work force.

American critics of investment in South Africa, however, point out that US investment in South Africa has increased five-fold from 1966 to 1981.<sup>15</sup> Within the first year and a half of the Reagan Administration, it was also noted that US direct investment increased 31 per cent and that US bank loans increased 246 per cent.<sup>16</sup> Others maintain that the true figures of US direct and indirect (mostly loans) investment in South Africa are perhaps distorted, with the total sum being considerably larger than the generally accepted figure.<sup>17</sup> Another contrasting estimate, attributed unofficially to the US Consulate in Johannesburg, reported that US assets in South Africa totalled R26 500 million.<sup>18</sup> These latter data have not yet been sufficiently clarified but the assumption is made that, whatever the ultimate figure, they would not substantially alter the direction of the investment controversy.

Another aspect of the investment analysis must be referred to, although no attempt will be made to portray a definitive assessment of the validity of the arguments presented by the proponents. Briefly, it is conceded by many that America's commercial relationship with South Africa may not add up sufficiently to be of substantial consequence to the US economy overall. However, it is argued, America's imports from South Africa represent very vital minerals required for strategic purposes. The data here are well known. South Africa has well over half of the non-communist world's reserves of vanadium, platinum, chrome, manganese and gold and has over half of the world's total reserves of the last three mentioned minerals.<sup>19</sup> These data were highlighted in the now famous "Santini Report" of the US House of Representatives. Congressman Santini, Chairman of the Sub-committee on Mines and Mining, reported that the United States is dependent on foreign sources to an amount in excess of 50 per cent for 24 of the 32 minerals needed for security and the maintenance of the US economy. Noting South Africa's only effective alternative supplier being the Soviet Union, he concluded, "America thus has a vital interest in the survival of South Africa as a Western ally".<sup>20</sup>

This argument does introduce an important dimension into the sanctions debate, in that it diminishes in effect the size of the commercial ties but focuses instead on the quality of those ties. The anti-sanction forces seized upon this information with glee, while those favouring disinvestment immediately set about to negate the importance of these minerals by pointing to the possibility of alternative sources, substitution, recycling and stockpiling, they also noted that South Africa's reliance on minerals exports would ensure their continued availability, no matter which regime was in power.

Much commitment—as well as money—has gone into the formulation of the arguments of the pro- and the anti-investor groups. Except for the strategic dimension of the need to maintain ready access to certain minerals, one could easily argue for the simple abandonment of commercial ties with South Africa, in view of the relatively small size of the total amount involved and the substantial boost which human rights would receive. At issue is the inescapable requirement to weigh moral against economic and security interests and this debate will not be resolved easily.

#### *IV Arguments in Favour of Disinvestment*

Those advocating disinvestment, a term which is taken to represent a wide variety of economic sanctions, are divided into two broad groups: first, private individuals and interest groups and secondly, public bodies and officials. No attempt will be made to present a comprehensive list of participants or of their history of active involvement in these campaigns. Their efforts have seen a very large number of participants but no single leadership has emerged to serve as a centralized co-ordinating body. Liberal whites are involved at the church and university levels and as mostly, but not exclusively, Democratic Party members of the US House of Representatives and the Senate and at all lesser levels of government. American Blacks have been playing an increasingly important role via various organizations and in their political capacities at the municipal level—which includes several of the largest cities—and in the House of Representatives in which they are represented by about 20 Congressmen.

Both private and public groups utilize a variety of tactics to maximise their impact. Initially, various White-led groups formed study committees (comprising mainly political and religious activists in the human rights and black advancement sectors of US domestic politics) and sought to bring pressure upon America's corporations and banks to decrease or to sever altogether their ties with South Africa. Success was minimal, with Polaroid Corporation having become the most significant company to opt out altogether. Then, organizational efforts focused on applying pressure at all governmental levels—in the true tradition of democratic politics. This latter phase has accounted for more visible success in terms of publicity, attitudinal changes, and legal requirements to impose official sanctions on South Africa. A striking example is the case of the Massachusetts legislature which in 1982 enacted the nation's most comprehensive disinvestment programme. Michael Maren noted that "Mass Divest" joined in a national coalition entitled "Campaign Against Investment in South Africa". Affiliated bodies included the American Committee on Africa, the American Friends Service Committee (Quaker), Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the United Methodist Church office for the UN, the Washington Office on Africa, and TransAfrica.<sup>21</sup>

The latter group, TransAfrica, has emerged since its founding in 1977, as the chief Black lobby group in the US concerned exclusively with foreign affairs. And of this concern, South Africa receives the lion's share of attention. The group pursues support from a number of sectors of the black community but has had notable success in attracting well-known black entertainment and sport stars. Realizing that the Reagan Administration and

the Republican-controlled Senate will resist forceful measures aimed at South Africa, TransAfrica embarked upon a risky but apparently successful effort at the end of 1984 to engage in daily protests at the South African Embassy in Washington. The immediate goal was publicity for significant legislative changes which, however, must face Reagan's veto powers. That President Reagan's Africa policy was vulnerable was quickly demonstrated when, after a first round of demonstrations, he somewhat uncharacteristically said in a speech on South Africa: "Quiet diplomacy is not enough. We feel a moral responsibility to speak out on this matter".<sup>22</sup>

The House of Representatives, controlled by the Democrats, has been pushing actively for sanctions against South Africa. The tactic, although to date unsuccessful in terms of passage into law, concerns the Solarz Amendment of banning the sale in the US of Krugerrands and US loans to the South African Government and requiring that all US companies operating in South Africa adhere to the Sullivan principles. The Gray amendment (long sessional hearings in 1981 and 1982) would have banned all new investments in South Africa. The Berman amendment would ensure controls on sales to the military and to the police, and the Wolpe amendment sought to control the export of nuclear technology and items to South Africa.<sup>23</sup> However, even if passage of these measures could have been secured through the House and the Senate in 1984, President Reagan would have been expected to veto the bills. But he would prefer not to face being identified so prominently on the side of South Africa. Reagan escaped having to resort to his veto powers in 1984 by the narrow voting margin of a single liberal Republican Senator.<sup>24</sup> Indications are that 1985 will only increase such pressures. During the first few days of 1985, Senator Kennedy made a highly publicized tour to South Africa in which he publicly distanced himself from the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" in South Africa. He may be setting the stage for 1988 and his potential Presidential candidacy in that year.

The neo-conservative mood in the Senate and in the White House at the national level is, however, not matched in the House of Representatives to the same extent or at the state and municipal levels. One recent study of state legislative responses clearly demonstrates the multifarious efforts to introduce anti-South African proposals. Although the resolutions and bills are impressive in their frequency and scope, very few have been passed to date.

The most prominent and active states in this regard are Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Michigan. Measures include the withdrawal of state pension fund investments in companies doing business in South Africa which do not adhere to the Sullivan Code; simple divestment of funds which are invested in corporations and in banks doing business with South Africa, and the prohibition of state-supported university endowment funds being invested in any companies with operations in South Africa. Most other states also introduced various restrictive measures but they were not passed into law for various reasons. These efforts concerned mostly the divestment of certain state funds from corporations or banks operating in South Africa.<sup>25</sup> But, the fact that states have undertaken direct measures which impinge on foreign relations, is held by some analysts to be unconstitutional. The SA Foundation's John Chettle argues that the "... Commerce Clause of the US

Constitution entrusts that body with the power to 'regulate commerce with foreign nations' ".<sup>26</sup>

Activities at the municipal level are just as intense. This is especially because of the fact that many of America's largest cities are run by black mayors and city councils, or, as in the case of New York City, Blacks and liberal Whites combine to utilize their public economic power to pressure those companies and banks against doing business with South Africa. As of mid-1984, 20 cities had passed various ordinances in this regard. New York's Employees' Pension Fund alone is larger than the GNP of many middle-ranked countries, and equals about half of South Africa's entire GNP. As the funds are invested in corporate securities, this places that city's administration in a very powerful bargaining position indeed.<sup>27</sup> Other prominent cities which have enacted restrictive measures include Washington DC, Dallas, St Paul, Minneapolis, Seattle, Philadelphia, Boston, Newark, Berkeley, Hartford, Davis, and many more. As in the case of the state governments, the authority of these sub-national bodies to involve themselves in foreign affairs directly is expected to be challenged on constitutional grounds. Also, should these various public funds be invested in anything but the most profitable portfolios, the public, as beneficiaries of these funds, may begin to question why their consent in such decisions has not been solicited.

Analyzing at least the public media controversy concerning these disinvestment-related activities, one is struck on the one hand by the extensive action being contemplated or generated in the attempt to restrict mostly economic relations with South Africa, and on the other hand, how sparse the debate is in terms of a comprehensive elucidation of the goals, appropriate methods, and the consequences of the means employed. Economic sanctions precedents are few and scarcely serve as models for studying the potential effects on South Africa. It is merely assumed that somehow such direct punitive action will pressure the South African Government to relent on its apartheid policies and to yield equality and political power to the Blacks—much in the historical mould of the US civil rights campaign during the 1950s and 1960s.

Where the anti-South African groups present specific demands, such as for the release of currently-incarcerated labour leaders and Mandela, the South African Government hypothesizes that succumbing to such external pressures would only lead to a host of new and greater demands. By acceptance of one or only a few specific demands which, if met, would promise South Africa ensuing peace, the anti-South African activists should realize that South Africa would demonstrate her vulnerability to escalating demands for change which could in the end devour the very structure of the existing order.

Yielding equal political rights is not only a question of morality and a constitutional debate on equality, as it was in the American civil rights campaign. In South Africa, it means that the ruling minority White elite would yield the authority to determine their own economic and social welfare. Where overseas critics see the problem primarily in terms of race, for White South Africans the problem only starts with race but ends with their perceived potential elimination as a presently-constituted society. Race is the ultimate criterion for determining the defence of the existing order or the

change of authority. But race implies much more than simply a question of ethnic origins, language or colour as is the case in the United States, where classic racism prevailed until at least the legal dimension was rectified to ensure *de jure* equality. In this regard, South Africa has failed to demonstrate the non-racial basis of the existing dilemma, hence her defence against primarily morally-based charges will never be refuted by reason alone. By the same token, no justification of the present system will ever be accepted overseas, as it amounts to either the perpetuation of a racially-based social system, or the maintenance of restricted social and economic elite classes. Both of these characteristics are simply outdated, when judged by evolving international ideological norms.

The disinvestors then do not see why a comprehensive articulation of their rationale is required, as theirs is fundamentally a moral concern which will never allow for any compromise—such as greater devolution to local authority, limited unionization, the new tri-chamber constitution, elimination of the Mixed-Marriages Act, or even the release of Mandela. Ultimately, the issue is political voting equality which will simply never be yielded voluntarily by the Whites, not because of any racist notions of Blacks being inferior, but because of the perceived fundamental disruption of their attained social welfare level. Could this welfare hypothetically be ensured, yielding political control to the majority would be more easily facilitated. The disinvestors, however, do not articulate plausible scenarios or models of a system which could ensure such reasonable expectations of all sectors of society. Here, foreign governments are just as guilty, as they too fail to respect the non-racial dimension of the South African question or to make specific demands, beyond the usual nebulous requirement for “change” which in its simplest presentation, ultimately is reduced to “one-man, one-vote”. Few foreign public officials have elaborated on their countries’ potential response to such eventualities. Few also admit that under such circumstances, there would be both increased and also spontaneous disinvestment far exceeding all that the present frenetic attempts have generated.

#### V *In Defence of Investment*

The striking feature about the pro-investor position is the fact that there are many prominent individuals and groups in South Africa and in the United States who are very much in favour of continued or even increased investment—albeit for different reasons. However, their failure to mount a substantial public awareness effort on behalf of investment is just as striking. At the heart of this failure are the radically opposed reasons for supporting such investment. On the right, arguments have the effect of favouring the retention of the existing political system because of the resulting economic stability. Yet among moderates, the argument is offered that continued investments will fuel the fabled black middle-class aspirations, which will lead to fundamental change in the system. These two divergent arguments hardly encourage a united effort, which in turn facilitates the predominance of the arguments in favour of disinvestment.

The wide range of pro-investors include the US Reagan Administration and of course the South African Government—including the opposition Progressive Federal Party; the Indian and Coloured parties represented in the new Tri-chamber Parliament; all homeland leaders; many South African

black business organizations; most major American businesses; the US Chamber of commerce; prominent American politicians, academics and even some US black leaders; many prominent South African Blacks; and three-fourths of South Africa's black population according to one recent survey.<sup>27</sup>

The most prominent arguments in favour of investment maintain that disinvestment will hurt primarily those it is intended to benefit: the Blacks. Other arguments maintain that the South African economy will survive disinvestment and indeed, may be stimulated by it; American-owned shares will quickly be bought up at bargain prices by South Africans or by Europeans; that it is a two-way street and hence it will also hurt Americans (an effective argument especially in the case of pension schemes which seek to divest from any company doing business with South Africa); that it is illegal for anyone other than the national government to regulate foreign commerce;<sup>28</sup> that rapid economic growth will do more to engender positive or "desirable" political changes than would a revolution; and that American companies in South Africa provide a very positive image for the Black worker. Finally, others take into account the actual figures involved and conclude, as did Helen Kitchen and Michael Clough: "... in the absence of parallel moves by Japan and Western European states, ... US disinvestment would precipitate no fundamental changes in the South African economy or political power structure".<sup>29</sup> This is echoed by James Barber who observes that sanctions "... are inherently unworkable: the economic interdependence between South Africa and the West, coupled with the great uncertainty about their effects on all concerned, renders such a policy inappropriate".<sup>30</sup>

Within South Africa, many prominent Blacks have argued on behalf of investment. Individuals include Lucy Mvubelo of the National Union of Clothing Workers,<sup>31</sup> Nthato Motlana,<sup>32</sup> Percy Qoboza,<sup>33</sup> Sam Motsuenyane and the National African Chambers of Commerce, and Chief Buthelezi who has been quite emphatic on this issue: "Whatever is said about investment in overseas lobbies should be tested against what the people in South Africa themselves say".<sup>35</sup> The Chief also clashed on this issue with Ted Kennedy during the Senator's trip through South Africa in January 1985: "No one has proved to us that the suffering which will ensue within the black community as a result of disinvestment will actually force the regime to effect the fundamental changes which all of us are clamouring for".<sup>36</sup>

These and other Black leaders suffer a perplexing problem which they have not been able to surmount. Their credibility to speak on behalf of the Black masses is questioned because they operate openly in institutions tolerated or formed by the Government, hence giving them the appearance of being "collaborators". Most foreigners have only a guarded respect for such prominent Blacks or reject them outright. Yet domestically these leaders have attained a greater degree of legitimacy than is perceived overseas. Certainly few question Chief Buthelezi's political acceptance by a substantial portion of the Zulu population — the largest Black tribal grouping in South Africa.

Another problem the pro-investors encountered is the lack of a quantified base for determining the support each side receives. To fill this void, a study was commissioned by the US Department of State and conducted by Professor Lawrence Schlemmer of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences of

the University of Natal.<sup>37</sup> The study went beyond the question of attitudes towards foreign investments in South Africa and it surveyed only the black employees in the major industrial centres in which multi-national investment is concentrated. The results of the survey produced sufficient data and offered little reason for challenging the conclusions. About 75 per cent of those workers surveyed support foreign investment in South Africa; 60 per cent support capitalism as a preferred economic structure for Black-ruled countries; South African employers specifically are seen in a negative light; American-owned companies generate a very favourable impression at the public image level (although slightly less so by workers at these concerns); and workers prefer to separate political issues from the industrial sphere.

In the political realm, the survey did not uncover equally encouraging evidence. The workers express support for more activist policies such as armed confrontation. This is the case especially among the better educated Blacks and residents of Soweto and Pretoria. Workers at US-owned companies and Inkatha supporters in Natal are significant exceptions to this. Can this seeming contradiction of greater political militancy with support for foreign investment be squared? In a previous analysis of Schlemmer's survey, I concluded:

... South Africans would be mistaken if they were to conclude that the preference for investment and for moral radical political measures are contradictory sentiments. . .

... Pretoria should take a cue and realize that the only true base for a final settlement with the majority of the population rests not on constitutions, laws, concessions, or even on elite consensus . . .

... Rather, this survey corroborates the view that Whites (and their Coloured and Indian allies) have little in common with Blacks . . . except, mutual reliance on predominantly economic issues.<sup>38</sup>

While this long-awaited study was enthusiastically received by the media and official bodies, its immediate impact is hardly discernible. The American disinvestment movement either shrugs off the study or it simply takes the view that proper political analysis and tactical change is not being perceived sufficiently by the workers and that this must remain the prerogative of the "politically-conscious" elite—domestic or foreign. The immediate intellectual progenitor of this line of thinking is neo-Marxism with its mandatory requirement of a "vanguard of the revolution". This should not be seen to imply that critics of continued investment are revolutionaries. Most are morally-motivated and are no doubt genuinely convinced that their disinvestment tactics are an efficient and peaceful means for attaining total human justice for all people in South Africa. But in view of such survey data and calls for investment by Black leaders who have attained a degree of legitimacy among the Black community, the responsibility for rejecting such evidence rests on the shoulders of those advocating disinvestment. The Schlemmer survey, however valid, remains without consequence unless the US Government undertakes a deliberate effort to validate such pro-investment arguments by incorporating them in the policy-making process. While the White House finds this compatible with its established policy, the House of Representatives has rejected such evidence and the Senate has managed to avert punitive action by only the narrowest of margins.

## VI *The Sullivan Principles as Compromise*

Between the two diametrically-opposed positions of pro- and anti-investors lies an argument which has been given life in the form of the "Sullivan Principles". Seized upon by many pro-investors as at least a viable—and costly—alternative to simple disinvestment, the principles have also been incorporated in the proposals for policy-changes towards South Africa at the official level. Private anti-investor groups however, place less credence on this attempt at compromise because of its basic call for voluntary adherence and its potential as only window dressing, while the more radical arguments see it as only another method of perpetuating the fundamental base of racism and capitalism.

Richard E. Bissell points out that the influence and antecedents to this code came from the British, the European Economic Community and from the South African private sector itself—in the form of the work of the Urban Foundation.<sup>39</sup> In essence, the Sullivan Code suggested that for American companies to continue operations in South Africa, they should introduce and adhere to certain principles aimed at non-racial labour practices. These principles include the racial integration of all facilities, equal pay and employment practices, supervisory and managerial training for Blacks, increased promotion of Blacks to supervisory and managerial positions, and the pursuit of active policies to improve the workers' lives. In 1978, these principles were detailed and expanded and provisions were introduced to monitor the progress of implementing these principles by the signatories.

As a code to be adhered to voluntarily, the inevitable happened. Not all American companies in South Africa joined; of those which did, not all complied with the increasingly demanding provisions; monitoring became more difficult; and there were no provisions for enforcement.<sup>40</sup> After six years of this well-publicized code, less than half of the 350 American companies in South Africa had signed and even among the signatories, there was neither complete nor enthusiastic compliance.<sup>41</sup> The Reverend Sullivan himself perceived that the code was having a positive effect, by demonstrating that US companies could operate in South Africa profitably without furthering the interests of apartheid. But by 1984, Sullivan lobbied Congress in order to make adherence to the principles mandatory by US law—a position opposed by the Reagan Administration.<sup>42</sup> Estimates are that American firms have spent up to R200 million on various projects to improve their Sullivan ratings to date.<sup>43</sup>

American companies in South Africa are of course sceptical. They employ less than one per cent of South Africa's labour force but they are expected to serve as the catalyst for reversing the apartheid system. Several critics have pointed out that the actual effect of their being forced out of South Africa would have only a limited impact on the country. South Africa's defensive weapons against such economic sanctions would allow for the survival of the economy although the pressure and pain would be felt. Sanctions hurt economic growth, which is required for the urgent creation of jobs.<sup>44</sup> But excessive pressure on American companies to pay for the cost of complying with the Sullivan principles could exacerbate the entire process if the cost, of what to them is essentially an expensive public relations function, exceeds the margin of profit they initially calculated when they established themselves in South Africa in the first place.

At the heart of the problem is the question of interference with the free enterprise system. A company's moral and humane attitudes towards its

workers must nevertheless be judged against its expected rate of profitability and its competitiveness against others. For the shareholder, the goal concerns economic objectives, but for the disinvestor, the objective concerns morals. While they are not necessarily incompatible, the cost must be calculated and it has its limits.<sup>45</sup> From the perspective of a worker who may lose his job due to the closure of an American-owned company in South Africa, it matters little if that company closed because of the cost of complying with the Sullivan code, disinvestment pressure, or the loss of profitability. These companies, however sympathetic they may be towards the plight of the victims of apartheid, would prefer that politics be sorted out in a political forum rather than to engage the private sector in a dubious process of social change which amounts to a possibly inefficient re-allocation of diminishing profits for public relations purposes. An example is the recommended provision of low-cost housing (purchase or rental) to workers, supplied by the employer. The cost of providing this will hardly be justified if the profitability of the entire enterprise is threatened. Any additional costs will have to be calculated against the competition's position. To expand on an old economic maxim: "there's no such thing as a free lunch" — anymore than there is free housing. Indeed, a motor manufacturer who gets into the housing business, is not allocating his established economic advantage efficiently — a cardinal sin to adherents of the free market system.

These American adherents to such restrictive codes are forced into a position of serving political objectives, which no more guarantee long-range prospects of continued profitability than they guarantee immunity from total loss in the eventuality of a breakdown of the peaceful social order or the assumption of power by a radical regime. Any new adherents to the Sullivan principles or any American company wishing to establish in South Africa will be confronted with the need to calculate risk under increasingly uncertain conditions. From a political point of view, the utilization of restrictive investment codes may be expedient because of their appearance of compromise — the essence of democratic political bargaining. But such compromise in the world of economic competition — the essence of the free enterprise system which has built the West — is not possible. What matters there is the bottom line. Corporate shareholders will hardly tolerate losses due to political or moral reasons.

## VII *Disinvestment: The Analytic Context*

In a broader perspective, the two major adversaries in the disinvestment debate are not addressing themselves to each other's implicit assumptions. The disinvestors focus on racism, morality and the short-term situation, which requires immediate rectification — with virtually any political price being acceptable. Those advocating continued investment are split among two broad lines of thinking: those who seek fundamental political changes but not at the expense of undermining the established economic structure, and those White elitists who see continued investment as a method to buttress their political domination with a strong economy which can dispense rewards in terms of jobs and material welfare. It is the latter group which does not see the debate as fundamentally a question of morality or racism, but one of power. The progressive elimination of apartheid measures, to them, will not stop until Blacks attain full and equal voting rights and this would reverse the power equation. Merely to lessen the inhuman dimension of apartheid will never suffice and indeed, such efforts will only produce demands for

quicker and further changes. Both groups of pro-investors place long-term economic development above the question of short-term morality. Given these divergent perceptions and assumptions in the debate, it is hardly to be expected that the debate will be resolved easily — or at all, at the intellectual level.<sup>46</sup>

The debate has also been dangerously over-simplified. As in most long-standing political confrontations, sides are taken along diametrically opposite and fundamentally irreconcilable lines. The issues, despite their immense complexity and the plausibility of both sides' arguments, get reduced to essentially "yes/no" propositions. This creates some rather unlikely alliances which rarely survive the resolution of the central conflict. For example, should the disinvestors succeed in their objective of eliminating every vestige of apartheid, the inheritors of power could quite possibly be of a sufficiently militant and authoritarian disposition to dominate the entire southern African region in a way many present-day disinvestors would hardly find attractive. Preferably, the disinvestment issue should be viewed in its full complexity and the resolution of the conflict, which in essence concerns the distribution of political power in South Africa, should not have to rely on the tool of disinvestment as the primary means available to engender change. Such punitive measures reflect the failure of political persuasions and such grossly-oversimplified political tactics may easily introduce as much long-range harm as is already experienced in the present system.

In calling for a reassessment of the entire South African situation, a broader geographic dimension needs to be introduced, in addition to a broader political context. South Africa's domination of the southern Africa region is an established fact and will remain the case into the future. Hence, any reshaping of the power structure occurring in South Africa will affect her neighbours from Namibia, through Zimbabwe and Malawi to Mozambique, including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Yet an alternative political structure could be introduced into South Africa which would facilitate economic confederal integration centering on the established economic core of South Africa. The destruction of this core will simply preclude any such development. Such a system would expand and build on the Whites' continued management of that economic core with the progressive introduction of trained and competent Blacks from the entire southern African region into the ranks of economic management. Nor would the Whites necessarily continue political domination over Blacks or Blacks over Whites.

The essential problem derives from the fact that in South Africa, there exists a somewhat unique historical situation in that a substantial number of people from the First and the Third Worlds occupy the same geographic space. Yielding power to the majority, who are economically members of the Third World, is a plausible solution based on traditional patterns of democratic thought, notions of majority government, and concepts of human rights which prevail in the First World. However, if it is accepted that a simple power shift from the First to the Third World may needlessly harm one or both of these societies, then another strategy ought to be introduced. One alternative is the physical division of the country into two but more likely is the concept of several units and the introduction of appropriate governmental institutions to tie the newly-created units together federally or confederally, along largely coincident lines of economic interest, as is the case in the European Economic Community. Such a fundamental political change

within South Africa would recognize the political and economic requirements of all communities, while at the same time ensuring that at least confederal association could become an attractive proposition to neighbouring countries in southern Africa. The entire region could in this way be stabilized politically, the established economic core could be expanded to serve a greater southern Africa community, and foreign investments could quickly flow into the entire area in unprecedented volume. This is of course a matter which goes considerably beyond only the parochial and short-term debate on disinvestment, but it is a dimension that has neither been debated nor calculated.<sup>47</sup> And, it would be a positive solution to a problem that has been approached to date with a generally negative philosophy.

Any official US Government backing of sanctions against South Africa has a built-in self-defeating mechanism. Measures which succeed in reversing the power position of Whites and Blacks in South Africa as the result of economic pressure will probably result in a devastated economy and the prospect of a bitter and protracted struggle for power which will only exacerbate the economic disruption. Should this lead to a radicalization of the entire southern Africa region, America's original concerns will hardly have been advanced. Neither the means nor the end would serve American interests — nor those of the Black and White populations of Southern Africa, if the objective is universal economic development in a mostly free enterprise environment.

While disinvestors in the US resort to perfectly legitimate tactics in furthering their own political programmes, the response by the American Government has been inadequate in one important respect: beyond only voicing the desire to lessen the odious nature of apartheid and to end racial discrimination in South Africa, no specific proposals, requirements, timetables and long-range objectives have been offered. This, of course, is understandable as it is commensurate with traditional diplomatic practices of avoiding interference in internal affairs. Yet, any official US Government sanctioning of disinvestment moves would have the effect of interfering in internal affairs — which is enthusiastically demanded by disinvestors, public or private.

Interference in South African affairs being unavoidable, a policy of making specific demands within a workable timeframe, based on positive measures relevant to the economic and political stabilization of the entire southern Africa region, should be contemplated. Such proposals, if accepted, could reshape the seemingly paradoxical relationship developing between the US and South Africa, with liberal tactics being employed to further conservative ends. If it can be demonstrated that the economic and social interest of Whites (as well as of Indian and Coloureds) can be guaranteed by engineering a fundamentally new political order in South Africa, which allows Blacks to gain their fair share of geographic resources, a new diplomatic offensive would be facilitated. And no country in the world has the economic and managerial capability to extend partnership in such an enterprise as does the United States. But repeated diplomatic platitudes of the desire for a just society, without specific and detailed plans, will be matched by lack of fundamental changes in South Africa of sufficient calibre to meet the challenges of the future. America ought to extend to South Africa her full arsenal of intellectual resources to arrive at an agenda of actions which will serve the interests of all of South Africa's communities, as well as the interests of southern Africa and those of the United States and Europe.

Finally, a call for urgency must be stressed. The foreign disinvestor and the American Government, as well as the South African Government and its radical and even moderate opposition, all focus predominantly on the requirement for change. The disinvestors have introduced the economic factor as a means of leverage to the attainment of their political objective. This too may reflect a dangerous misperception by all concerned in the dispute.

Instituting evolutionary political change or adjusting to the effects of revolutionary change is a protracted process. Yet both sides may in the end be defeated by economic realities. Even without further disinvestment, the economy of South Africa already shows such a degree of weakness that it is conceivable an economic collapse of the country could precede any attempt at revolutionary overthrow or any other moderate constitutional reformulation. The origins of this recent weakening of the economy are debatable but the increasing cost of maintaining the apartheid structure should not be discounted as perhaps the most important contributor. Influx control, separate amenities, resettlement, homeland administration, governmental overbureaucratization, three parliamentary bodies and attendant offices—amongst the latter being one for a racial group which constitutes only 2,8 per cent of the population—industrial decentralization, disproportionate military and police costs, etc—all these command a price which may account for the economic malaise which became evident in 1984.

South Africa is also very reliant on foreign economic ties in the form of trade, technology, labour influx, gold sales, and investments. In this regard, the proper question is perhaps not what will be the effects of disinvestment on South Africa's economy but what damage has already been done by the investments which have shied away from South Africa in the last twenty years. 350 American companies employing one per cent of the labour force is hardly the maximum carrying capacity of South Africa's economic potential to absorb such investments. In an ideal solution reflecting everyone's political satisfaction, the potential for economic reconstruction, growth, stabilization, regional integration, and foreign investment from the OECD, could be so encouraging as to suggest that a serious calculation of this greater geographic and political perspective of the South African problem should be undertaken. Treating the problem in only its Black/White dimension will remain an insufficient response and will only facilitate the extension of Africa's economic plight besetting the rest of this continent, to the entire southern African region.

#### Notes

1. "Sanctions: Real threat or myth?" *Leadership SA*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1983.
2. Arnt Spandau has subjected the policy of apartheid to scrutiny in order to determine its cost in economic terms. A fifty per cent effective boycott (as of 1976) would result in a 13 per cent decline in personal income and a tripling of unemployment in South Africa. *Economic Boycott Against South Africa*, Kensyn, SA, Juta and Company, Ltd., 1979.
3. *Sunday Tribune* (Durban), 19 August 1984.
4. Theo Malan, "South African and economic sanctions". *Africa Insight*, vol. 11, no. 1, 1981. This figure is expanded in the estimate by J. de L. Sorour who notes that between 60 and 70 per cent of South Africa's gross national product stems from trade and investment. "Director General's Report", *South Africa Foundation News*, April 1984.
5. See Rolf Hasse, "Boycotts and Embargoes as a Tool of Politics". *South Africa Forum*, Position Paper, vol. 7, no. 4, 1984.

6. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs D.J. Louis Nel revealed that all but four African nations trade with South Africa with the four exceptions being insignificant. *SA Digest*, 31 August 1984.
7. Four commodities, gold, diamonds, coal and platinum comprise nearly 70 per cent of South Africa's exports. "The Rex Column" *Sunday Times*, 12 June 1983.
8. Adapted from data originated by Commissioner of Customs and Excise. Institute of Race Relations, *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1983*, Johannesburg, 1984, p. 116.
9. James Barber, Desmond Blumenfeld and Christopher R. Hill, *The West and South Africa*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 53.
10. *Survey of Race Relations*, op. cit., pp. 108-115.
11. *The South African Economy*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 85.
12. James Barber, et. al., op. cit., pp. 57-59.
13. Robert M. Godsell, "Investing in Apartheid or Investing in Reforms", *Indicator, South Africa: Industrial Monitor*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1983.
14. See the balanced presentation in *South Africa: Time Running Out, The Report of a Study Commission on US Policy Toward South Africa*, Foreign Policy Study Foundation, Inc. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, pp. 133-146.
15. Quoted by David Hauck of the Washington-based Investor Responsibility Research Center, in *The Star* (Johannesburg), 17 August 1983.
16. Elizabeth Schmidt, " 'Marching to Pretoria': Reagan's South Africa Policy on the Move". *TransAfrica Forum*, vol. 2, no. 2, 1983.
17. Reported in *The Star*, 25 August 1983.
18. Barry Streek, "The Disinvestment Campaign", *Natal Mercury*, 21 November 1984.
19. See the discussion of this by Richard E. Bissell, *South Africa and the United States*, New York: Praeger, 1982, chapter 4.
20. "Sub-Sahara Africa: Its Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World". US House of Representatives, 96th Congress, second session, Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, July 1980.
21. "Building a Constituency Against Apartheid: *Africa Report* (US) May-June 1984.
22. *Natal Mercury*, 13 December 1984.
23. *Sunday Times*, 13 November 1983.
24. *The Star* (Johannesburg), 2 January 1985.
25. States Information Center, The Council of State Governments, *CSG Backgrounder*, Lexington, Kentucky, June 1984.
26. Reported in "USA. A Survey", supplement to *Financial Mail*, 7 October 1983.
27. *Financial Mail*, 17 August 1984.
28. See John Chettle, "The View from Washington", *South Africa International*, vol. 14, no. 4, April 1984.
29. *The United States and South Africa: Realities and Red Herrings*. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1984.
30. James Barber, et. al., op. cit., p. 51.
31. Cited by Allen C. Brownfeld, "The Voices We Never Hear", *Fiat Lux*, March 1984.
32. Quoted from a speech in Sweden in the *Sowetan*, 24 April 1984.
33. Quoted in *The disinvestment in South Africa campaign in America*. Sandton: Southern African Editorial Service, (Pty) Ltd., 1979.
34. Reported in *Natal Mercury*, 9 January 1985.
35. From a speech in Durban, 28 September 1983. Reprinted as "Investment in South Africa", *South Africa International*, vol. 14, no. 4, April 1984.
36. *Natal Mercury*, 11 January 1985.
37. *Black Worker Attitudes: Political Options, Capitalism and Investment in South Africa*. Durban: Indicator Project. University of Natal, 1984.
38. Karl P. Magyar, "The disinvestment survey: a matter mainly of economics — not morality", *Natal Mercury*, 2 October 1984.
39. Bissell, op. cit., p. 86. See also Bernard Simon, "Looking at the Codes". *Leadership SA*, "Human Resources, 1984-85".
40. See Reinald Hofmeyr, "The Sullivan Principles (and other codes), are they relevant?" *Leadership SA*, vol. 1, no. 1.
41. The American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa reported that by 1983, 147 of the 350 American companies had endorsed the code. However, these companies employ 71 per cent of the workforce of American companies in South Africa. *US Business Involvement in South Africa*, Johannesburg, 1984.

42. Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, "The Sullivan Principles and Change in South Africa", *Africa Report* (USA) May-June 1984.
43. Bernard Simon, "Looking at the Codes", op. cit.
44. A. B. Lumby estimates that South Africa must achieve a 7 to 8 per cent economic growth rate in order to merely absorb new job seekers. "Sanctions: the real threat", *Financial Mail*, 25 January 1985.
45. The increased pressures of the Sullivan Code have been characterized as "low-grade blackmail". *The Star*, 17 September 1984.
46. I discussed this question of morality vs. power in an article "US investments do help blacks in South Africa". *The Star*, 17 August 1983.
47. I have dealt with the structural details of such a system in an article "Confederal Integration: An economic base for a new dispensation", *Africa Insight*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1984.

CSO: 3400/1012

SOUTH AFRICA

FURTHER REACTIONS TO BOTHA'S NATAL NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS SPEECH

Ken Owen

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Aug 85 p 23

[Text]

**PRESIDENT Botha's** appalling speech on Thursday night told us more about ourselves than about him.

We live in cloud cuckoo land.

Ever since the whites sought to achieve painless change by voting for a new, unfinished, incomprehensible constitution, we have steadfastly ignored the single most important truth about South Africa: this is a land so deeply divided that nobody can see across the gulf.

We deal not with each other but with illusions of one another.

Mr Botha, speaking English before a party congress in order to reach the biggest international audience ever accorded a South African, spoke of a "manifesto" for change, a crossing of the Rubicon from which there was no turning back.

His audience heard only a bellicose refusal to release Nelson Mandela, a graceless posturing, a refusal to bargain except on his own terms. All of it larded with gobbledegook from the lexicon of Nationalist ideology: national states, constitutional dispensation, participation.

The misperception is total.

Black people are talking of ruling South Africa, of Nelson Mandela as State President, of seizing Mr Harry Oppenheimer's fortune. The imagination of the young blacks has been captured by the utopian idea of a socialist state in which the means of production will be taken from the rich whites and put at the disposal of "the people", like a shop thrown open to looters.

It cannot be achieved without war.

The Afrikaners, represented by Mr Botha, are talking of an independent Afrikaner republic in which other communities will

be accommodated — the word is precise — insofar as justice is compatible with Afrikaner hegemony.

## Challenge

It cannot be achieved without oppression.

To bridge this gap is the challenge that faces South African leaders. Middle ground does not exist, it must be created, and that is a task that no mere politician, bound by his small-town constituency and his caucus, can fulfil. It demands statesmanship.

Give Mr Botha the credit that he has tried to change the context of South African politics. He has risen above himself, and in six years he has done more than anybody dared to expect when he came to office. But he is trying to sidle into the future, hoping his followers won't notice.

The hard Left is undecieved. It expected nothing of Mr Botha's speech on Thursday, rejecting in advance all possible ameliorative actions that might

challenge its own mythology: that South Africa is at civil war, that the troops are in the suburbs, that apartheid is under siege by a freedom-loving army that is destined to triumph.

Campaigns against conscriptions and militarisation have been launched to prepare the way. Like the murder of black policemen and councillors, they are intended to deny Mr Botha the instruments for the suppression of revolution.

While Mr Botha was preparing his message to the world, the United Democratic Front was quietly distributing to foreign embassies its own message that law and order was synonymous with white domination. It demanded the release of Nelson Mandela and all detainees, the return of exiles, the lifting of the state of emergency, the withdrawal of security forces from the townships, and so forth.

It called on foreign governments to break diplomatic relations, and foreign businesses to withdraw.

Nothing is so easy. The revolution is not at hand and the white redoubt will not come tumbling down at the sound of trumpets. The power of the State has not even been unsheathed, much less tested.

After 600 deaths in riots, Mr Botha's perspective is still that he is employing minimum force in 14 percent of the country. As he said, he will do more if he must.

## Power

But peace is no nearer than revolution. To quell the turbulence in the townships will, in the absence of the kind of political breakthrough that Thursday failed to bring, require repression on a scale that must destroy Afrikaner hopes of a civilised society for themselves.

An entire generation of black youngsters is growing up in a brutalising atmosphere where enemies are burned, where women who fail to observe a boycott may have an ear sliced off in the street, where the worst crime is "collaboration". Our streets are breeding the kind of Middle Eastern creature that lives and dies by the gun.

To bridge the gap, Mr Botha offered a review of influx control but not its abolition; permanence for black communities, but not equality; citizenship but not an equal franchise; permission to build houses, but not the right to escape from that political pressure cooker, the racial ghetto.

He has offered enough to risk his by-elections, not enough to create a new political process.

So we do it the hard way. The recession will linger, and joblessness will recruit a new army of rebellious youngsters; emergency powers will be extended and used with diminishing restraint. The flight of foreign capital will continue until we have bought back all our assets, and paid all our debts.

## Isolation

Our foreign relations, already in a state of collapse, will sour and shrink. Our isolation will deepen and we shall become a harder, tougher, less likeable people.

Unless we are careful, our resources will go into policing and security, and black people will increasingly be left to house themselves in ZoZo huts and shanties. Police brutality, real and imagined, will poison political debate and human relationships. Corpses will litter the landscape.

President Botha has promised to change the outmoded and

costly — not to say brutal, unjust, wicked and impoverishing — system of influx control. He had better do it quickly and thoroughly.

He has promised to cut away the strangling over-regulation of the state, by taking powers to do so himself if he must. He had better be quick and thorough, so that we can at least try to rescue ourselves from the mess the Nats have made.

He has promised negotiations for constitutional change, and citizenship for certain classes of black people. He had better act in good faith because he sorely needs black allies.

And he had better search unceasingly for ways to establish a process of negotiation across the gulf that divides, for if he does not then the emigration of decent people, of doctors and artists and scientists and managers, will become a rout.

When that happens, the chance of establishing middle ground will be gone forever, and the agony which has now begun will have to be seen through to its bitter end.

Percy Qoboza

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Aug 85 p 22

### [Text]

AS I had predicted, the eagle has not landed. For millions of people around the world, whose eyes were firmly glued on the goings-on at the Durban City Hall, expecting a major announcement, it was a let-down — an anticlimax to a week that kicked off full of promises that a new spirit had taken over this nation.

Mr P W Botha, the State President, seemed just the old PW continuing to live in the amazing Alice in Wonderland world of the National Party: cruelly oblivious of the violence and destruction that are tearing the country apart ... negligent of the cries of this country for a new political direction that can help us restore peace and rebuild this nation with all its potential.

The message that came out loud and clear from his speech was for the whole lot to go and jump in the lake.

Is this really what South Africa wants? Are we made to understand that, rather than looking for alternative policies that can address the demands for change, this Government has decided that it is going to shoot its way out of trouble? Are we to accept that there is no alternative to violence? Can this country really thumb its nose at the international community which is close to imposing dangerous sanctions?

## Backlash

Even Ronald Reagan is fighting with his back to the wall, trying to salvage his discredited "constructive engagement". His massive support in the Senate has dwindled.

This is why many of his senators, fearing the backlash that is raging in that land against "constructive engagement", are beginning to think of their own political future.

It is true that the State President did make some strange noises about an alternative system to influx control. He indicated that the system is too costly. But we told his Government that almost 30 years ago. What worries me about the noises he made is that he did not mention the immorality of those laws. Only the costs.

There was also some permutation to be worked out about citizenship. This, too, depended on the bantustans refusing to take Pretoria-style independence. But the birthright of our people in Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda has, under his party's per-

ception, been taken away from them for ever and ever.

It's no use deluding ourselves that it was a political process that came from the voluntary agreement of the bantustans.

We know, all of us, that it was a decision that was rammed down the throats of our people, aided and abetted by a few politicians who have no inkling of what political dignity means, or even appreciate the values of freedom and human personality.

One simply has to go through the numbers of people who voted in these bantustan elections to see that only an outrageous minority bothered to turn out.

But then what do you say about a government that will accept only six votes as an expression of the will of the people?

And all of us have to stand on the sidelines while our country is being led on the path of chaos. Those of us who believe in the process of non-violent change to the system have necessarily to raise our voices even more vigorously than we have thus far.

As Bishop Desmond Tutu so timeously observed this week, peaceful protest is becoming even more difficult these days. Yet the quest for peace and justice must continue, and the commitment to their attainment must be pursued relentlessly.

The biggest and most hurtful aspect of Mr Botha's speech was his blatant refusal to release Mr Nelson Mandela. I have said time and again that his unconditional release from prison will help create an atmosphere of hope in this country that the Government is genuine in its desire to enter into serious and genuine negotiations with black people.

If this Government could release Robey Leibbrandt, a man who committed the most heinous of crimes against his nation — that of betraying it to its enemies — then it is mystifying that the quality of mercy does not extend to its political opponents.

Not that Mandela needs any mercy from anybody. Nobody must underestimate the man's will to suffer. He is in prison because, like

Mr Botha and his people, he was hit by the bug to be free.

Mr Botha's own historical experience must tell him that the human soul's quest for freedom can never be suppressed.

## Savaged

One merely has to take time off and speak with the young people of Soweto to realise just how this country has savaged those youngsters.

When I listened to Mr Botha on television, like millions of South Africans, I was overcome by a sense of hopelessness, sustained only by the knowledge that to help bring peace to this country is a duty — a God-given duty — of every one of us.

The polarisation has gone far enough. Hearts have been hardened enough. But we must continue to pull out the reserves of human stamina to continue fighting for the establishment of a just society.

For all of our sakes, our children's sakes, and for the sake of our country, we must overcome.

Lawrence Schlemmer

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Aug 85 pp 22

[Text]

THE State President's speech on Thursday was unsurprisingly disappointing within the context of National Party politics. The expectations raised about the speech had been large, foolish and almost preset to be disappointed.

The expectations were based on our anxieties and concerns about South Africa's future. We had paid little heed to the rules and regulations of leadership.

A reliable recent poll has shown that the Government's popularity among Afrikaners has fallen, rather than risen, in the past few months — in a ratio of two to one.

Obviously the state of the economy is a prominent reason. Equally important, however, is a fear that the Government is vacillating, uncertain, vulnerable to pressure and unable to quell the current unrest. These fears appear not to be insignificant among the English-speakers either.

Mr Botha lives with this knowledge, and he is also not the man to stroke the hand that is

beating him. He made a point of mentioning all the pressures, demands and advice with which he is surrounded at present. Pandering to pressure is not his style, nor is it the substance of his politics.

## True

It is true to say that the final fall-back position of this Government under pressure is to re-

consolidate the Afrikaners, impose controls on the economy, gear up the security establishment and to tell the world and the ANC to go to hell.

"Don't push us too far" — his most emotional words during the speech (repeated twice) — were not merely intended for effect. The "garrison state" option is one very important reality that his critics have to bear in mind.

Thankfully he has not altered course, however. He did not say anything that was new, but he reaffirmed that common citizenship would be installed, that negotiations about black participation at central level would continue, that non-independent homelands would be given central representation and that the realities of regional differences would be accommodated in the political system — a mild concession to the Buthelezi Commission.

## Clear

The reform process, within the Government framework, is still underway.

It has become clear that Mr Pik Botha has spelt out the envisaged process in much greater detail in confidential briefings in Europe. That is partly what gave rise to all the expectations of Mr Botha's speech.

The assumption will be that there are contradictions at Cabinet level. This is not really the case. Anything that Pik Botha has said can be reconciled with the State President's much more general commitments.

However, three major problems arose in his speech.

One was his peremptory and categorical refusal to issue a statement of intent. The forcefulness of his tone in doing so in a speech in the Natal/KwaZulu region must inevitably deepen the rift between him and Chief Buthelezi, who has been most prominent in asking for such a statement.

Quite incomprehensibly, Mr Botha linked demands for a statement of intent to what he termed a wish to "destroy or-

derly government". Given Inkatha's role in damping down the brief but serious rash of unrest in Durban, this choice of words is close to being a political insult to Inkatha and Buthelezi.

Whites, Indians and coloureds in Natal who have some sense of responsibility towards their black future partners in the region simply cannot let this pass.

The issue of a statement of intent has already become a dangerous issue in our politics. Mr Botha seems to assume that what Chief Buthelezi wants is for the Government to spell out its negotiating position.

If the Government understands the demand in this way, its refusal to provide a statement of intent is understandable.

## Assurance

As I understand it, however, Chief Buthelezi is not asking to see the Government's constitutional proposals in advance. What he has asked for is the assurance that negotiation will be about "power-sharing" in some variety or form.

He is saying that he is not prepared to talk about mere consultation or simply about the division of powers along racial or confederal lines. Power-sharing is not necessarily a great leap for the Government.

It could be argued that General Affairs decision-making in the Tricameral Parliament is a form of power-sharing. The resistance to a very broad statement of intent about power-sharing is highly unconstructive.

A second major problem was the State President's heavy implication that Nelson Mandela is a communist. Mr Mandela's symbolic significance to blacks is such that by suggesting that he is a communist, Mr Botha has given communism its biggest public relations victory in years.

## Pressure

Whatever Mandela's original trial may or may not have sug-

gested, today we simply do not know whether he is a communist or not. By making the implication, Mr Botha has actually put more pressure on himself to find a way of releasing Mandela so that the latter can speak for himself.

A third major problem is a constitutional issue. Mr Botha made the point that the independent states would be a "material part" of a constitutional solution for blacks in South Africa.

This statement is dangerously vague. Few people would strongly resist some form of over-arching "confederal" body to link the independent homelands and South Africa together in a system of joint planning and development.

## Vital

If the Government intends that black representation from the non-independent regions and the so-called white areas is to be grafted onto such a body, then the negotiation process will be stillborn — worse, the foetus will poison the mother.

That kind of link will exclude all blacks from the dialogue — except very traditional groups in the independent states. Greater clarity on this issue is vital to any further progress on the constitutional front.

One hopes that the world gets the message that Mr Botha will not bend to pressures which are simply punitive and which take no account of economic and political realities in South Africa.

Equally, however, one hopes that having delivered that message, Mr Botha will now begin to deal with his own political realities in a less reactive way than the tone of his speech.

The only significant black political "allies" he ended up with after concluding his speech were the African Zionists he addressed in the Northern Transvaal, and that was a long time ago in these uncertain times. Not even his own staunchest supporters can be happy with that.

SOUTH AFRICA

POLICE NAME 25 ARRESTED UNDER EMERGENCY

MB271147 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1144 GMT 27 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, 27 Aug, SAPA--Police said today 25 more people had been arrested under the emergency regulations, bringing to 2,344 the number detained under the five-week-old emergency.

The number freed reached 1,222, according to lists released by the police in Pretoria. Thirty-nine names have been added to the release list since last Friday.

A police situation report yesterday put the release figure at 1,103 and total detentions at 2,197.

The latest arrests: (the numbering follows SAPA's earlier list):

<u>Name</u>	<u>Race/Sex</u>	<u>Magisterial District</u>
2320 Madada Mabhoza	B/M	Albany
2321 Alwitt Mdoka	"	"
2322 Mkhusele Gcdeke	"	"
2323 Ellede Temise	"	"
2324 Tambele Daweti	"	Kirkwood
2325 David Mogcagi	"	"
2326 Wesley Mbenkashe	"	"
2327 Mcebe Dawati	"	"
2328 Gladman Tsotsot	"	PE [Port Elizabeth]
2329 Ben Montjane	"	JHB [Johannesburg]
2330 Roy David	C/M	"
2331 Moses Peterson	"	"
2332 Agmet Aabdullah	"	"
2333 Jerald Willason	"	"
2334 Joulien Williams	"	"
2335 Clive Michaels	"	"
2336 Wiltor Adams	"	"
2337 Julandi Hamilton	C/F	"
2338 Romand Fransman	C/M	"
2339 Newille Louw	"	"
2340 Chris Rich	"	"

<u>Name</u>	<u>Race/Sex</u>	<u>Magisterial District</u>
2341 Ronald Swartz	C/M	JHB [Johannesburg]
2342 Lance East	"	"
2343 Zaitoona Bhajat	C/F	"
2344 Morris Manikuo	C/M	"

The peoples released were named as (the numbering follows SAPA's earlier list):

<u>Name</u>	<u>No on Arrest List</u>	<u>Magisterial District</u>
1184 Patrick Hlalele	(1538)	JHB
1185 Joseph Moseki	(1540)	"
1186 Solomon Mangope	(1541)	"
1187 Abram Molemane	(1542)	"
1188 Elen Mokhine	(1536)	"
1189 Patrick Lekgale	(1554)	"
1190 Joseph Sekgwane	(1537)	"
1191 Jacob Tabane	(1555)	"
1192 Gladwin Komane	(1544)	"
1193 Zacharia Matsobane	(1545)	"
1194 Jacob Motlhajoa	(1548)	"
1195 Lucas Mbewe	(1547)	"
1196 Raymond Monotoe	(1549)	"
1197 Edwin Maitse	(1543)	"
1198 Caiphus Mokgosi	(1550)	"
1199 Willem Motsikwa	(1552)	"
1200 Jacob Mooketsi	(1559)	"
1201 Moses Mabhalane	(1557)	"
1202 Benedict Mikhachane	(1546)	"
1203 Nicholas Mabote	(1551)	"
1204 Thaba Mmolawa	(1553)	"
1205 Job Lebeko	(1556)	"
1206 Isaac Zekhalia	(1558)	"
1207 Tseko Tomotomo	(1560)	"
1208 Clifford Tohlang	(1562)	"
1209 Lucas Gabawakgosi	(1563)	"
1210 Zimela Kekana	(1564)	"
1211 Seghloe Surprise	(1565)	"
1212 Richard Santho	(1566)	"
1213 William Tshegameno	(1567)	"
1214 Pule Molaba	(1575)	"
1215 William Molemane	(1570)	"
1216 Phillip Moseki	(1572)	"
1217 Elijah Molefe	(1574)	"
1218 Wilson Zikhali	(1568)	"
1219 William Motshepe	(1569)	"
1220 Arthur Menyatso	(1573)	"
1221 Jacob Sekhoto	(1571)	"
1222 Clive Radebe	(1577)	"

CSO: 3400/1018

SOUTH AFRICA

POLICE NAMELIST OF ARRESTS, RELEASES

MB301318 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1302 GMT 30 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, 30 Aug, SAPA--Police said today 70 more people had been arrested under the emergency regulations in the past three days, bringing to 2,414 the number of people who have been detained under the almost six-week-old emergency.

A total of 1,306 (no5 1,346) of the detainees have been freed, according to police lists released in Pretoria. The release figure stood at 1,222 when the police last gave out lists on August 27.

A police situation report earlier today, however, put the release figure at 1,218.

The people who have been arrested were named as (the numbering follows SAPA's earlier list):

<u>Name</u>	<u>Race/Sex</u>	<u>Magisterial District</u>
2345 Edward Paulus	B/M	PE [Port Elizabeth]
2346 Madoda Jacobs	"	Cradock
2347 Johnson Langman	"	PE
2348 Maudhonsonge Jakavula	"	"
2349 Trevor Tutu	"	JHB [Johannesburg]
2350 Walter Mahlangu	"	"
2351 Mathew Modanetsi	"	"
2352 Zacharia Mkwana	"	"
2353 Robert Molakoane	"	"
2354 Andrew Motangh	"	"
2355 Andrew Kgarke	"	"
2356 Tsediso Habosesa	"	PE
2357 Siphiwo Tyelo	"	"
2358 Mzwandile Mewa	"	"
2359 Samson Dayimin	"	"
2360 Danile Sin	"	Uitenhage
2361 Benson Mangaliso	"	"
2362 Sebezile Busakwa	"	PE
2363 Ngamile Harmans	"	"

<u>Name</u>	<u>Race/Sex</u>	<u>Magisterial District</u>
2364 James Malambile	B/M	PE
2365 Kennedy Mabuto	"	"
2366 Makhosonke Matshoba	"	Vanderbijlpark
2367 Randolph Jones	C/M	JHB
2368 Joe Nydre	B/M	PE
2369 Mbuyelo Myeki	"	"
2370 Lindile Lala	"	Albany
2371 Fileka Mgeleza	B/F	"
2372 Andile Ngubo	B/M	Uitenhage
2373 William Radebe	"	Vereeniging
2374 Kopo Masisi	"	"
2375 Julian Cheke	"	"
2376 George Raputsoe	"	"
2377 Tsidiso Mabuye	"	"
2378 Julius Khati	"	"
2379 Gilbert Motsopo	"	"
2380 Edwin Motshepe	"	"
2381 Petrus Qobola	"	"
2382 Samuel Nyamande	"	"
2383 William Mbhele	"	"
2384 David Pule	"	"
2385 Samson Kolaepe	"	"
2386 Charles Chaka	"	"
2387 Boy Mabileda	"	"
2388 Michael Radebe	"	"
2389 Solomon Motaung	"	"
2390 Beauty Pefile	B/F	"
2391 Olfis Mkhosini	B/M	PE
2392 Zolile Dlambulo	"	"
2393 Clifford Nondlwana	"	"
2394 Tumelo Myoli	"	"
2395 Siphowe Forster	"	"
2396 Nceba Zwane	"	"
2397 Mzimbasi Ngwatu	"	"
2398 Vuani Samka	"	"
2399 Sphiwe Mgxashe	"	"
2400 Fundile Ngoqo	"	"
2401 Vuyisile Ncandana	"	"
2402 Benjamin Yaca	"	"
2403 Zola Gangca	"	"
2404 Sipho Masala	"	"
2405 Reginald Schultz	"	"
2406 Beathwell Nomkhena	"	"
2407 Zandesele Rabi	"	"
2408 Mzandile Bucwa	"	Uitenhage
2409 Lehogang Beea	"	JHB
2410 Josef Makhaleme	"	"
2411 Jovo Malima	"	"
2412 Ben Matiko	"	"
2413 Steven Ndou	"	"
2414 Dumisani Sithole	"	"

The detainees who were released were named at (the numbering follows SAPA's earlier list):

<u>Name</u>	<u>No. on Arrest List</u>	<u>Magisterial District</u>
1223 Daster Kubheka	(1640)	Benoni
1224 Abel Makhuba	(1645)	"
1225 Benjamin Makhuba	(1646)	"
1226 Job Makola	(1670)	"
1227 Sipho Maropodi	(1668)	"
1228 Richard Padi	(1669)	"
1229 Colin Matsapola	(1667)	Springs
1230 Harold Mahlalela	(1736)	Brakpan
1231 Ephraim Phale	(1636)	JHB
1232 Adolph Chenyane	(1639)	"
1233 Raymond Mokgethi	(1635)	"
1234 Donald Tjunke	(1637)	"
1235 Lafred Mmgomezulu	(1638)	"
1236 Floyd Manale	(2038)	"
1237 Michael Boikanyo	(2039)	"
1238 David Mabe	(2040)	"
1239 Moses Ramasodi	(2041)	"
1240 Elmond Moedi	(2042)	"
1241 Kenneth More	(2043)	"
1242 Francisco Dolamo	(2044)	"
1243 David Mofokeng	(2045)	"
1244 Gideon Balita	(1583)	Uitenhage
1245 Patrick Saul	(1584)	Alicedale
1246 Zandile Ngalo	(1585)	"
1247 Nade Sono	(1587)	Albany
1248 Mbousilo Jack	(1588)	Somerset East
1249 Johannes Mararman	(1589)	Uitenhage
1250 Pumelok Langisa	(1590)	"
1251 Zolile Kilili	(1592)	PE
1252 Mpomelolo Ngqibisi	(1593)	"
1253 Volisele Ngcwayi	(1594)	"
1254 Sikimboso Mtanpo	(1595)	"
1255 Zwemibanzi Mtombo	(1596)	"
1256 Machosonkile Piliso	(1597)	"
1257 Zwandele Kinana	(1598)	"
1258 Meu Moyoleli	(1599)	"
1259 Siphewo Campo	(1600)	"
1260 Zonwapa Soyama	(1601)	"
1261 Mobiselo Zono	(1602)	"
1262 Lindele Ngxovo	(1603)	"
1263 Zulada Gcakasi	(1604)	"
1264 Tangemga Siko	(1605)	"
1265 Maysayi Booi	(1606)	"
1266 Eric Nyati	(1607)	"

<u>Name</u>	<u>No. on Arrest List</u>	<u>Magisterial District</u>
1267 Stanki Malgas	(1608)	PE
1268 Sindele Potvi	(1609)	"
1269 Arthur Swarts	(1493)	Uitenhage
1270 Arnold Solomon	(1494)	"
1271 Bulelo Butana	(1494)	"
1272 Myuselelo Tini	(1496)	"
1273 Cuprian Maulwana	(1497)	"
1274 Michael Nyanda	(1498)	"
1275 Joseph Nyanda	(1499)	"
1276 Sihaan Receipt	(1500)	"
1277 Migrantile Maku	(1501)	"
1278 Mzoxolo Dick	(1502)	"
1279 Varule Jonas	(1503)	"
1280 Mhophe Nogcazi	(1504)	PE
1281 Veleboyi Matthews	(1505)	"
1282 Sonwabo Nanga	(1506)	"
1283 Moses Magjabi	(1508)	"
1284 Monde Falentein	(1510)	Uitenhage
1285 Mongameli Falentein	(1510)	"
1286 Fikile Majola	(1511)	"
1287 Stoffel May	(1512)	"
1288 T. Mani	(797)	PE
1289 Phintle Gekema	(1582)	Uitenhage
1290 Jackson Johannes	(1610)	PE
1292 Abraham Manyati	(1612)	"
1293 Jojel Baka	(1612)	"
1294 Dereck Isaacs	(1619)	Uitenhage
1294 Maartin Volstruis	(1620)	"
1296 Jack Salter	(1621)	"
1297 Martin Goliat	(1622)	"
1298 Bingo Sobikwa	(1628)	Albany
1299 Nophumzile Mzizi	(1660)	"
1300 Moses Dikoebe	(1647)	Vereeniging
1301 Petrus Letoane	(1648)	"
1302 Abraham Tau	(1716)	"
1303 Seth Mazibuko	(1761)	JHB
1304 Bhekea Nkozi	(1664)	"
1305 Kenneth Ngobese	(1665)	"
1306 Domenic Chirwa	(1666)	"

CSO: 3400/1018

SOUTH AFRICA

CONTINUING LIST OF NAMES OF THOSE RELEASED, ARRESTED

40 Arrested

MB161130 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1126 GMT 16 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, Aug 15 [date as received] SAPA--Police said today a further 40 people had been arrested under the emergency regulations.

According to the lists of names released daily by the police in Pretoria, 1,753 people have been detained since the emergency was implemented almost a month ago.

At least 1,024 of these have been freed, according to the police list, although a police situation report earlier this week put the release figure at 963.

No people had been freed for the past two days, a police spokesman said.

Those detained were named as (the numbering follows SAPAS earlier list):

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
1714 Jacob Thebenani	B/M	Vereeniging
1715 Moses Shabane	"	"
1716 Abraham Tau	"	"
1717 William Makgalemele	"	"
1718 Aaron Femele	"	Uitenhage
1719 Jonethen Hermanus	"	Port Elizabeth
1720 George Mabhumane	"	"
1721 Lulamile Hermanus	"	"
1722 Lelean Kente	B/F	Grahamstown
1723 Lukamaso Hene	B/M	Uitenhage
1724 Andile Mlilwana	"	"
1725 Sipho Ktese	"	"
1726 Liso Mlilwana	"	"
1727 Tema Habana	"	"
1728 Michael Peterson	C/M	Port Elizabeth
1729 Zukile Menemene	B/M	"
1730 Mdumiso Bennie	"	"
1731 Fikele Qumba	"	"
1732 Zukile Matshizana	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
1733 Andile Memani	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1734 Mlukeli Magara	"	"
1735 Skiti Kamisele	"	"
1736 Harold Mahlalele	"	Brakpan
1737 Petro Mera	"	Springs
1738 Ronnie Komalo	"	"
1739 Abraham Komalo	"	"
1740 Patrick Matsiloa	"	Germiston
1741 Mongezi Gunguluza	"	Graaff-Reinent
1742 Tandeka Maloyi	B/F	"
1743 Melvis Peterson	B/M	"
1744 Dawid Claassen	C/M	Fort Beaufort
1745 Matemba Baardman	B/M	"
1746 Pinda Rumba	B/F	"
1747 Ntombozolo Rumba	"	"
1748 Fonto Rumba	B/M	"
1749 Zola Rumba	"	"
1750 Mtuloxolo Rumba	"	"
1751 Monstapo Thengela	B/F	"
1752 Lawrence Mziwanaduza	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1753 Mile Koltana	"	"

271 Arrested

MB191515 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1504 GMT 19 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, Aug 19, SAPA--Police said today 271 more people had been arrested during the weekend under the emergency regulations, bringing to 2,024 the number of people detained under the month-old emergency.

A further 78 people had been released, according to a police list released in Pretoria. The total of detainees freed now totals 1,102, according to the lists, although police figures released earlier today differ.

The latest people arrested named on the latest list are (the numbering follows SAPAS earlier list):

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
1754 Molefi Khopane	B/M	Vanderbijlpark
1755 Taunyane Thobi	"	"
1756 David Modibede	"	"
1757 Isaac Mealto	"	"
1758 Mashome Motokeng	"	"
1759 Teboho Moshenohe	"	"
1760 Ephraim Lepati	"	"
1761 Seth Mazibuko	"	Johannesburg
1762 Moelia Ngeve	"	Fort Beaufort
1763 William Lamani	"	"
1764 Jomo Mtongane	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
1765 Nonvameko Mdludui	B/F	Fort Beaufort
1766 Sandile Kona	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1767 Wandile Popo	"	"
1768 Monde Nyashu	"	Somerset East
1769 Mashiwa Jack	"	Cradock
1770 Mondau Mluzeli	"	Somerset East
1771 Daliwonga Khonza	"	Albany
1772 Gibson Ncipa	"	"
1773 Petrus Mbuli	"	Johannesburg
1774 Michael Radebe	"	"
1775 Barani Mandlala	"	"
1776 Steven Gadela	"	"
1777 Simon Melani	"	Port Elizabeth
1778 Nkomwbi Modotyyi	"	"
1779 Pummlulelo Onth	"	"
1780 Philip Mzwanene	"	"
1781 Tembirosi Ngqolomde	B/M	"
1782 Kiwo Timka	"	"
1783 Niyisile Ntsinga	"	"
1784 Seth Tshabalala	"	"
1785 Tembesile Ngxabane	"	"
1786 Johannes Mabuzwana	"	"
1787 Welile Nkanaana	"	"
1788 Novi Nkanaana	"	"
1789 Sipiwo Koahlo	"	"
1790 Nikile Prins	"	"
1791 Mcedisi Henene	"	"
1792 Mniniwe Adams	"	"
1793 Lindile Mcatha	"	"
1794 Mzwandile Richard	"	"
1795 Mzwandile Yorkwe	"	"
1796 Brice Mliso	"	"
1797 Tembile Matya	"	"
1798 Tobile Njokweni	"	"
1799 Thabile Makhohlao	"	"
1800 Mdumiso Sithole	"	"
1801 Mzwandile Mavu	"	"
1802 Nomlungisi Mcontsi	B/F	Fort Beaufort
1803 Mbulelo Blom	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1804 Makaya Mapni	"	"
1805 Frank Ncilo	"	"
1806 Mzimme Mpina	"	"
1807 Nopman Swartbogi	"	"
1808 Mthuthuzeli Molly	"	"
1809 Lolantitile Sigidi	"	"
1810 Stanley Meintjies	"	"
1811 Vuil Sapulana	"	"
1812 Zanethemba Kholwaphi	"	"
1813 Jeffrey Dlula	"	"
1814 Anotue Mathakazeli	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
1815 Fris Mfene	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1816 Zumtwe Homi	"	"
1817 Mnyamezeli Mpepo	"	"
1818 Semphine Fumpa	"	"
1819 Phikisani Jackson	"	"
1820 Xola Novo	"	"
1821 Veza Ncandama	"	"
1822 Payl Fani	"	"
1823 Rotsi Fayani	"	"
1824 Alfred Hoyer	"	"
1825 Mavali Mahlnwyana	"	"
1826 Siphiso Smith	"	"
1827 Mbulelo Mtuya	"	"
1828 Lindile Leonard	"	"
1829 Diemelakewe Daytinani	"	"
1830 Eric Vikilahle	"	"
1831 Kola Jacobs	"	"
1832 Wanga Monaka	"	"
1833 Gilbert Thanda	"	"
1834 Andile Mpusiso	"	"
1835 Michael Tshula	"	"
1836 William Tsili	"	"
1837 Erich Nkolo	"	"
1838 Humphrey Yolasiwa	"	"
1839 Mogsana Mitgnut	"	"
1840 Yolani Mpepho	"	"
1841 Tembekile Wauhope	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1842 Richard Petani	"	"
1843 Foueweuo Tluoxe	"	"
1844 Malweradile Makqawalana	"	"
1845 Tembile Jamane	"	"
1846 Vandene Nkonone	"	"
1847 Dawid Moeshoeshe	"	"
1848 Nukile Mtaleni	"	"
1849 Mputa Selane	"	"
1850 Mziwonice Qowane	"	"
1851 Wonga Fulela	"	"
1852 Sinob Didi	"	"
1853 Mthuthuzeki Mtwaide	"	"
1854 Telesa Gungliluza	"	"
1855 Zwelane Maphongwana	"	"
1856 Mathews Mona	"	"
1857 Ntumi Mnobeli	"	"
1858 Erich Mendi	"	"
1859 Wella Nduna	"	"
1860 Cis Qomfo	"	"
1861 Peter Ngoina	"	"
1862 Tulane Thoms	"	"
1863 Pumzile Tuze	"	"
1864 Ngosinatu Quanta	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
1865 Ndumiso Kahlu	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1866 Monde Lumka	"	"
1867 Dalidurpo Hani	"	"
1868 Dawid Zammani	"	"
1869 Mbulilo Nkanati	"	"
1870 Mzolei Minnie	"	"
1871 Nduduza Shabla	"	"
1872 Marris Matomela	"	"
1873 Nzalisero Kila	"	"
1874 Mathews Mengo	"	"
1875 Longela Maluhle	"	"
1876 Luelala Debe	"	"
1877 Lundi Meanzi	"	"
1878 Thobile Basuti	"	"
1979 Thembile James	"	"
1880 Nywandile Neslono	"	"
1881 Zandile Yopkwe	"	"
1882 Mbulelo Soboni	"	"
1883 Sanele Koombhalala	"	"
1884 Umbulelo Thongwisi	"	"
1885 Vuyani Sanka	"	"
1886 Zolani Ngcwelese	"	"
1887 Siphino Foster	"	"
1888 (unreadable)	"	"
1889 Mzolesi Ngqansweni	"	"
1890 Lungisi Ngwaxela	"	"
1891 Mzwakhe Solo	"	"
1892 Kola Gola	"	"
1893 Xolani Mkhobeli	"	"
1894 Tobile Kula	"	"
1895 Welcome Ngohla	"	"
1896 Ludwe Nganlana	"	"
1897 Mdovisile Blom	"	"
1898 Temba Goduka	"	"
1899 Xolile Qona	"	"
1900 Enoch Tshabalala	"	"
1901 Mbolelo Ngqolombe	"	"
1902 Monde Ntunzi	"	"
1903 Mbolelo Mkonto	"	"
1904 Nkonzinath Sithungu	"	"
1905 Zingiske Mbaya	"	"
1906 (unreadable)	"	"
1907 Andile Mbusiso	"	"
1908 Gladstone Njalene	"	"
1909 Erich Sangaprice	"	"
1910 Nkunze Mlozane	"	"
1911 Raymond Yakaza	"	"
1912 Vusumzi Zenzile	"	"
1913 Zandisile Magqogqo	"	"
1914 Mntuwaye Nkohla	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
1915 Monwabisi Kolosa	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1916 Matwa Mpnumezi	"	"
1917 Mlandeli Xosa	"	"
1918 Johnson Mosinala	"	"
1919 Donald Mewulaiyi	"	"
1920 Teffeky Sidingi	"	"
1921 Disanga Wapi	"	"
1922 Philip Ngoka	"	"
1923 Kylethu Chisi	"	"
1924 Norman Qamtoeti	"	"
1925 Antony Tembikile	"	"
1926 Erich Hiili	"	"
1927 Zongezinele Silhopovi	"	"
1928 Zolile Nqonqeni	"	"
1929 Attunti Tito	"	"
1930 Mkhulule Cwathe	"	"
1931 Zolani Lepile	"	"
1932 Zandisile Zekele	"	"
1933 Mncedi Gombe	"	"
1934 Sidney Yalweni	"	"
1935 Sonnyboy Tom	"	"
1936 Tobile Ndyoyi	"	"
1937 Vukile Mahayisa	"	"
1938 Aniole Tetanye	"	"
1939 Mvula Mani	"	"
1940 Egzilo Mccezula	"	"
1941 Lighton Tshenese	"	"
1942 Welile Mpokele	"	"
1943 Madota Kitsana	"	"
1944 Ngoda Zomo	"	"
1945 Thembile Ntsele	"	"
1946 Mbuyiseli Halem	"	"
1947 Chadreck Dabula	"	"
1948 Fam Nqola	"	"
1949 Chrispin Shatai	"	Grahamstown
1950 Mlungisi Naradows	"	Uitenhage
1951 Mzukisi Williams	"	"
1952 Tozamile Dondashwe	"	"
1953 Vuyo Mgxashe	"	Port Elizabeth
1954 Xolisile Magxaki	"	"
1955 Patrick Vuso	"	"
1956 Zolisa Vuani	"	Fort Beaufort
1957 William Ntonyanto	"	Somerset East
1958 William Fani	"	"
1959 Reuben Pati	"	"
1960 Duma Magwagwa	"	Uitenhage
1961 Rebecca Scoltz	C/F	Graaff-Reinet
1962 Charglene Nissan	"	"
1963 Momamed Hassing	A/M	Springs
1964 David Roseshi	B/M	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
1965 Mjale Tuswe	B/M	Port Elizabeth
1966 Mxolisi Makoga	"	"
1967 Sipho Majala	"	"
1968 Givel Tuswa	"	"
1969 Mzimisa Manjo	"	"
1970 Godfrey Sipheno	"	"
1971 Vujani Takota	"	"
1972 Mafu Pastina	"	"
1973 Vuzile Uzail	"	"
1974 Sulami Nuinhluzi	"	"
1975 Masxhosa Nelson	"	"
1976 Kolile Magwa	"	"
1977 Peter Matobese	"	"
1978 Sheperd Mlaklepi	"	"
1979 Sandle Mkwani	"	Jansenville
1980 Patricia Motlaung	B/F	Johannesburg
1981 Duke Nyangwa	B/M	"
1982 Lazarus Mouetsa	"	"
1983 Johannes Makhale	"	"
1984 Dick Matlaka	"	"
1985 Brister Kalaote	"	"
1986 Mirriam Toera	"	"
1987 Simon Mokgethi	"	"
1988 Betty Nhlapo	"	"
1989 Mathen Khaile	"	"
1990 Edna Malinga	B/F	"
1991 Humphrey Malinga	B/M	"
1992 Victor Mbunge	"	"
1993 Michael Ndlega	"	"
1994 Grace Photolo	B/F	"
1995 Vincent Mazibuko	B/M	"
1996 George Hlubi	"	"
1997 Melibo Nqaba	"	"
1998 Tony Gwala	"	"
1999 Peter Mpekani	"	"
2000 Sydney Mabula	"	"
2001 Siphiwe Dingalo	"	"
2002 Solomon Sibeko	"	"
2003 Constance Moswane	B/F	"
2004 Christopher Walaza	B/M	"
2005 Mtonzi Mlangu	"	"
2006 Asaph Masemola	"	"
2007 David Tshabalala	"	"
2008 Wilson Tshabalala	"	"
2009 Solly Bucigo	"	"
2010 Sipho Msimamzo	"	"
2011 Mathews Mashoa	"	"
2012 Tempelton Xoso	"	"
2013 Lawrence Mbatha	"	"
2014 Phineas Mabatha	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2015 Kennith Molosiwa	B/M	Johannesburg
2016 Phillemon Malatse	"	"
2017 Edward Mdeleze	"	"
2018 Isaac Moalusi	"	"
2019 Bhngane Hlongwane	"	"
2020 Isaac Tladi	"	"
2021 Joseph Mashuza	"	"
2022 Gudoba Mabaso	B/F	"
2023 Daniel Moselekatse	B/M	"
2024 Emmanuel Ragwadi	"	"

The following people were released (numbering follows SAPA'S earlier list):

Name	(No. on list of arrests)	Magisterial District
1025 M.P. Mokone	(59)	Krugersdorp
1026 J. Selimela	(60)	"
1027 J.S. Tsoari	(87)	Vanderbijlpark
1028 R.M. Fannie	(88)	"
1029 T.W. Mokolo	(89)	"
1030 Solly Phakoe	(84)	"
1031 Abraham Mbongo	(85)	"
1032 Vincent Khumalo	(86)	"
1033 J.O. Sehlare	(1029)	Vanderbijlpark
1034 A.F. Dabi	(1210)	Vereeniging
1035 S. Khota	(1211)	"
1036 N. Vahed	(1212)	"
1037 M.S. Mohlabane	(1260)	"
1038 B.I. Mtembu	(1335)	"
1039 D.D. Sithole	(1402)	Randfontein
1040 D.F. Mahlaba	(1651)	Vanderbijlpark
1041 Jabulani Xaba	(537)	Johannesburg
1042 Lawrence Njilele	(702)	"
1043 T.V. Mkhinje	(1346)	"
1044 M. Mchophela	(565)	Port Elizabeth
1045 N. Ndcina	(757)	"
1046 S. Mtati	(1228)	Albany
1047 T. Mahlako	(1231)	Port Elizabeth
1048 A. Mni	(1233)	"
1049 M. Mqcuka	(1294)	"
1050 C. Ntam	(1279)	"
1051 S. Khulu	(1340)	"
1052 S. Fuyan	(1341)	"
1053 S. Nyamfu	(1344)	"
1054 W. Mpinana	(1345)	"
1055 M.S. Ngxangxeni	(1357)	"
1056 D. Bata	(1358)	"
1057 G. Ntonsie	(1358)	"
1059 S. Malgas	(1361)	"
1060 M. Mglani	(1362)	"

Name	(No. on list of arrests)	Magisterial District
1061 G. Gulu	(1363)	Port Elizabeth
1062 N. Mbethe	(1364)	"
1063 B. Mtangwana	(1365)	"
1064 T. Fudwana	(1366)	"
1065 L. Mbuqu	(1367)	"
1066 R. Stamper	(1368)	"
1067 Jim Ngaaalwana	(1369)	"
1068 T. Chmani	(1370)	"
1069 K. Makinze	(1371)	"
1070 B. Adam	(1372)	"
1071 M. Sigwinia	(1373)	"
1072 J.J. Mqgineni	(1375)	"
1073 S. Dymane	(1376)	"
1074 L. Fifane	(1377)	"
1075 R. Matigo	(1385)	Uitenhage
1076 S. Mens	(1386)	"
1077 E. Malinda	(1389)	Port Elizabeth
1078 S. Kona	(1378)	Uitenhage
1079 B. Danster	(1380)	"
1080 N.J. Niki	(1381)	Port Elizabeth
1081 Z.M. Gadudu	(1382)	"
1082 M. Mthuhlu	(1383)	"
1083 Z.M. Mehlo	(1384)	"
1084 E.Z. Khayaalethu	(1390)	"
1085 M. Bole	(1391)	Uitenhage
1086 M. Blom	(1392)	"
1087 J. Blok	(1393)	"
1088 E.P. Gijana	(1394)	Port Elizabeth
1089 T.R. Bheki	(1395)	"
1090 P. Klaas	(1396)	Uitenhage
1091 M. Vaaltyn	(1397)	"
[No.'s 1092-1095 indistinct]		
1095 L. Witbooi	(1401)	"
1096 M. Tanster	(1429)	"
1097 J.C. Sehlare	(1209)	Vanderbijlpark
1098 A.F. Dabi	(1210)	Vereniging
1099 S. Khota	(1211)	"
1100 N. Vahev	(1212)	"
1101 M.S. Molabane	(1260)	"
1102 M. Baartman	(1254)	Fort Beaufort

Detainee Total at 2076

MB211025 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1017 GMT 21 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, Aug 21, SAPA--Police said today that 52 more people had been arrested under the emergency regulations, bringing to 2076 the number of people who had been detained since the month-old emergency was declared.

The names of the people detained are (the numbering follows SAPA'S earlier list):

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2025 Mzandele Zwane	B/M	Springs
2026 Gladstone Mdnage	"	Benoni
2027 Hakison Mazelana	"	"
2028 George Munella	"	"
2029 Amon Nkomo	"	"
2030 Inazenzia Mkhone	"	"
2031 Sipho Mpthi	"	Germiston
2032 George Plaakie	"	Springs
2033 Sipho Jokazi	"	"
2034 Naptali Sepholo	"	"
2035 John Parkie	"	"
2036 Hendrik Monana	"	Germiston
2037 Horis Shabalala	"	"
2038 Floyd Manale	"	Johannesburg
2039 Michael Moukanyo	"	"
2040 David Mabe	"	"
2041 Moses Ramasabo	"	"
2042 Almond Moede	"	"
2043 Kenneth More	"	"
2044 Fransisco Dalamo	"	"
2045 David Mofokeng	"	"
2046 Deon Nduma	"	Klipplaat
2047 Matthews Fisant	"	"
2048 Victor Ngogo	"	"
2049 Benjamin Rigala	"	Uitenhage
2050 Mzamatwana	"	"
2051 Joseph Martin	C/M	"
2052 Mtimase Manzia	B/M	"
2053 Notyotyoy Blayi	"	Port Elizabeth
2054 Nomaokhiza Njamakazi	B/F	Albany
2055 Tembile Nangu	B/M	Port Elizabeth
2056 Boy Charlie	"	"
2057 Khulekile Gukula	"	"
2058 Maxwell Rala	"	"
2059 Lennox Grootboom	"	"
2060 Ncebe Mdledge	"	"
2061 Mile Koltana	"	"
2062 Laurence Mziwanadoda	"	"
2063 Molia Mahloso	"	Vereeniging
2064 Gibson Ncipa	"	Alicejale
2065 Daliwonga Khaza	"	"
2066 Momeundiso Kulathi	B/F	Albany
2067 Bonginkosi Dilisa	B/M	"
2068 Mtomboti Gotwana	B/F	Port Elizabeth
2069 Martin Glover	W/M	Albany
2070 Pieter Ntozini	B/M	Port Elizabeth
2071 Zola Mtatzi	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2072 Eric Mapuma	B/M	Port Elizabeth
2073 Welcome Joma	"	"
2074 Jonathan Bonani	"	"
2075 Gowan Fani	"	"
2076 Wilton Tzane	"	"

Police Arrest Another 59, Release 81

MB221357 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1339 GMT 22 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, Aug 22, SAPA--Police said today 59 more people had been arrested under the emergency regulations, bringing to 2,135 the numbet of people detained under the month-old emergency.

A further 81 people had been freed, according to a police list released in Pretoria. The total of detainees freed now totals 1,183, according to the lists, although police figures released earlier today said 1,102 had been freed out of a total of 2,131 people detained.

The latest people arrested were named as (the numbering follows SAPA'S earlier list):

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2077 David Phalane	B/M	Jhb
2078 Andries Musi	"	"
2079 William Makhamatha	"	"
2080 David Diutuwileng	"	"
2081 Bessie Fihla	B/F	"
2082 E. Swartz	C/M	"
2083 Wayne Daniels	"	"
2084 Ezekiel Selepe	B/M	Randburg
2085 Daniel Maja	"	"
2086 Charles Malatji	"	"
2087 Mandla Mashobane	"	"
2088 Bella Mahlangu	B/F	"
2089 Herman Fisher	C/M	Jhb
2090 Johan Pennekin	"	"
2091 Steven Molekoa	B/M	Benoni
2092 Glen Tshabalala	"	"
2093 Abednego Motsopi	"	"
2094 Ben Mkhwanazi	"	"
2095 Buloyane Mashele	"	"
2096 Steven Molefe	"	"
2097 Kapenic Makoko	"	"
2098 Phillip Khanyile	"	"
2099 Mafatshe Mokoena	"	"
2100 Klokke Mataung	"	"
2101 Michael Mthembu	B/M	"
2102 Raymond Karoolis	C/M	Albany
2103 Michael Mpuntshe	B/M	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2104 Timothy Yolingana	B/M	Albany
2105 Zilizile Lana	"	"
2106 Mhlabeni Mbutsha	"	"
2107 Lendi Lali	"	"
2108 Mlulelu Danster	"	"
2109 Sandile Getshe	"	"
2110 John Momo	"	"
2111 Mtheteli Mbende ni	"	"
2112 Sinelele Goyela	"	"
2113 Linodiwe Skade	B/F	"
2114 Nontana Mbatshe	B/M	"
2115 Mzikisi Poti	"	"
2116 Mtunsi Badu	"	"
2117 Tembile Ngalo	"	"
2118 Vuyisi Nzwana	"	"
2119 Lifa Mangama	"	"
2120 Phakamile Duasi	"	"
2121 Thombile Gojela	"	"
2122 Songesile Lose	"	"
2123 Khayaletu Mzizi	"	"
2124 Thozamile Notoyanto	"	"
2125 Zali Mpuntshe	"	"
2126 Xolo Pakuwana	"	Uitenhage
2127 Linda Mankama	B/F	"
2128 Ben Sttenkamp	C/M	Cradock
2129 Daniel Williams	B/M	Fort Beaufort
2130 Norman Nqamboji	"	Pe
2131 Donald Magcadi	"	"
2132 Medikaja Mlunkulhni	"	"
2133 Richard Mtsa	"	"
2134 Edward Mijobile	"	"
2135 Patience Murawha	B/F	Jhb

The following people have been released (the numbering follows SAPA'S earlier list):

Name	(No. on arrest list)	Magisterial District
1103 Meriga Kene	(1434)	Benoni
1104 Tembinkosi Banga	(1433)	Springs
1105 Isak Tsottetsi	(1623)	Benoni
1106 Victor Madikiza	(1491)	Brakpan
1107 Obed Khumala	(1487)	"
1108 Ben Zulu	(1486)	"
1109 Bonniman Mtintso	(1488)	"
1110 Saraphina Sepeta	(1524)	Benoni
1111 B. Mtembu	(1335)	Vereeniging
1112 Darlington Sithole	(1402)	Krugersdorp
1113 Daniel Mahlaba	(1651)	Vanderbijlpark
1114 Yusuf Dadoo	(1467)	Krugersdorp

Name	(No. on arrest list)	Magisterial District
1115 Yusuf Ismail	(1468)	Krugersdorp
1116 D. Molawe	(1649)	Vereeniging
1117 M. Kokoena	(1650)	"
1118 J. Thebehani	(1714)	"
1119 M. Shabane	(1715)	"
1120 W. Makgalehele	(1717)	"
1121 P. Ntshingila	(1469)	Jhb
1122 P. Khoza	(1470)	"
1123 G. Tamapo	(1471)	"
1124 F. Seepoole	(1472)	"
1125 E. Ndlovu	(1473)	"
1126 A. Modikse	(1474)	"
1127 Samuel Majola	(1439)	Pe
1128 Yonsimia Sokhanyile	(1440)	"
1129 Amos Mjekhule	(1441)	"
1130 Johnny Melle	(1442)	"
1131 Gideon Maboza	(1443)	"
1132 Zoline Moshani	(1445)	"
1133 Khandlethu Mnikina	(1444)	"
1134 Payina Besman	(1446)	"
1335 Shadrack Matuduka	(1447)	"
1336 Lungile Nonduwana	(1448)	"
1337 Koke Dyantyi	(1449)	"
1138 Vukile Jerreck	(1450)	"
1139 Vuyisile Mantle	(1451)	"
1140 Thembesile Sandlo	(1479)	Cookhouse
1141 Piki Ngcingola	(1404)	Pe
1142 Israel Mantamaro	(1405)	"
1143 Mluleki Thandoni	(1406)	"
1144 Jacobus Hlele	(1411)	"
1145 Sibonisile Gqezengele	(1412)	"
1146 Xolani Ngesi	(1413)	"
1147 Sipho Nxusa	(1414)	"
1148 Fanni Ivy	(1415)	"
1149 Xola Wabaka	(1416)	"
1150 Raymond Nbenga	(1417)	"
1151 Victor Dolashe	(1418)	"
1152 Roland White	(1423)	"
1153 Susan-Ann Lund	(1424)	"
1154 Lucky Sejana	(1430)	"
1155 Salelo Solulo	(1431)	Uitenhage
1156 Sithembiso Mangati	(1435)	Pe
1157 Owen Lumbe	(1438)	"
1158 Cynthia Kwanini	(1656)	"
1159 Painke Ngubo	(1296)	Graaff-Reinet
1160 Sam Mayo	(695)	"
1161 Richard Yarnicker	(762)	"
1162 Manganiso Doro	(831)	Jansenville
1163 Vumile Bokwe	(832)	"
1164 Toyn Zahela	(1003)	Randburg

Name	(No. on arrest list)	Magisterial District
1165 Zwelinezine Danster	(1004)	Randburg
1166 Sugile Jonas	(1005)	"
1167 Sophie Gomo	(1010)	"
1168 Graham Joseph	(1214)	Steytlerville
1169 Collin Nappies	(1215)	"
1170 Elliot Poppo	(1419)	Jansenville
1171 Lindelwa Hempe	(1420)	"
1172 Thozanele Nqeza	(1421)	"
1173 Jabulani Xaba	(537)	Jhb
1174 Lawrence Njilele	(702)	"
1175 Teddy Mkhinje	(1347)	"
1176 Firoz Cacalia	(1706)	"
1177 Liliana Risi	(1707)	"
1178 Mlingi Shezi	(1708)	"
1179 Trevor Ngwane	(1709)	"
1180 John Payne	(1710)	"
1181 Richard Pretorius	(1711)	"
1182 Bernhardt Reck	(1712)	"
1183 Adrian Perkel	(1713)	"

94 More Arrested

MB231510 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1502 GMT 23 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, Aug 23, SAPA--Police said today 94 more people had been arrested under the emergency regulations, bringing to 2,229 the number of people detained under the month-old emergency.

The total of detainees freed totalled 1,183, according to lists released by the police up to yesterday. No further releases were announced today.

The latest people arrested were named as (the numbering follows SAPA's earlier list):

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2136 Benjamin Mohani	B/M	Johannesburg
2137 Morris Ngandela	"	"
2138 Moses Mathiboni	"	"
2139 Joseph Moloi	"	"
2140 Danie Johannes Otto	W/M	"
2141 Jabu Sikilan	B/M	"
2142 Pogie Dyantjies	"	"
2143 Linda Thabethe	"	"
2144 Clayton Kgega	"	"
2145 Cebongele Kole	B/W [as received]	Springs
2146 Victoria Namzaa	"	"
2147 Itimileng Mohlala	"	"
2148 Cicilia Mnghibi	"	"
2149 Prinses Molefe	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2150 Pheminana Mlozi	B/W	Springs
2151 Thobhi Mavimbela	"	"
2152 Folomom Mathathe	B/M	"
2153 Paulue Mkozi	"	"
2154 Arthur Cebantoni	"	"
2155 Ezekie Dhlamini	"	Vereiniging
2156 Qhalane Kqethang	"	Vanderbijlpark
2157 Mopele Julias	"	"
2158 Agbus Mazibuko	"	"
2159 Aupake Malose	"	"
2160 A. Mkhwanazi	"	"
2161 Moses Maphohoza	"	"
2162 Aaron Moketsi	"	"
2163 Esther Ntswaki	"	"
2164 Majola Zacharia	"	"
2165 Joshua Beushu	"	"
2166 Azered Velaphi	"	"
2167 Pauline Nomumelo	B/W	"
2168 Radebe Ntsala	B/M	"
2169 Petrus Kubela	"	"
2170 Poliman Mapogame	"	"
2171 William Mahuthu	"	"
2172 Mofokeng Mofone	B/W	"
2173 Aaron Tsholonuana	B/M	"
2174 Makoe Romonana	"	"
2175 Neso Azpheus	"	"
2176 Jabuuile Nzamela	B/W	"
2178 Percu Dineka	B/M	"
2179 Abram Phakiso	"	"
2180 Solom Mothibedi	"	"
2181 Mohlomola Mtimkhulu	"	"
2182 Daniel Sebeabe	"	"
2183 Michael Pocali	"	Port Elizabeth
2184 Welcome Rolani	"	"
2185 Mowonca Bladi	"	"
2186 Vuvani Rolani	"	"
2187 Gwele Kwatelia	"	"
2188 Welile Phillip	"	"
2189 Temba Ngajeka	"	"
2190 Hzwantile Magaga	"	"
2191 Gift Mabutho	"	Cradock
2192 Witutuzele Mabutho	"	"
2193 Ludwe Jafta	"	Somerset East
2194 Sunshine Bloue	"	"
2195 Ntomgamzi Nesi	B/W	Albany
2196 Vuyani Booi	B/M	"
2197 Mziwonke Mkele	"	"
2198 Desember Klaas	"	Port Elizabeth
2199 James Klaas	"	"
2200 Temba Bethwell	January	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District	
2201	Nocela Stuurman	B/W	Somerset East
2202	Solomon Mashele Wasa	B/M	"
2203	Willem Olifant	C/M	"
2204	Nomelisanga Vivian Simiti	B/W	Somerset East
2205	Lobani Tofui Nanayasu	B/W	Somerset East
2206	Rosie Jack	"	"
2207	Zola Patiwe	B/M	Port Elizabeth
2208	Monabizi Pienaar	"	"
2209	Zipho Mbetzele	"	"
2210	Lunga Qebeyi	"	"
2211	Mbugizile Mabope	"	"
2212	Mlungizi Getu	"	"
2213	Zipho Ndongeni	"	"
2214	Zwelinzima Kasa	"	"
2215	Zamxola Ntsuma	"	"
2216	Bonakele Nqonongono	"	"
2217	Phillip Mpijane	"	"
2218	Edward Maneli	"	"
2219	Mntanbo Ziknumbuzo	"	"
2220	Morris Thamzanqua	"	"
2221	Lujanda Gcakazi	"	"
2222	Aron Swelibanzi	"	"
2223	Stunkie Malgas	"	"
2224	Siphiwo Gampu	"	"
2225	Ngxowuh Lindile	"	"

90 More Detained

MB261222 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1219 GMT 26 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, Aug 26, SAPA--Police said today 90 more people had been arrested under the emergency regulations, bringing to 2,319 the number of people detained under the five-week-old emergency.

The total of detainees freed totals 1,183, according to lists released by the police in Pretoria by Friday last week, although a police situation report earlier today put the release figure at 1,103 (and total detentions at 2,197). No releases were announced today.

Those arrested were named as (the numbering follows SAPA'S earlier list. Friday's list should have ended at 2,225, and not 2,229, as four names were mistakenly entered. Correction follows.):

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District	
2226	Matsheldiso Melamo	B/M	Randfontein
2227	Maho Seboni	"	"
2228	Aaron Kgomo	"	Benoni
2229	Zimizane Fortune	"	Alberton

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2230 Mlilo Vaba	B/M	Alberton
2231 Neo Mqeboe	"	Germiston
2232 Andries Maphetla	"	"
2233 Kwanele Ngetu	"	PE (Port Elizabeth)
2234 Ashbaf Mohammed	"	Uitenhage
2235 Bonnisile Ghqa	"	PE
2236 Kaplane Jafi	"	Uitenhage
2237 Samuet Nanyo	"	"
2238 Phakamila Xangaja	"	"
2239 Petros Klaas	"	Kirkwood
2240 Kennike Payi	"	PE
2241 Henry Hyikilawa	"	Grahamstown
2242 Payus Nontswelelo	"	Albany
2243 Gryse Nzuzo	"	Alexandria
2244 Alfred Nzimkuzu	"	Bedford
2245 Sidney Sam	"	PE
2246 Mzimase Melhnyama	"	Kirkwood
2247 Tempelke Phesimani	"	"
2248 Soha Thuta	"	"
2249 Nkosinatu Msemeheho	"	"
2250 Kaiser Khaule	"	PE
2251 Martin Papu	"	"
2252 Mzimkulu Jaji	"	"
2253 Montuwaye Fonte	"	"
2254 Zawaele Tiklie	"	"
2255 Mbuldo Mazoka	"	"
2256 Paleko Tiso	"	"
2257 Lawoelie Cola	"	"
2258 Mbayiselo Lungisi	"	"
2259 Michael Fumbato	"	"
2260 Vilanie Colda	"	"
2261 Patrick Thlelewe	"	Uitenhage
2262 Vuoni Molhuna	"	"
2263 Mzolie Vuramie	"	"
2264 Tampiele Hoffman	"	"
2265 Fotazelo Nwelo	"	"
2266 Simewe Foka	"	"
2267 Isaac Mjoli	"	"
2268 Tembila Bewa	"	"
2269 Nzumeni Gyeviva	"	"
2270 Temba Makanga	"	"
2271 Temba Speelman	"	"
2272 Zandile Ngato	"	"
2273 Mzikisi Fosani	"	"
2274 Bthupiso Fihpi	"	"
2275 Mbeko Jonas	"	"
2276 Temba Rika	"	"
2277 Khaye Biwso	"	"
2278 Alfred Pinos	"	"
2279 Edwin Stuikman	"	"
2280 John Uys	"	"

Name	Race/Sex	Magisterial District
2281 Julius Matomela	B/M	Uitenhage
2282 Zekeli Menjele	"	"
2283 Mkoleko Zomdawi	"	"
2284 Peter Jacobs	"	"
2285 Jackson Siwtu	"	"
2286 Mathews de Bruyn	"	"
2287 Simon Kause	"	"
2288 Nzukuzi Koko	"	"
2289 Josef Boleko	"	"
2290 Welcome Maklhi	"	"
2291 Manabis Cosa	"	"
2292 Munja Mabuleni	"	"
2293 Spires Toto	"	"
2294 Michael Mabona	"	"
2295 Patrick Mtuikiwe	"	Krugersdorp
2296 Henni Maile	"	Alberton
2297 Monguza Tshongweni	"	"
2298 Peter Mofokeng	"	"
2299 Lennox Mqinegama	"	PE
2300 James Rodwhina	"	"
2301 Roy Tulo	"	"
2302 Fezile Johnson	"	"
2303 Meolisy Matume	"	"
2304 Andile Meudiawsa	"	"
2305 Mkululeko Klaas	"	"
2306 Pindile Mhlopo	"	"
2307 Siphino Mcapayi	"	"
2308 Zoile Mesani	"	"
2309 Vakke Mpambo	"	"
2310 Moneesi Mpampam	"	"
2311 Mthory Rotoman	"	"
2312 Mcimbi Kompoto	"	"
2313 Ina Nosusi	B/F	"
2314 Johnson Herman	B/M	Kirkwood
2315 Mamgisi Kuunana	"	Uitenhage
2316 Madono Marhoza	"	Albany
2317 Sonsele Apeke	"	"
2318 Andrew Rownam	C/M	Uitenhage
2319 Franz Phuwelele	B/M	PE

CSO: 3400/992

SOUTH AFRICA

CAPE TOWN RELATIVES ASK WHEREABOUTS OF DETAINEES

MB270645 Johannesburg SAPA in English 2223 GMT 26 Aug 85

[Text] Cape Town, 26 Aug, SAPA--A delegation of relatives of Cape Town detainees today handed a signed petition addressed to the commissioner of police, to the security police at Caledon Square.

Mrs Rosalie Block, mother of Mr Graeme Block, and Mr Eric Rossouw, father-in-law of Mr Saleem Badat, handed the letter, signed by 17 relatives, to a senior security policeman.

The letter called for the security police to divulge the whereabouts of the detainees and to give reasons for the arrests.

It also asked for an assurance that the detainees would not be assaulted.

After a long deliberation with the security police the group, which included Mrs Kathy Luckett, wife of the Anglican priest; Rev Syd Luckett, Mrs Farieda Omar, wife of advocate Mr Dullah Omar; Mrs May Ann Adams, Mrs Veronica Simmers and Mrs Shireen Bedat, was told that police could not divulge the whereabouts or allow regular visits "at this stage."

The detainees, who are all being held under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, were in solitary confinement, Mr Eric Rossouw said this afternoon.

With regard to medical treatment by personal doctors, the security police said the senior district surgeon would see the detainees and their personal doctors could contact him with regard to any special treatment or medication they may be needing, Mr Rossouw said.

Reading matter would be restricted to the Bible and Koran although detainees could request study material if they were detained for a long period.

The group was later allowed to hand in fruit, sweets, biscuits and cigarettes and were told that each detainee would be allowed two sets of clothing which they would be required to wash themselves.

CSO: 3400/1018

SOUTH AFRICA

**TEXT OF ORDER CONCERNING ATTENDANCE AT FUNERALS**

Pretoria GOVERNMENT GAZETTE in English 31 Jul 85 pp 1-2

[Text] Government Notice

**MINISTRY OF LAW AND ORDER**

**No. 1746**

**31 July 1985**

**ORDERS BY THE COMMISSIONER OF THE  
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE**

Under regulation 6 of the Regulations in terms of the Public Safety Act, 1953, promulgated by Proclamation R. 121 of 21 July 1985, I, Petrus Johannes Coetzee, Commissioner of the South African Police, hereby issue with reference to the magisterial districts specified in the Schedule the following orders in respect of funeral ceremonies, including any memorial service, commemorative service, funeral procession or burial, of any person who has apparently died as a result of unnatural causes:

1. (1) No memorial or commemorative service in connection with a funeral of a deceased person referred to above, shall be held out of doors.
  - (2) Only an ordained minister of a religious denomination or organization may act as a speaker during any proceedings at any such funeral ceremony. Provided that such a minister shall not at such a ceremony in any manner defend, attack, criticise, propagate or discuss any form of government, any principle or policy of a government of a state, any boycott action, the existence of a state of emergency or any action by a Force or a member of a Force.
  - (3) Person concerned who are attending the funeral shall only travel by vehicle from the place where the memorial or commemorative service has taken place to the place where the deceased is to be buried, and along a route determined by a Divisional Commissioner of the South African Police.
  - (4) No flags, banners, placards, pamphlets or posters shall be displayed or distributed at or during the funeral ceremony.
  - (5) No public address system shall be used at or during the funeral ceremony.
  - (6) A particular funeral ceremony shall not be held with regard to more than one such deceased person.
2. A Divisional Commissioner may, on written application, grant exemption from any or all of the above-mentioned orders.

### **SCHEDULE**

Magisterial Districts of Adelaide, Albany, Alexandria, Bathurst, Bedford, Cradock, Fort Beaufort, Graaff-Reinet, Hankey, Humansdorp, Jansenville, Kirkwood, Pearston, Port Elizabeth, Somerset-East, Steytlerville and Uitenhage, Cape of Good Hope;

Sasolburg, Orange Free State;

Albertyn, Balfour, Benoni, Boksburg, Brakpan, Delmas, Germiston, Heidelberg, Johannesburg, Kempton Park, Nigel, Randburg, Randfontein, Roodepoort, Springs, Vanderbijlpark, Vereeniging and Westonaria, Transvaal.

CSO: 3400/988

SOUTH AFRICA

REPORT ON HOW FUNERALS ARE TURNED INTO POLITICAL HAPPENINGS

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Aug 85 p 15

[Report by Allan Soule]

[Text]

**THEY** have become the roadshows of death — the travelling political funerals of unrest victims.

Radical protest organisers have taken charge of most unrest-victim burials and shamelessly hijacked the solemnity of the traditional black funeral.

For the black liberation cause, their propaganda value has become incalculable.

Burial proceedings have been honed into slick publicity operations geared to mesmerise the world's news media with stirring visuals and stinging words.

In the Eastern Cape and other areas of the country hit by unrest, the funeral circuit has emerged as a huge crowd-puller. Every funeral attracts a mass of black followers, who often travel great distances at great personal cost.

They come to savour the heady atmosphere, to be part of a vibrant spectacle and to ride high on euphoric waves of pounding militant rhetoric.

The theatrical props are all there. Beret-wearing sentinels pose next to gaudy coffins. Little girls dressed in white and clutching candles ride on the bonnets of hearses. Banners and flags rise above the skyline.

### Peak

The main cast is carefully selected, a band of able performers who deliver dramatically scripted monologues steeped in hate and revolutionary propaganda.

Audience participation is encouraged. And the

mourners revel in their own role. They chant and sing.

At the inevitable climax, the crowd frenzy has reached its peak. Often it breaks, unleashing savagery and, not infrequently, more deaths.

Last Sunday's funeral of murdered black activist Mrs Victoria Mxenge in a Ciskei village proved no exception.

It was a nightmarish re-run of funeral fever in its most deadly form. A black soldier died. He was cruelly put to death in the veld by being stoned and burnt alive because of the uniform he wore.

His killers were "mourners" at a funeral rally presided over by men of the cloth and attended by a coterie of white sympathisers.

The funeral began at daybreak on Sunday when the packed buses began rolling into the village of Rayl, traditional home of the Mxenge family.

Stiff-limbed and bored after hours of cramped travel, the mourners formed themselves into squads representing a host of UDF-affiliated civic organisations.

Leaders spurred the cohorts into motion. Unfurling banners and flags, they jogged round a dusty common chanting protest slogans. The emotional force began to gather.

## Angles

In the makeshift amphitheatre in the shadow of the township church, the atmosphere was carnival-like. People perched in trees and on rooftops.

Media men ferreted about checking equipment and seeking out the best angles. They had come from many corners of the world to document South Africa in the throes of so-called revolution.

Then the curtain rose on the opening scene. There were 16 speakers, among them the veteran banned activist, Mrs Helen Joseph. She cut an unlikely figure of resistance as she frailly punched the sky with her fist. Amandla!

Around lunchtime, the heat, dust and the interminable speeches began to take the edge off the proceedings. Organisers sensed the restlessness and skillfully threw in a twist.

The master of ceremonies made a dramatic announcement. "Buses carrying our people from Port Elizabeth have been stopped at a roadblock near Peddie. Our people have left the buses and they are marching to meet us on foot. Will all bus drivers come forward and go and collect our brothers."

The crowd roared their disgust and the adrenalin

flowed once more, the heat and discomfort forgotten.

Some newsmen scuttled off to cover the protest march. The seasoned "funeral correspondents" hung back — they'd seen this before, at the Cradock funeral of four murdered civic leaders on July 20.

## Scars

Meanwhile a skilled operative worked his way through the crowd. He stripped off a tattered shirt and displayed his back meshed with scars.

"Look how I was beaten by the boere," he cried. His audience hissed angrily and he moved on.

After five hours of speeches the steaming procession headed for the graveyard less than a kilometre away. The temperature of the crowd was dangerously high.

Almost as if on cue, a Ciskeian military van blundered on to the scene and the inevitable happened. The van was the spark that ignited the powder keg.

First one, then a barrage of rocks rained down on the vehicle. Three frightened men huddled together in the flimsy cab as glass shattered round them.

The driver, a resident of the township, made a fatal mistake — he jumped out and tried to protest his innocence. Then, sensing his folly, he vainly tried to run, but was caught and dragged away to be executed.

One of the other two men in the van started it and they drove to safety.

On a lonely patch of veld behind them, their comrade's body burnt under a pyre of discarded tyres.

South Africans — and the world — saw him burning on their television screens.

SOUTH AFRICA

TREURNICHT WARNS OF POTENTIAL WHITE RESISTANCE TO REFORM

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 15 Aug 85 p 3

[Text]

THE slumbering tiger of white resistance was being awakened by government's integrationist policies, Conservative Party leader Andries Treurnicht warned last night.

Opening the party's third annual Orange Free State congress in Bloemfontein, he told more than 1 000 supporters in the City Hall that the President P W Botha was attempting to achieve an impossible compromise between white self-determination and white subjection to black majority rule in a unitary state.

"With all respect, I want to warn you (Botha), you will be crushed between black radical demands and white's resistance which will refuse to be co-governed by non-whites," he said.

"I warn you, you are awakening the tiger in the whites ... you underestimate the dormant objection among the whites to the path of integration."

Treurnicht urged Botha to reconsider before he continued with the implementation of his policy, and to break loose from the liberals and power-sharers.

Describing government's present course as political recklessness, he said: "Don't try a political experiment that has succeeded nowhere else. Don't place a foot on the road to what will inevitably result in black majority rule."

He added that whites were entitled to their own sovereignty, parliament, white government, education systems, judiciary, civil service and security forces.

The same right applied to other population groups in South Africa, but within their own, geographically separate homelands. — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/989

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**BUTHELEZI SAID TO BE BUILDING UP WHITE CONSTITUENCY**

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 13 Aug 85 p 14

[Article by Hannes de Wet]

**[Text]**

Whether it is his intention or not, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of kwaZulu, is slowly but surely building up a white constituency in South Africa.

At the moment he is probably doing more than any other leader in the country to make white voters favourably disposed towards a faster pace of political reform.

Consider the situation:

Antagonism in the world community towards South Africa is intensifying. Legislation in the United States to impose mild sanctions against South Africa is well on its way. Only a veto by President Ronald Reagan can stop the Bill now.

President Reagan is under heavy pressure to approve sanctions. Thus far the American President has refused to declare sanctions as an effective punitive measure to bring about change in South Africa.

And who is he quoting to strengthen his case?

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.

Chief Buthelezi, President Rea-

gan told American TV viewers last week, has warned that sanctions would only hurt the people it was supposed to help — South Africa's blacks.

And Chief Buthelezi is a genuine leader of more than a third of South Africa's blacks, President Reagan said.

There is nothing new about the argument President Reagan has used against sanctions. The South African Government has said the same thing umpteen times. But it just didn't carry the same weight as Chief Buthelezi's warnings.

Whites in South Africa are likely to begin seeing Chief Buthelezi as a possible partner in any future dispensation. The Government, by word of the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Mr Chris Heunis, has indicated that Natal/kwaZulu may have to be seen as a unit.

Another reason why Chief Buthelezi may find acceptance among whites is because of the stark contrast of the kwaZulu leader's utterances overseas when compared

with those of Bishop Desmond Tutu.

When the Bishop is abroad he openly joins in the condemnation of South Africa. He has repeatedly pleaded for economic pressure against South Africa and has done little to counter international scorn for President Botha's reforms thus far.

Chief Buthelezi, on the other hand, although he is presently at loggerheads with President Botha, told Western leaders on his recent overseas visit: "The State President deserves credit for some of his reforms thus far. The removal of the Immorality Act and Mixed Marriages Act was not just cosmetic."

He has also credited President Botha for officially acknowledging the permanency of urban blacks.

Chief Buthelezi must be acutely aware of the applause and popularity he can get abroad by unconditionally slamming the South African Government. But he refrains from doing that.

This conduct could make whites less hesitant to share power with the blacks.

CSO: 3400/1023

SOUTH AFRICA

WHITES LIKELY TO SACRIFICE MORE IN NEW ORDER

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 21 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by Peter Wallington]

[Text]

MANY of the points which it was speculated President P W Botha would include in his Rubicon speech last week were yesterday outlined by Deputy Director General of Foreign Affairs Neil van Heerden.

In a speech delivered at an SA-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry function, in Johannesburg, he said government's answer to the unrest was to:

- ☐ Take a new look at common citizenship;
- ☐ Take a new look at the division of SA into separate entities;
- ☐ Work towards a more equitable education system;
- ☐ Take a new look at influx control;
- ☐ Improve living standards and establish the principle of "the right to a job for all";

☐ Pursue urgently dialogue between all population groups;

☐ Halt all forced removals.

However, Van Heerden said his speech "should not be construed as further extrapolation on the State President's address last week".

He warned that both black and white would have to make sacrifices, and that whites would largely be the givers.

"The old order is passing, and we are heading into a new one."

He added that there were some who did not want to see reform succeed and they were a significant factor in sustaining the unrest.

Van Heerden cautioned that, while SA would have to contend with even more turmoil, most people had no alternative but to work things out.

CSO: 3400/1024

SOUTH AFRICA

INKATHA STILL STRIVING FOR CHANGE WITHOUT VIOLENCE

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 17 Aug 85 p 24

[Text]

DURBAN — Inkatha, the national cultural liberation movement spearheaded by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, has been much in the news lately.

As speculation mounts about a possible joint constitutional future for Natal and kwaZulu, more and more South Africans — especially Natalians — have become curious about the movement: what it is, how it started, what it does, and where it's going.

The story began in 1928 when the King of the Zulus, King Solomon ka Dinizulu, established a cultural organisation named Inkatha kaZulu as a means of maintaining and nurturing Zulu traditions and culture.

(The word "inkatha" is Zulu for the grass coil used by Zulu women as a load support on the head. Politically, it symbolises unity.)

Little was known about Inkatha kaZulu until 1975, when Chief Buthelezi, King Solomon's grandson, revived the organisation.

What had previously been a purely cultural organisation became a cultural and political organisation.

With Chief Buthelezi at the helm as president, Inkatha — more political than cultural these days — has grown into the largest black organisation in South Africa, claiming a membership of 1 150 094.

Though most members are Zulu, the leadership is constantly at pains to emphasise that it has many non-Zulu members all over the country.

The Inkatha Youth Brigade accounts for 38 percent of membership, and the Inkatha Women's Brigade for 36 percent.

The high percentage of youth membership is cited by Inkatha leaders to contradict the argument by critics that the movement is made up chiefly of older, more conservative blacks.

Chief Buthelezi was an active member of the ANC in the 1950s, but opted for non-violent strategies for change after the ANC was forced underground and adopted violence.

So it is perhaps no

coincidence that Inkatha's official colours — gold/yellow, black and green — are the same as those of the ANC.

Chief Buthelezi remains steadfastly opposed to violent change and is one of the few black leaders in South Africa who says he is prepared to shelve the one man, one vote ideal if the Government recognises that there should be one citizenship for all in a unitary state, and commits itself to work towards black/white power-sharing.

The crux of Inkatha's views were summed up by Secretary-General Dr Oscar Dhlomo in an address in Durban last week: "We believe in the basic right of African people to a dispensation involving universal franchise in a single political system.

"We are, however, mindful of the fact that the white minority has deeply ingrained anxieties regarding the possibility of political domination, and therefore we are open to negotiation on this issue, possibly around a federal model."

SOUTH AFRICA

THEMBISA BUSINESSMEN DETAINED, SHOPS CLOSED

MB301330 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1316 GMT 30 Aug 85

[Text] Johannesburg, 30 Aug, SAPA--A number of Tembisa businessmen have been detained and their shops closed down in terms of the emergency regulations.

The detention of the businessmen follows a meeting last Thursday between local traders and members of the East Rand Consumer Boycott Committee which called for the boycott of white businesses.

Those detained are the chairman of the Tembisa Chamber of Commerce, Mr Jerry Morakile, Mr Naboth Khoza, Mr Moses Mnguni, Mr Vuyisile Siyothula and Mr Ambrose Dlangamandla.

Two other people, Mr Goba Ndlovu and Mr Ishmael Seeta, have also been detained.

Mr Ndlovu's wife, Mrs Ruth Ndlovu, said her husband had been taken away by soldiers and policemen at 2.10 am on Thursday.

Shopowners in the township have also claimed that trucks delivering goods to their shops were turned back by members of the defence force at the entrance to the township on Wednesday.

The wives of some of the detained businessmen said their husbands had been summoned to the police station for questioning on Monday before they were detained.

The wives of three of the businessmen, Mrs Dorcas Morakile, Mrs Busi Khoza and Mrs Happy Mnguni, said their husbands had been detained on Wednesday. They said the police said the detentions were in terms of the emergency regulations.

Police in a convoy of cars went to the shop of Mr Khoza at Limindlela railway station and ordered his wife to close the shop. They said they were taking the action in terms of the emergency regulations.

Policemen were posted at all the shops which had been closed down.

SOUTH AFRICA

SHOPS BOYCOTT ALSO HITS BLACK TRADERS

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 14 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by Sam Mabe]

[Text]

**A**S the boycott of white businesses spreads to new areas, a number of questions have been raised in the black community.

Yesterday a businessman in Soweto's Diepkloof township shook his head, saying he was frightened about events in the township this week.

He is running out of stock to sell. Delivery trucks coming into the township are intercepted by youths, looted and set alight.

"We thought it was good for the political activists to call on the community to buy black, but where are we expected to get our goods from?" he said.

"Are our people expected to starve?"

"Not only that, but every minute I am scared that my shop might be the next to go up in flames — they are burning shops indiscriminately."

Most blacks agree with the demands put forward by the Consumer Boycott Committees in Pretoria and Johannesburg this past weekend. The boycotts started in the Eastern and Western Cape.

The Transvaal committees are demanding, among other things, the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of political prisoners and the withdrawal of troops from black townships.

The intention is to persuade white businessmen to talk to the Government to do something about these grievances.

But there are very obvious flaws with the planning.

It is not only the white retailers who will suffer. In fact some shops in the Eastern Cape have had to close down, leading some people to believe that the boycott was very effective.

But the people in the black townships have to eat; they need the goods that only white commerce can provide. So the black shopkeeper will still have to go to the white wholesalers for their stock. This might be done openly or it might have to be done secretly.

Thus the white wholesalers and manufacturers will continue to flourish, whatever the length of the boycott.

White money in retailing will then be transferred to manufacturing and wholesale business.

The assistant manager of the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce,

Mr A Malherbe, says white business will devise some means to cushion itself against the effects of the boycott.

"White business is not the Government and does not govern the country," he said yesterday.

But in the same breath he said the opening of central business districts to all race groups was the result of the initiatives of white business.

White commerce and industry has influenced Government thinking since 1976. They are largely responsible for 99-year leasehold and other "reforms".

It is therefore not surprising that some people believe that the consumer boycott will yield the results they want.

Black business, on the other hand, seems to support the boycott.

Dr Sam Motsuenyane, president of the National Federated Chamber of Commerce, said he agreed with the spirit of the boycott because it was based on "legitimate reasons".

But he felt that there should have been some planning involving the organisers and black businessmen.

"Black businessmen might not be able to carry the volume of business they will suddenly be faced with unless supplies of stock are allowed to come into the townships," he said.

"Our children should stop looting delivery vans coming into the townships because if that continues, shops will go empty and the boycott will lose the support of the consumers.

"We have reached a stage where we want to be on the side of the people. We want to say what they say and be part of the process of change that is going on. This brings up the necessity of dialogue.

"We will need to sit down for our plans to be well-organised and be co-ordinated," Dr Motsuenyane said.

But many blacks prefer to buy from white shops in town because of exorbitant prices in the black shops.

Dr Motsuenyane said some businessmen had agreed to lower their profit margins slightly since the increased volume of business that could result from the boycott would increase their turnover.

The truth is that the black businessman, who had been hoping to benefit from the boycott, is caught in the crossfire.

SOUTH AFRICA

BODY TO MONITOR INDIAN, BLACK CONTACT

Port Elizabeth EVENING POST in English 13 Aug 85 p 4

[Text]

DURBAN — The appointment of a joint black and Indian "Committee of 20" to monitor relations between the two communities in Durban's northern areas was announced last night by Mr Yellan Chinsamy, vice-president of the South African Black Alliance.

The black Kwamashu township's Mayor, Mrs Esther Africa, was elected chairman at a meeting here yesterday, with an Indian businessman from Duffs Road, Mr Dookey Ramdarie, as vice-chairman.

Mr Chinsamy said the committee, comprising 10 blacks and 10 Indians, would also act as a "peace-keeping group" and would meet at least once a week.

He said the committee was appointed on the initiative of Inkatha, the Zulu movement, which, he added, had stepped in to bring peace in unrest-torn black townships and in black and Indian relations.

The committee had the blessing of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of Kwazulu and president of Inkatha and the Black Alliance, he said.

Mr Chinsamy said the "wonderful way" in which Inkatha had put an end to the week-long rioting in black areas showed its strength was "beyond doubt".

Appealing to Indians and blacks to keep calm, the Chairman of the Ministers' Council in the House of Delegates, Mr Amichand Rajbansi, said he was in close and constant touch with the Government and was able to give the assurance that police and army action would be readily available in the event of further flare-ups.

"I have been touched by the willingness of many blacks in the area to return to Indian owners goods, including many items of furniture, looted during the unrest," Mr Rajbansi said.

The Gandhi shrine, which had also been destroyed in the unrest, had to be restored at all costs, he said, adding that the House of Delegates would be willing to help the Gandhi board of trustees in undertaking restoration.

Community and social workers today estimated damage to property to be more than R25 million.

In Inanda about 100 houses, shops and businesses had been destroyed and two schools had also been burnt down.

Mr Rajbansi told Sapa he would raise the matter of compensation for families who suffered losses in the unrest in Durban with the Government this week.

Meanwhile two doctors whose surgeries were destroyed in the Inanda rioting have been offered employment in the House of Delegates administration, Mr Rajbansi said.

He said the doctors were providing medical attention to Inanda refugees at the Greenbury Community Centre in Phoenix for the time being.

All the Inanda Indian families whose homes were lost in the unrest would be rehoused within a month, according to the Minister of Housing and Local Government in the House of Delegates, Mr Baldeo Dookie.

Meanwhile police have warned vigilante groups in Durban's Indian areas bordering trouble-hit black townships against taking the law into their own hands.

Indiscriminate and impulsive actions by such groups could easily trigger unnecessary violence, a police spokesman said. — Sapa

SOUTH AFRICA

AFRIKANER YOUTH LEADERS REJECT NP POLICY

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Hans Pienaar]

[Text]

INFLUENTIAL leaders among the Afrikaner youth have expressed their frustration at the slow pace of reform by the Government.

While reiterating their allegiance to the National Party as the "only force" with the ability to bring about reform, they have stated their rejection of its current policy.

The main points of the thinking among the youth leaders are:

- Disappointment at the rejection by Mr Chris Heunis of "grey areas" ever being National Party policy.

- The belief in federalism as the only viable constitu-

tional structure of the future.

- The replacement of influx control with a policy of controlled black urbanisation.

- A single constitution with single citizenship governed by a Bill of Rights and veto rights for minorities.

- The unacceptability of the perception that the armed forces are prime

forces in maintaining a political system which is unacceptable to blacks.

Most of these points were agreed on at a meeting between Stellenbosch University student leaders and members of the Inkatha Youth Brigade this week, said SRC president Le Roux van der Westhuizen.

It was also agreed that the decision-making process on structural reform should involve all South African peoples.

CSO: 3400/1022

SOUTH AFRICA

**SOWETO MAYOR SAYS CURFEW MIGHT ENDANGER RESIDENTS' LIVES**

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 17 Aug 85 p 5

**[Text]**

The mayor of Soweto, Mr Edward Kunene, said yesterday that the curfew imposed on the township could put the lives of residents in danger.

He was reacting to the 10 pm to 4 am announced by President Botha at the Natal National Party's congress. It came into force last night.

"Soweto will remain as it is," said Mr Kunene. "The new regulations will not restrain residents from being in the streets during the prohibited period. The imposition of the curfew can be likened to putting an apple on a table and telling someone not to take it. The result will be just the opposite."

He also said the Government was creating an unsafe atmosphere in the township by keeping troops patrolling the streets.

He claimed that soldiers go round with their rifles pointed at children, and this sometimes incited the children.

The Divisional Commissioner of Police for Soweto, Brigadier Jan Coetzee, has said most Soweto residents will be able to obtain exemptions from the curfew if they need them for valid and legal reasons.

The brigadier said he had already had calls from big businesses and the Johannesburg City Council, and it had been decided that blanket permission would be given in these cases.

Residents wanting exemption from the curfew should apply to their nearest police station.

It would be granted as soon as possible, but in some cases proof of employment would be needed.

Brigadier Coetzee said employers would have to

issue staff with documents confirming that they needed to be exempted. These should include the person's name and identity number.

The brigadier said the curfew was aimed at "the two percent of Soweto residents who are perpetrating acts of violence and unrest".

He apologised to "the other 98 percent" for the inconvenience, and said the police would not be seeking to take action against them.

He said the police appreciated the role "being played by law-abiding citizens in discouraging the perpetrators of this senseless violence, and we thank them for their support in our efforts to bring life back to normal in Soweto".

Brigadier Coetzee added: "I would like to assure law-abiding people that the new measures will be applied humanely and with discretion. We ask only that they have patience with us. The measures will not remain in force for longer than necessary."

Meanwhile, residents say the curfew will turn Soweto into a dead city at weekends.

On weekends, life in the township usually starts up about 10 pm — just when the curfew starts.

Residents say the people who will be affected most will be the young men and women who frequent night-spots — and they fear that being forced to remain at home will lead to tensions and stress.

Birthday parties and weddings will also be affected as these usually carry on until the early hours.

The National Soccer League brought forward the starting time of last night's game from 8 pm to 7 pm to allow fans to get home well before the curfew.

CSO: 3400/1021

SOUTH AFRICA

SASJ ACCUSES BOTHA OF ATTEMPTING TO DISCREDIT PRESS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 17 Aug 85 p 5

[Text]

The Southern African Society of Journalists (SASJ) has dissociated itself "in the strongest terms possible" from the remarks made by President Botha about the media in his address to the Natal National Party congress in Durban on Thursday.

According to a statement released by the society's national president, Mr David Allen, the SASJ believes that Mr Botha's statements demonstrate that the only media he will tolerate in the future will be those totally dedicated to his party.

"His remarks, an attempt to discredit the media in the minds of the public here and overseas by linking them through suggestion and innuendo to revolutionary movements, could be seen as his way of preparing the way for the eventual abolition of

media freedom.

"If this indeed is what the President is planning then he is following in the footsteps of many of the African dictatorships he is so fond of criticising. How ironic!" Mr Allen said.

"The State President asked the media through his audience how they could explain the fact that they are always present with cameras, etc, at places where violence takes place.

"We can answer him very simply — they were doing their job.

"That such a question could be asked by a head of state in this day and age could be taken to demonstrate the most startling naivety. But of course we know different. Mr Botha is not naive. His question had an entirely different purpose — to

discredit the media.

"Of course he never actually said that the media supported revolutionary movements. He just posed a few questions and left them to sow the seeds of doubt.

"We wish to say to Mr Botha that every member of this society disassociates themselves in the strongest terms possible from his remarks.

"In answer to his question about whose interests we serve, those of South Africa or revolutionary movements, we would answer him as follows:

"We serve South Africa's interests, ALL of South Africa, and that is not to be taken to mean the interests of Mr Botha, the National Party, or the Government at the expense of any other individual or section of our community.

CSO: 3400/1021

SOUTH AFRICA

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSERVATIVE PARTY DISCUSSED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 17 Aug 85 p 12

[Article by David Braun]

[Text]

Pausing in his painful ministrations to my jaw earlier this week, my dentist asked me: "What's happened to Treurnicht? Why's he so quiet lately?"

My mouth was too full of dental gadgetry to venture anything but a gargled reply, but I also wondered why the Conservatives had been out of the news.

In all the publicity of recent months of the state of emergency, escalating urban unrest, the diplomatic crises, volatile stock market and the rise and fall of expectations of the State President's reform announcements, the Conservative Party, which Dr Andries Treurnicht leads, has almost been forgotten.

Yet the CP is in the process of holding provincial congresses this week in the Free State and next week in the Transvaal.

The agenda for the Transvaal congress landed on my desk, co-incidentally, the day after my visit to the dentist.

Apart from its cover, it might have been the agenda of last year's congress, or that of the year before.

While South Africa agonises over weighty issues of state — the very future of the nation — the Conservatives are gathering by their hundreds, if not thousands, to bemoan the fate of white Christian civilisation.

Flipping through the Transvaal congress agenda it was immediately evident that by far the majority of the resolutions to be debated were negative. They slammed the Government for integrating the races on almost every front.

Resolution Number One, for example, re-affirms the party's position on a white South Africa, and calls on the congress to appoint a committee of experts to decide and report on the methods by which white sovereignty can be restored in the white fatherland.

Number Two rejects what it terms the Government's intention to extend political participation and joint decision-making to blacks at the highest level with whites in a unitary state.

The third rejects the Government's policy of "allowing the uncontrolled entry of blacks into white areas", while the fourth and fifth reject the extension of the "new integration policy"

And so one can go on down the agenda, noting

the condemnation of the scrapping of the law prohibiting "political interference", the integration in the civil service, the repeal of the laws banning sex and marriage between members of different race groups, the opening of the CBDs for multiracial trading, the integration of sport until "even school level" and the state of integration in the security forces.

There are also resolutions which attack the Government's "sycophantic" foreign policy and "weak" reaction to foreign pressure (especially from the United States). One point expresses unease over Government policy to associate with Marxist and "neo-communist" governments.

These issues do not merely show how far back the clock will be turned if the CP should come to power — they would almost suggest a catalogue of National Party Government achievements in breaking down separation.

One would not be surprised if the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, pulled out a CP congress agenda as proof of the right-wing threat whenever he briefed foreign colleagues on the National Party's pace of change.

Elsewhere in the agenda, it becomes evident that although the CP may have been keeping a low profile in recent months, it has not wasted any time in signing up disgruntled Nationalists.

The number of branches in the Transvaal, for example, has grown by 10 percent in the last year to a total of 1 450. Most political observers believe that National Party membership in the same period has declined.

Dr Treurnicht says in his report that the CP is firmly based on the white nation. The party is successful because it is able to steer the will of the white people to survive.

"Whoever is prepared to sacrifice and lose blood for that will, shall profit from the fruits and rewards of victory," he says.

Next week some of the limelight may fall briefly on the CP Transvaal congress. It may make for a significant, if not bizarre, footnote in South African history.

South Africans of all races should, however, not underestimate the significance of the CP. In theory, at least, the party is closer to winning power than any other political entity currently in opposition to the Nationalists.

SOUTH AFRICA

LEGAL EXPERT CRITICIZES ILLEGAL POLICY ACTIVITIES ON WITS CAMPUS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 22 Aug 85 p 20

[Article by Estelle Trengove]

[Text]

Speaking of the police action at the Wits campus last week, Professor Johan van der Vyver said the students were having a peaceful protest on the university grounds when the police stormed them with sjamboks and fired tearsmoke.

He said he believed the police acted improperly.

"In circles in which I move, we often receive information describing the police as the aggressors and the cause of the state of emergency. I don't want to make such a generalisation. I think that would be unfair. I think in many cases the police do act properly, but that was not the case on Monday (last week)."

The police assaulted students left and right, many of them women and most of them not even participants in the demonstration.

"I think the police acted like pigs. Their actions were barbaric and unlawful."

"Normally I would advise students to launch civil actions against the State to claim damages for the assaults on them. In terms of the state of emergency, however, one cannot institute such actions."

"That leaves one with much pent-up anger."

"If a student were to ask me what to do, I would probably tell him to do what I do now. I come to the campus armed, so that if I am ever confronted by a bunch of rogues in police uniforms, I will be able to defend my dignity."

"And when this type of situation arises, we have a revolution."

Professor van der Vyver said that if he was so angered by the Wits

incident, how much more angry were the people in the townships likely to be. They lived with such situations every day.

Speaking of the South African Constitution he said: "My own reaction was the hope that the law-maker breaking his own laws would become something of the past. But within the first month, the State President acted unconstitutionally on two occasions."

"The first was with regard to the Coventry Four. That was the case of the four men caught in England for weapon smuggling. South Africa asked for their return, promising that they would be sent back to England to stand trial."

"Afterwards, however, it was decided that they would not be sent

**"I think the police acted like pigs. Their actions were barbaric and unlawful."**

back and the South African Government would break its promise."

Last year, at a National Party congress in Bloemfontein, the State President, Mr P W Botha, said he personally had made the decision that the men should not return.

"Issues regarding which the State President may personally make decisions are defined in the Constitution and do not include episodes such as that involving the Coventry Four. If he made the decision personally, he acted illegally," Professor van der Vyver said.

"In such circumstances, the State President must act after consultations with Ministers who are members of the Cabinet. My interpretation of the Constitution is that he must consult all the Ministers who

are members of the Cabinet," he said.

"The second occasion (on which Mr Botha acted unconstitutionally) was related to his announcement of his Cabinet. He declared that the convention of joint responsibility for Cabinet decisions by Ministers would fall away.

"I believe the reason for this decision is widely known. The Indian and coloured members of the Cabinet were very unhappy that they were not consulted in the case of the Coventry Four. According to constitutional convention, they should have had joint responsibility if it was a decision by the Executive."

Professor van der Vyver said this left the Indian and coloured members of Parliament in a very weak position, because decisions could be made even if they did not agree with them.

"Constitutional conventions cannot be changed by a decision of the

State President, but only through legislation.

"I would plead that our Constitution should make greater provision for a broader spectrum of interested parties to watch that it is adhered to.

"In security legislation there is provision for situations in which the actions of the security forces are above the law. The most notable example is detention for questioning which excludes the right of the courts to question the reasons for a detention."

Professor van der Vyver pointed out that this power of detention was awesome. "It is arbitrary," he said.

"One seeks assurances that these powers will not be abused. But they are abused, as we see from evidence led in court hearings. I believe our South African Police have the techniques at their disposal to break any person possessing information within 48 hours."

CSO: 3400/1021

SOUTH AFRICA

TEACHING COLLEGES TO REDUCE STUDENT INTAKE

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 21 Aug 85 p 5

[Article by Susan Fleming]

[Text]

White teaching colleges will decrease their student intake by hundreds next year because of the shrinking white population and the drop in teacher resignations.

Over the past seven years the white school population has dropped considerably — in 1978 there were 185 023 pupils in Grade 1 and Grade 2, but by 1985 this figure was down to 157 125.

The proposed decrease in student intake comes at a time of renewed interest in the teaching profession. This year hundreds of aspiring teachers were turned away from the Johannesburg College of Education and

Goudstad College.

The Minister of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly, Mr P Clase, said the decline in pupil numbers had resulted in a reduction in the quota of new students that colleges of education were allowed to admit.

He added that there were plenty of job opportunities for white high school teachers to become lecturers in the black colleges.

Although there would be places for several hundred students at white teacher colleges next year, Mr Clase said it would not be possible to grant admission to black students.

"The training colleges are an 'own affairs' con-

cern and this means that black students will not be allowed there," he said.

The rector of the Johannesburg College of Education, Professor Rod Connacher, said that of the 800 who had already applied to JCE for next year, about 400 would be accepted.

Professor Connacher said it was "beyond his control" to admit black, coloured and Indian students next year when fewer white students were accepted.

At present there were eight black students at JCE, but they were registered with the University of the Witwatersrand for the Bachelor of Primary Education degree.

CSO: 3400/1023

SOUTH AFRICA

CONSERVATIVE MP VOICES FEARS ABOUT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 16 Aug 85 p 4

[Text]

BLOEMFONTEIN — Young South Africans will be fighting with communist forces against anti-communists in Mozambique, the Conservative Party congress in Bloemfontein was told yesterday.

A motion expressing serious concern at South Africa's growing involvement in Mozambique and the Government's "inexplicable and contradictory actions against the Mozambican resistance movement, the MNR, was unanimously approved.

Delegates also discussed the possible involvement of the South African Defence Force in the protection of power lines from the Cabora Bassa dam to the Republic.

Mr Tom Langley, CP MP for Soutpansberg, said the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, had admitted that the Government had supported the MNR with be-

tween R12 million and R16 million and other logistic aid up to March 16 last year, when the Nkomati Accord was signed.

Then it had turned around and started acting against the MNR.

The MNR, he said, was the Mozambican equivalent of Angola's Unita rebel movement which was still supported by the Government.

Referring to the power lines, Mr Langley said the MNR had made it clear it would continue its armed struggle.

If South African troops were used to help protect the lines, the paradoxical

situation would arise where they would be fighting with communist forces, against anti-marxists.

There were 21 500 communist troops and advisers in Mozambique, consisting of Cubans, Koreans, Russians and others.

These were helping, as South Africa was, to prop up President Machel's puppet regime.

Criticising the SABC, Mr Langley said the corporation's radio and television channels were being used to condition the whites in South Africa for their total abdication from power.

Speaking on a motion condemning the "growing partnership between the SABC-TV, radio and Press against white self-determination", he described the director-general of the SABC, Mr Riaan Eksteen, as one of "Mr Pik Botha's mafia". — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/1021

SOUTH AFRICA

MIXED COUPLES IN WRONG AREAS CAN BE REPORTED TO POLICE

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Aug 85 p 2

[Article by Norman West]

[Text]

MIXED couples living in "the wrong areas" can be reported to the police, the deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Piet Badenhorst, said at the Natal National Party congress this week.

Mr Badenhorst was replying to a question from a delegate who expressed his displeasure with Indian women — whom he referred to by the derogatory term "Indian Marys" and for which the Natal leader, Mr Stoffel Botha, later apologised — living with white men in white areas.

Delegates were assured there would be no "grey areas" to give sanctuary to mixed couples.

Persons of mixed race may now be legally married following the repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act and Section 16 of the Immorality Act.

### 'Undesirable'

But they will have to live in areas demarcated for them in terms of Section 12 of the Group Areas Act which determines the group identification of South Africans.

In an information sheet compiled by the NP information service, it is made clear that the NP regards mixed marriages between different population groups "where religion, languages and cultures differ greatly", as undesirable.

The NP officially considers such marriages should be discouraged by churches, parents, marriage counselors and the community "as they cause numerous social and other problems".

The curious Section 12 of the Act, which determines what residential area a person should be relegated to

once he or she marries a person of another colour, was set out as follows:

White persons, whether men or women, married to or living with a person of another group, are specifically excluded from the white group.

### Townships

Such whites should for the purposes of the Group Areas Act be considered to be members of that group into which they marry or live with, for example, should a white man marry a black woman, the white man is regarded as a member of the black group — and must thus go and live in a black township with his black wife.

With regard to the coloured, Indian, Chinese and Malay groups, section 12 of the Act decrees that the man determines the group identity — that is, the woman assumes the group identity of the man.

A group identity change also determines where a person may possess and occupy fixed property after his marriage.

This means a white man married to or living with a black woman assumes the black group identity and will normally reside in a black residential area.

SOUTH AFRICA

SOWETO RESIDENT DESCRIBES LIFE IN TOWNSHIP FOR NON-VIOLENT MAJORITY

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 18 Aug 85 p 2

[Text]

**I AM Joe Zwane, the father of four and a peace-loving resident of Orlando East, Soweto.**

I consider myself better off than some of my friends because this township is nearest to town.

Every morning I wake up at 4am and get ready to go to work. I have to catch a 6am bus to the city centre where I work as a messenger at an engineering firm.

My wife, Gladys, was a factory machinist until she was retrenched recently. She now looks after the house.

I have to give my children R5 every day for the school bus and lunch. But my concern these days is for their safety with so many rioters about.

While I don't usually have to worry about getting to work in the mornings, I face problems when I return home in the evenings.

Because of the riots, buses now off load us just outside the township. We then have to walk four kilometres to get home. And when we get off the buses we are stoned by youths for no apparent reason at all. Almost every afternoon we have to run for cover.

### Teargas

The other day we had a narrow escape when youths attacked the bus just as we were alighting. The bus pulled away, leaving us to face the wrath of the children.

It is difficult to decide to fight back instead of running away because you are then branded a sell-out and something terrible could happen to you and your family.

We were saved by the appearance of an army truck which fired teargas. The youths ran for cover. We were choked by the teargas, but at least it prevented a bloody scene.

Whether these youths are students or simply political hooligans, we cannot tell.

I have often heard men complain on the bus about this harassment and some have vowed that they will fight back — but nobody has done so.

It's a question of who will bell the cat.

Some of my friends have been mugged by youths on Fridays — because they know people carry money on that day.

One day I got home to find that my children had been forced out of school by activists who accused them of being "puppets".

According to my eldest daughter, who is in matric, the school principal had been forced to summon all the children to assembly where they were addressed by pupils from a nearby high school who told them they should not return to school until all political detainees — some of whom are students — had been released.

They were told to go home and tell their parents that the school would be closed until all their demands had been met.

It was also suggested that children who attended multiracial private schools would be forced to join the boycott.

Despite my meagre income, I am forced to shop at a local store, which doubles its prices during riots, because I am prevented from shopping at more competitive places like Checkers or OK Bazaars.

Other townships have supermarkets that try to sell at competitive prices, but the only way to get there is by bus. With Putco not operating in the townships, problems just seem to be piling up.

I bought a fridge and a TV set from a furniture shop in town three weeks ago but they have not yet been delivered because delivery vans are being burnt in Soweto.

The store manager told me that the only alternative was for me to organise my own transport.

But nobody in the townships wants to be seen carrying furniture these days, even if the van is not marked. People are frightened of giving the impression that they could be working for a furniture shop.

So, until the riots are over, I cannot get my purchases delivered.

I have the responsibility to bring up my children in a normal way and give them a good education.

But while I am at work I can never be sure that they are safe — from rioters and from stray police bullets.

The trouble makers are usually not around when the police arrive.

Our local shopkeeper, Mr Joe Sibisi, also has day-to-day problems with the rioters.

Though nobody dares to buy from the city these days, for fear of reprisals by the Con-

sumer Boycott Committee supporters, township businessmen are not safe either.

Whenever there is a funeral for an unrest victim, they have to close shop for the day. The same applies when unrest flares.

Youths have raided shops, helping themselves to food and drinks.

Black-owned bottle stores have also been targets.

This is because they are not heavily guarded like those owned by the West Rand Development Board. Usually students help themselves to alcohol and then go on the rampage.

## **Bitterness**

---

Often youths demand food and money, claiming to have been sent by the Congress of South African Students.

But Cosas has denied this, saying it was aware that many thugs had taken advantage of the unrest to further their own ends.

My neighbour, who is the principal of a local high school, told me last week that he dared not rebuke students for fear of finding his house gutted.

Though children no longer go to school except to hang around the gates, teachers have to report daily, waiting for the students themselves to decide to return to lessons.

I am worried because riots often start up towards the end of the year, interfering with children's studies and causing them to fail.

As a struggling man with a large family, I feel bitter about the school fees I have to pay annually only to find that children cannot write their exams or, if they do, stand to fail because so much time has been spent outside the classroom.

And another major concern these days is that your house may be burnt to ashes. The fact that many township houses — bought under the 99-year leasehold scheme — are not insured, adds to the worry.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT URGED TO DEAL WITH BLACK HOUSING**

**Johannesburg THE STAR in English 19 Aug 85 p 6**

**[Text]**

There is an urgent need to adapt local government legislation to cope with the housing crisis in the black community, the local government and housing conference of the Transvaal Association of Management Committees was told in Johannesburg at the weekend.

Nearly 200 delegates of Transvaal Indian and coloured management committees attended.

Speakers pointed out that housing in the Black community had reached a critical stage and that finance was the solution to this problem.

Apartheid was blamed for the housing crisis and

there were calls for it to be scrapped.

"Blacks must be incorporated into the constitutional dispensation," said House of Representatives MP Mr F L Erasmus.

The chairman of the Committee for Black Housing of the South African Institute for Housing, Professor Toni Lamont, predicted it would be impossible to eliminate the Black housing backlog within the next few decades.

He said the economic situation made it difficult for the Government to maintain its contribution to housing.

Minister of Local Gov-

ernment, Housing and Agriculture Mr Baldeo Dookie said one of the major problems was the delay in the proclamation of townships. There were 20 townships being delayed because of this.

The secretary of the National Ad Hoc Committee for Housing of Port Elizabeth, Mr Eddy Samuels, said Regional Services Councils and the National Ad Hoc Committees had to be considered in the wider context of changing Government legislation.

He described the new Regional Services Councils as "city regionalisation".

CSO: 3400/1020

SOUTH AFRICA

ACCORDING TO POLICE, UNREST IS WANING

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Aug 85 p 3

[Text]

Residents in townships were becoming increasingly upset with hooliganism and it is apparent from latest figures and reports emanating from local communities, that there is a marked decrease in the number and extent of incidents of unrest, the Police Directorate of Public Relations said in Pretoria today.

A total of 998 people were still being held in terms of the emergency and 1 081 have been released.

Among the incidents reported were:

- In Galeshewe near Kimberley a youth was arrested for stoning a vehicle. In the same area a beerhall was stoned and looted.
- In Soweto a vehicle was extensively damaged by arsonists and a bus was stoned by four youths who were arrested by the police.
- In New Brighton near Port Elizabeth a butchery was extensively damaged when a group of about seven thugs threw two petrol bombs at it.
- An unidentified man was shot dead and a police officer injured when youths set fire to a police van in Zone 9 Mdantsane, East London, on Sunday night.

Warrant Officer Fezile Sigabi, stationed at Vulindela police station, opened fire in self-defence when his vehicle was stoned, said Ciskei police liaison officer Lieutenant Mavus Ngwendu. A young man was shot and died instantly and Warrant Officer Sigabi, hit on the head by a stone, lost consciousness, he said.

In other arson attacks in Ciskei, six classrooms at Whittlesea's Masibulele Teachers' Training College were damaged by petrol bombs early today.

A petrol bomb was also thrown through a window of the Toll Hotel at Seymour yesterday, causing damage of about R1 000.

- Police confirmed yesterday they had used shotgun

rounds and rubber bullets to disperse black youths in Duncan Village on Sunday. The youths were taking part in an illegal march. No injuries were reported.

- Police are guarding five grenade blast victims at two Peninsula hospitals following a grenade explosion in Guguletu on Sunday night.

Rewards totalling R3 000 have been offered for information leading to the arrests of those responsible for grenade blasts in the Peninsula.

- A man and a 13-year-old boy were flown to hospital in Cape Town from East London yesterday with serious gunshot wounds.

The boy, Onje Tshomapi, and a 24-year-old man, Mr Selby Dunjwa, were taken to Conradie Hospital by the Red Cross air ambulance and were admitted at 6.30 pm. Onje was partly paralysed, while Mr Dunjwa was completely paralysed, the spokesman said.

- Two petrol bombs were thrown at the home of a community council member in Nkobeela township at Robertson on Sunday night, SABC radio news reported. The petrol bombs, which were thrown through a window of the home of Mr J Samuels, caused only slight damage and no injuries. Police arrested 61 black males and 27 black females on charges of public violence.

- Teachers converged on Mitchell's Plain police station yesterday to demand the release of a colleague who was taken away by police during a clash with about 1 500 pupils at Westridge Senior Secondary School. Almost the entire staff of 59 drove in cars to the police station, where Mr Gordon Edwards was released.

- "In kwa-Thema on the East Rand, police arrested a man stoning a bus. — Sapa.

CSO: 340C/1020

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**CHURCHES DIFFER IN REACTION TO MEETING WITH BOTHA**

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Aug 85 p 19

[Article by Estelle Trengove]

[Text]

Three church delegations gave different reactions to meetings held yesterday with the State President to discuss the situation in South Africa.

The view of the delegation headed by the Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Archbishop Philip Russell, was that there was a wide gap between the perceptions of the Government and those of the black community.

While Mr P W Botha clearly believed he was leading the country on the road to reform, township people felt no real change was taking place, the group said.

Archbishop Russell was accompanied by the Methodist Church president, the Rev Peter Storey, the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference president, Archbishop Denis Hurley, the Presbyterian Church moderator, the Rev Alan Maker, the Revs Stanley Mogoba and Ernest Baartman of the Methodist Church, Catholic Bishop Peter Buthelezi and the Revs E du Plessis and B K Dladla of the Congregational Church.

Archbishop Hurley said the two perceptions of South African reality were so different that communication had been almost impossible. Mr Botha did not get the point that there was something drastically wrong in the country.

The delegation hoped Mr Botha heard its fundamental message that there was a desperate need for dramatic action, but Mr Storey said: "We are not sure he did."

A Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) delegation, however, left its meeting with Mr Botha and other Cabinet ministers feeling the Government was

in control of the situation.

**WORRIED ABOUT VIOLENCE**

The NGK had been worried about the violence, intimidation and destruction of property in the townships and had approached Mr Botha to gain "first-hand knowledge" of what was going on, the NGK moderator, the Rev Kobus Potgieter, said.

Mr Botha promised his delegation that "Christian principles would be upheld" when the Government needed to take action on the unrest.

The Government also undertook to end the state of emergency as soon as possible, Mr Potgieter said.

A United States Baptist minister, Reverend Jerry Falwell, and his delegation were also satisfied with the outcome of their discussions with Mr Botha.

Mr Falwell, who claims to have a following of 7.5 million people in the US, said he was convinced the South African Government was making progress and reform was taking place.

Mr Falwell and his team are making two hour-long video programmes of interviews with people in South Africa who are opposed to disinvestment. These will be broadcast on US religious TV channels before the US Senate is due to vote on sanctions against South Africa.

He said he was told by Mr Botha that apartheid was not the government's policy — apartheid was a social reality. The government's policy was reform.

Since arriving in South Africa, he had spoken to a number of people "and we have yet to find one person in South Africa who wants disinvestment", he said.

However, Mr Storey said Mr Falwell's perception of the situation in South Africa was wrong. "He hasn't the slightest idea of what goes on in the hearts and minds of South Africa's people," he said.

SOUTH AFRICA

CONFLICTING REPORTS OF UNREST DISTURB BLACK TOWNSHIP

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Aug 85 p 19

[Article by Sol Makgabutlane, Chris More and Rich Mkhondo]

[Text]

Residents of many black townships have strong feelings about the actions of the police in the townships. Now the State President has authorised a magisterial commission of inquiry into some incidents raised by church leaders. Another aspect of the State of Emergency is the reporting of unrest incidents, a topic discussed here.

The black community has become anxious and concerned about news reports on the unrest in townships.

Many are perturbed at the way police "situation reports" reflect the news — both by the way they are described and by omissions.

Comments by police spokesmen in reaction to reports — in which reporters were witnesses or residents are being quoted — have also been criticised.

At the same time, the credibility of reporters is being questioned on two points: residents accuse them of softening their reports, while police suggest that newsmen believe everything they are told by residents.

The state of emergency regulations, coupled with the "normal" laws governing the reporting of violence, has forced Pressmen to walk a thin tightrope.

Township residents berate newspapers for giving credence to comments by police spokesmen in which unrest victims who suffered from anti-riot action are being portrayed as having been the guilty parties.

On June 10, the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, said all people who were shot by police during unrest in Duduza and kwaThema townships had been engaged in attacks on police patrols or homes of black policemen.

"In every case where a person died the police acted in self-defence, or in defence of the property of a policeman," he said.

Residents said that they believed that in many instances police action had been unnecessary and unprovoked.

Reporters believe this is backed up by events which reporters from *The Star* witnessed.

Here is a brief list of cases in which reporters' and/or residents' accounts varied with those of the police. The examples are from reports which appeared in *The Star*. The version of the reporters and/or residents is given in light type, and that of the police in bold:

● (June 16, Soweto): Police in armoured vehicles along Potchefstroom Road fired tearsmoke canisters as people streamed out of Regina Mundi after the June 16 memorial service. As people moved out of the gate raising their hands in a plea for peace, two tearsmoke canisters flew in their direction. Retaliatory stones then were hurled in the direction of the police. News correspondent Allister Sparks said police had not been provoked. This was reiterated by Dr Nthato Motlana, who said police were "undisciplined".

A section of the crowd gathered outside the church after the service and started stoning the police when asked to disperse. One policeman was slightly injured and four police vehicles damaged.

● (June 7, Soshanguve): A reporter was told by pupils at two high schools that police fired tearsmoke into their classrooms and sjam-

bokked them when they failed to identify pupils who had stoned a police vehicle. At Ga-Rankuwa Hospital the superintendent told (a reporter) that six pupils were treated.

Police confirm using tearsmoke to disperse stone-throwing mobs, but deny reports of injuries.

● (July 7, Duduza): Residents told *The Star* that police wearing balaclavas sjambokked them without provocation. *The Star* took pictures of police with sjamboks and wearing balaclavas.

Police deny allegations that they wore balaclavas. However, the Police Directorate of Public Relations later said policemen did wear balaclavas. They said it was cold and police needed protective clothing.

● (July 24, Daveyton): Police shot dead four people and wounded 16 after a funeral of an unrest victim. Later at a funeral of one of four victims, mothers of two victims said the story carried in *The Star* relating the four's death based on information from the police was "nonsense".

A police spokesman said the four were shot dead while stoning a police vehicle.

CSO: 3400/1020

SOUTH AFRICA

MORE CRITICISM OF PRESS ON REPORTING UNREST

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 20 Aug 85 p 19

[Article by Andrew Beattie]

[Text]

Since the declaration of a state of emergency, the tightrope walk required of journalists in avoiding prosecution has become even more hazardous, and as a result the public has a right to ask anew: "Are we being fully informed about what is going on in South Africa?"

The media inside South Africa have responded in varying ways to a request by the Commissioner of Police to "tone down" or "scale down" unrest reports.

So far as TV is concerned, returning tourists frequently observe that overseas networks cover the unrest far more comprehensively than the SABC. This criticism is sometimes extended to the local Press.

Professor John Dugard has alleged that the administration of justice is tainted by racial prejudice and the wide powers of enforcing order under the state of emergency — by arbitrarily apportioning guilt and punishment — might be abused by junior constables "prompted by their own racial bias".

In the light of increasing pressure on the local Press, it is argued that reporting of irregularities such as those perceived by Professor Dugard has become more difficult.

Newspapers are in many cases reliant solely on police accounts of incidents.

As *City Press* editor Percy Qoboza put it: "The truth about what is happening in the townships is often something between two totally contradictory

versions — that of the police and that of the community."

Mr Qoboza felt local papers were "losing credibility."

"This happens when township residents tell reporters, for example, that a group of children were surrounded by police who fired teargas at them without any provocation, and the newspaper then reports that police were 'forced to fire teargas to disperse a stone-throwing mob of schoolchildren', this kind of situation arises.

"When the newspaper gets to that community, they say: 'Hang on, this is not how it happened.' This undermines a newspaper's credibility — and it happens far too frequently.

"The police version is far too often regarded as sacrosanct, and anybody who disagrees with that version cannot reasonably challenge it without facing the wrath of section 27(b) of the Police Act," he said.

"Credibility" problems also creep into affairs between reporters and editors, probably as a result of the heavy onus of proof placed on the person making any odious allegations against the police. In most cases the police are given the benefit of the doubt.

Foreign reporters are undoubtedly in a more favourable position. Local reporters are obliged to quote police comment on any issue involving police action even if they are eye-witnesses.

While foreign reporters generally acknowledge their less vulnerable position, they accept

the local Press is largely, but not always, doing a good job despite all the pressures.

Peter Kenny, assistant bureau chief of Agence France-Presse (AFP), said: "One cannot generalise about the local Press. Some are very fair while others give the unrest virtually no coverage at all."

Peter Hawthorne who is the local *Time* magazine correspondent said: "I don't really think it is true to say that overseas writers cover unrest better than local journalists. Frequently foreign agencies lift stories out of the local Press.

"I must point out that the coverage of recent funerals has been particularly well handled by *The Star*.

"But I think it is true that under the emergency regulations news editors have tended to verge on being over-cautious in criticisms of police actions."

He added that foreign reporters were far less inhibited about possible prosecutions.

The problem of subconsciously censoring objective reportage of fact, and, even more so, subjective feelings about particular incidents, is common cause among local reporters: this springs from laws and police action designed to suppress the public's formation of views and expression of opinion.

With so many laws on the statute book affecting the Press, "telling it like it is" in South Africa is not always possible.

SOUTH AFRICA

TOWNSHIP DESCRIBES POLICE ABUSES

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 21 Aug 85 p 4

[Article by McKeed Kotlolo]

[Text]

Many Mamelodi residents claim that members of the police force and the army stationed in the township are committing atrocities daily since the outbreak of unrest in the area a fortnight ago.

Some of the victims were either left in an incoherent state, while others suffered fractured limbs, gun and sjambok wounds.

The president of the Mamelodi Parents' Association (MPA), Mr Louis Khumalo, said: "The policemen have virtually taken over the township and are assaulting innocent people."

A spokesman for the Police Directorate of Public Relations in Pretoria said the allegations were very serious "and those people can go to the nearest police station and lay charges".

Mr Khumalo said the police should send a senior officer to the local police station where the residents would be laying their charges this week.

Trouble in the township started on August 10 after the burial of a 19-year-old high school pupil, Obed Matlala, who was allegedly killed by local hostel inmates a week earlier.

Clashes between residents and the inmates erupted, leaving a number of people injured and many houses near the hostel damaged. The hostel itself was also considerably damaged.

One of the police victims who is said to have been assaulted last Monday, is Abraham Kenneth Phokane (19), a Std 8 pupil at Rethabile Secondary School. He seems incoherent, unable to talk or hear, and is lying in the Kalafong Hospital near Atteridgeville.

His mother, Mrs Deborah Phokane, said "about 15" white policemen in a white Datsun minibus collected her son from their home at about midnight on Monday August 12.

She said the policemen were rude and forced their way into the house by breaking one of the doors.

She added that the last time the family saw Abraham in a healthy condition was when the policemen took him into the waiting vehicle and told her not to worry.

"But we were shocked when we saw him brought home by some local residents the next morning. He was so wild and could not recognise us, all he did was to shout: 'Maburu! Maburu!'."

"He was bleeding from the ears and he appeared as though he could not hear anything we were trying to say to him. At one stage, he was vomiting blood and his face and head were swollen," Mrs Phokane said.

**"The boers, the boers killed Sakkie!"**

Abraham, who was described by his family as a quiet and faint-hearted person, was rushed to the Kalafong Hospital where he received treatment.

When a reporter visited him three days after his admission, he was talking incoherently and would repeatedly murmur: "Maburu, Maburu abulaile Sakkie!" (The Boers, the Boers have killed Sakkie!).

Mr Sakkie Mokobo was also in the group that was collected by the police the same evening that Mr Phokane was taken. He is said to be in a critical condition at the same hospital.

A senior superintendent at the Kalafong Hospital, Dr J van Rooy, told *The Star* he had been given orders by the police not to comment on any unrest case to the Press and to refer all inquiries concerning unrest victims to Police Headquarters in Pretoria.

Mr Meshack Mogale (26) of 600 Section B was also collected on the same evening by policemen claiming they were looking for his younger brother.

He said they decided to take him because they could not find his brother.

Mr Mogale said he was together with Mr Mokobo, Mr Phokane and a few others. They were all taken to the local police station where he claimed they were

sjambokked, punched and kicked before they were driven to the outskirts of the township, near the Eerste Fabrieke Railway Station in the early hours of Tuesday August 13.

He alleged that on arrival at the place, they were told to run into the veld and the police started shooting at them. He said he was hit by rubber bullets on the back of both thighs.

When a reporter visited him at home, Mr Mogale could not walk properly because of his injuries which are believed to have been caused by the rubber bullets. After the police had left, he and another victim, tried to look for Mr Phokane but could not find him because it was too dark.

"We did not search for too long for fear of being spotted by passing army vehicles which were patrolling the area. We arrived home at about 2.30 am," Mr Mogale said.

Another case is that of 57-year-old Mr Jannie Maseko who was allegedly assaulted by police last Monday evening after his 14-year-old son, Petrus, was shot in the arm while hiding in his bedroom and his 11-year-old grandson, Clifford Mhaule, was shot in the hand while trying to enter a neighbour's yard.

Mr Maseko, a motor mechanic of Section D, received treatment from a private doctor who later referred him to hospital because of bruises caused by sjamboks on his back and head.

Mr Maseko said he was repairing a car in front of his house when several people came running. Later he heard a gunshot at the back of his house.

"I saw a group of policemen armed with rifles and I ran into the house for shelter. My children and wife were hiding in the bedroom when I went into another room and hid under a bed.

"The policemen came into the house and kicked open the door of the bedroom in which Petrus was hiding. A few seconds later I heard someone say: 'Hier is hy — skiet hom' and a shot went off with my son screaming for help." He said they later searched the house and found him where he was hiding. "I screamed for mercy and told them that I was the owner of the house and I came out."

Mr Maseko said that he and his son were taken to waiting Casspirs where he was sjambokked by the police and thrown to the ground before they left him.

## 'Sjambokked and punched'

Another case is that of Mr Annanius Ditau, who was visiting from Kagiso in Krugersdorp. Mr Ditau (29) was allegedly dragged out of a relative's Mamelodi West home by the police who were patrolling the streets in Section Q.

Mr Ditau suffered head, back and facial injuries and his eyes were swollen from being sjambokked and punched by the police. He said his wrist watch was damaged in the process.

Numerous other residents claimed that they were assaulted inside their homes and shebeens. Others said they were confronted by the police while they were returning from work in the evening.

Cinema-goers at the Thebu Cinema in Mamelodi West said police tried to stop a film show on Wednesday afternoon after they demanded they be allowed to search for a person they claimed had entered the cinema, but were refused permission and later left.

They allegedly returned the following day and fired tearsmoke at the patrons during interval at the cinema. Some of the patrons added that the show had to be stopped for about an hour since it was difficult to go back to the cinema because of the tearsmoke that was fired nearby.

He said the police were parked a few metres from the cinema and were laughing at the choking patrons.

The President of the Mamelodi Parents Association (MPA), Mr Louis Khumalo, said they were not going to submit allegations of malicious behaviour by members of the police and army to a magisterial inquiry because they have already decided to lay charges.

He said the allegations against the police in Mamelodi differ from those in Daveyton and other townships "because our township is not affected by the state of emergency".

Mr Khumalo added that they had already made arrangements with their legal advisers to accompany them to the local police station to lay charges before the end of the week. He said they will be meeting some of the legal advisers today or tomorrow.

SOUTH AFRICA

REPORT ON COSTS OF FAILED INFLUX CONTROL

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 14 Aug 85 p 18

[Article by James Clarke]

[Text]

The decentralisation of South Africa has failed. The cities won.

Now there's speculation that President Botha might give formal notice of its abandonment, at least in part.

Coincidentally, the Urban Foundation's two most prominent governors, Mr HF Oppenheimer and Dr Anton Rupert, are making a plea for the Government to abandon influx control — "cold turkey".

Influx control — a classic form of social engineering — has been tried many times in history. Nowhere has it worked. Unless you count Cambodia.

There, as soon as the new communist government took over in the mid-70s, it succeeded in moving 2 million elderly, sick, unemployed and others from the capital to the countryside, at the point of bayonets. Today thousands are back.

Britain spent R40 billion building "new towns" in the countryside after World War 2 — but succeeded in persuading only 2 million people to forsake the cities. That's R20 000 a head. Today Western town planners believe such moves were unnecessary, unnatural and certainly uneconomic.

In Third World countries the general experience has been that social problems are fewer and better dealt with in a metropolis.

It is easier to provide urban dwellers with clean water and easier to get food there too.

South Africa announced in the '70s it was going to build 10 "new Sowetos" in the platteland to deflect blacks from the cities. It hoped to persuade 15 million would-be city dwellers to forget the idea.

So far, trying to stop influx has mauled South Africa's economy and cost us dearly in terms of international standing. Billions of rands and millions of man-hours have been expended on what has been a failure.

Durban is rapidly approaching the stage where it will have more squatters than citizens. In one area the population moved from nil to 80 000 in eight months.

But, according to Mr Chris du Plessis, public affairs director of the Urban Foundation, the crime rate there is not as high as in the rest of Durban.

Urban influx did not bring the dregs of humanity to town, nor did it bring the unemployed, he said. It brought men who were desperate to work and who had the initiative to get up and do something about it.

Mr du Plessis said the foundation had found that between a third and a half of all households in squatter areas supported themselves by working in the informal sector.

But at a recent Small Business Foundation conference it was estimated that there were 400 laws inhibiting small businesses.

CSO: 3400/1023

SOUTH AFRICA

RESETTLEMENT SCRATCHED FOR 2 TRANSVAAL COMMUNITIES

MB280601 Johannesburg SAPA in English 2103 GMT 27 Aug 85

[Text] Pretoria, 27 Aug, SAPA--Two communities in the Wakkerstroom District in the Transvaal will not be resettled, the deputy minister of development and of land affairs, Mr Ben Wilkens, said tonight.

In a statement issued in Pretoria, Mr Wilkens said, "After negotiation with a delegation of the Kwa-ngema black community, the government has resolved that this community will not be resettled, but will remain permanently on the land they occupy, namely the farm, Kaffirlokagi, in the district of Wakkerstroom, Transvaal.

"The community has agreed to accept 1,112 hectares of state land adjacent to Kaffirlokagi as partial compensation instead of the 1,889 hectares of land of the community concerned which will be flooded because of the construction of the Heyshope Dam.

"As far as the remainder of the land is concerned, namely 886 hectares, it was agreed that the community would be compensated on cash basis.

"After similar negotiations with a delegation with the black community of Driefontein, in the district of Wakkerstroom, Transvaal, the government decided that this community must not be resettled either, but will also remain permanently on the land which they occupy: namely, the concerned portion of the farm Driefontein."

"The government decisions were also discussed with the local white farming community. The black community of Driefontein has agreed to accept 212 hectares of state land--a portion of the farm Grootspuit as well as for 403 hectares of the farm Roodekraal, which was offered for sale by Lotshaba forest, to the South African Development Trust, as compensatory land instead of 615 hectares of Driefontein which will be flooded by the Heyshope Dame.

"The decision of the government is subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions by the black communities concerned. For example, respecting and maintaining of border fences, prohibiting illegal squatting on the land concerned, that the cultural potential of the land is not overutilised."

CSO: 3400/1018

SOUTH AFRICA

LIBERAL SPIRIT IN NATION PRAISED

Port Elizabeth WEEKEND POST in English 20 Jul 85 p 10

[Article by Dirk van Zyl]

[Text] GRAHAMSTOWN was this week the venue of a gathering of one of the most remarkable groups of South Africans ever joined together in one organisation — the members of the old Liberal Party.

And through their gathering, aimed at an historical appraisal of their role and achievements before they were forced to dissolve when the passing of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act in 1968 legally compartmentalised politics in South Africa along racial lines, they once again focused attention full-square on one of the most misunderstood — and often much maligned — philosophies in the world.

And who better to set the tone among delegates from all over South Africa and of all races than the venerated, world-renowned author, philosopher and former LP leader, octogenarian Dr Alan Paton, whose alertness of mind and astuteness of insight would still put many young intellectuals to shame.

And who could ever forget his book, *Cry the Beloved Country*, in which one of the cancers in South African society, migrant labour, is laid bare with such compassion and understanding for the victims?

In these times the warning at the end of the book is particularly apt: that a tragedy may be inherent in a scenario that when whites eventually reach out to their fellow South Africans who happen to be black, they may find it is too late: that the black man has turned his back on them. (It is salutary to remember that the book was published more than 30 years ago).

At the opening dinner of the Liberal Party workshop this week, a former prominent party member, Mr Ernie Wentzel, SC, (national chairman of the South African Institute of Race Relations) said that *Cry the Beloved Country* had changed the lives and outlooks of many people.

In paying further tribute to Dr Paton, Mr Wentzel said those who had met him had "known they have known a great man".

Dr Paton put his seal on the importance and validity of liberalism in an interview with the *Evening Post* during the conference when

he said: "If there is no hope for the Liberal philosophy, there is no hope anywhere."

Generosity of spirit, tolerance towards others, a repugnance of authoritarianism, a love of freedom, absolute respect for the Rule of Law and for the dignity of one's fellow man were among the hallmarks of a true Liberal, Dr Paton said.

In a paper, former member Professor Tony Mathews, dean of Natal University's Law faculty, told delegates: "The disorder and the conflict all around us today seem to me to vindicate the Liberal faith in an integrated solution to South Africa's political problems."

Dr Paton said the party had always been more pre-

occupied with moral issues than constitutional models, but this was to an extent contradicted by Prof Mathews' reference to the party as having had a "programme of universal franchise in a unitary state".

This, he pointed out, was today the policy accepted by most black South Africans and remained "as unacceptable as ever" to most whites.

"In my view this policy is unsuitable both as a basis for negotiation between the contending groups and as a means for ushering in an era in which Liberal values will be respected and practised," Prof Mathews said.

Those Liberals who had believed their party's task had been to "pave the way for simple black majority rule were wrong, particularly if they thought that such a transition would automatically guarantee the triumph of the Liberal values for which they stood."

Prof Mathews continued: "The task of devising a political system for a divided plural society in which such values will prevail is clearly an awesome one."

The Liberal Party's place in history must therefore clearly be seen in terms of its philosophical ideals, universally shared in the civilised world, and the extent to which it helped keep them alive in South Africa, rather than in terms of any constitutional policy it may have had.

Here it could be noted that these ideals are embodied, to a greater or lesser degree, in a number of present organisations, bodies and parties in South Africa and that former Liberal Party members are to be found in a number of leading spheres in the country's academic, political, business and professional life.

They are to be found, among others, in the SA Institute of Race Relations, the Progressive Federal Party, Solidarity and Inkatha and among leading thinkers and intellectuals.

Individuals in active politics include Mr Pat Poovalingham (MP for Reservoir Hills and Solidarity's national chairman), Mr Neil Ross (national director of the PFP), Mrs Irene Menell (PFP MPC for Houghton), Mr Brian Bishop (chairman

of the Civil Rights' League in Cape Town) and Mr Tom Walters (a leading Cape Town city councillor).

Thus, dead though the Liberal Party may be — and this week's workshop in no way set out to resurrect it, even in the light of the scrapping by Parliament last month of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act — its spirit very much lives on.

The foundation of modern liberalism — drawing on classical roots going back to Socrates and St Paul — can be said to have been laid by two famous 18th Century documents: the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man drawn up by the French National Assembly in 1789.

Both were concerned with the assertion of a peoples' liberty.

The first formed the basis of the constitution of a free United States of America, the British colonial yoke having been thrown off, while the latter was part of the scene-setting for the French Revolution, in which the people ended feudal, despotic rule.

Both asserted the premise that individual freedom of thought and of expression is of prime importance in the affairs of man and that all other freedoms flow from that.

In South Africa's history, the first governmental assertion (and only true governmental one thus far?) of liberalism could be said to be what became known as the "Cape liberal tradition".

This included parliamentary government in the Cape on the British model, the Rule of Law firmly based on an independent judiciary, a staunch and uncorrupt public service, a free Press, freedom of speech and conscience and equality in the eyes of the law.

But at Union in 1910, with Cape delegates having to compromise with the powerful Transvaalers on the "non-white" question by agreeing that only whites sit in Parliament, the Cape liberal tradition's defences were breached and were to be increasingly whittled away by racism.

There are today, however, some signs of a reversal of this process and in conclusion one should note that liberalism is not confined to any one political policy, ideology or society.

Liberals can be found in communist Poland; they were present in Nazi Germany; some Nationalists in this country are labelled "liberals" by their right-wing opponents, and in Britain liberals can be found in the Conservative Party and conservatives in the Liberal Party!

Liberalism's greatest antagonist is authoritarianism — in whatever form and wherever it is to be found.

SOUTH AFRICA

STUDY OF TRAVELING TIME SPENT FOR HOMELANDS COMMUTERS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 3 Aug 85 p 6

[Text]

---

Some homelands commuters spend more time travelling than with their families at home, it was disclosed this week at the Annual Transportation Convention in Pretoria. *The Star* reporter McKeed Kotlolo travelled to and from work with Mr Simon Mnisi of kwaNdebele who arrives home at 9 pm, goes to bed 30 minutes later and is up at 3 am. He spends around six hours a day on a bus.

---

Hundreds of kwaNdebele residents who spend more than 40 hours a week travelling to and from their workplaces on the Reef and Pretoria have little time to share with their families.

A recent study on the effects of long journeys on black commuters in Pretoria found some spent more time travelling to and from work than they did sleeping.

The study was made public at the Annual Transportation Convention in Pretoria.

It found that commuters from kwaNdebele did not participate in any personal activities and only a minority undertook any other activities or household chores.

The results of the research were confirmed by the *The Star* after a trip by bus to the outskirts of Siyabuswa in kwaNdebele on Wednesday night.

Because of the long journey, some people slept on the floor of the bus between the seats while others slept standing.

*The Star* accompanied Mr Simon Mnisi of Magana go Buswa, near Siyabuswa, to his house and spent the night there, before returning with him to Pretoria West where he is employed as a panel-beater.

Mr Mnisi spent about seven hours daily travelling to and from work. But others interviewed at the Marabastad Transfer Station, on the outskirts of Pretoria, travelled for more than eight hours daily.

The soft-spoken father of four knocks off work at 5.15 pm and walks for about 25 minutes to catch his normal 6 pm bus at Marabastad.

We boarded the bus at 6 pm. As the bus moved off some commuters started sleeping. And when we alighted at Siyabuswa at 8.20 pm half the travellers were already asleep.

After alighting we had to walk for another 30 minutes along a meandering gravel road and through thick bushes and a graveyard — notorious as a hiding place for thugs — before reaching his home.

We found his children already asleep and his wife Sophie preparing for bed.

The tired but loving father took a candlestick and ushered me into the children's bedroom where he stroked the forehead of Calby (2), who was sleeping in a cot and remarked: "This is how we live as a family. Those who can't wake up when I arrive only see me on weekends when I am off duty."

Shortly after we had seen his children, Mr Mnisi showed me where I would sleep and bade me goodnight. I had thought he was going to wash and have a meal.

But that was not to be. Mr Mnisi has his supper at work during the 3 pm tea break "and there is no time to wash at night or drink tea for fear of waking up late in the morning due to tiredness."

Mr Mnisi, like many other workers from the homeland, does not drink tea in the morning and only has a full bath during weekends.

Next morning we woke up rather later than normal for Mr Mnisi — 3 am. We only had time to wipe our faces in cold water so as not to miss the 4 am bus.

We had to walk fast to the unmarked bus stop to catch the bus. On arrival we found women clad in blankets already waiting for the same bus. They had missed the 3.30 am bus.

The bus drove out of the township with those commuters who had missed the 3.30 am complaining they were also going to miss the 6.30 am buses to various suburbs of Pretoria while others complained about missing the 6.30 am train to Johannesburg.

The commuters rolled themselves in their blankets and started sleeping. Even those who did not have seats slept on their feet.

The bus arrived at the Marabastad Transfer Station at 6.25 am and commuters immediately hurried off.

We walked to Mr Mnisi's place of employment at a normal pace and it took us about 25 minutes.

A spokesman for Putco in Pretoria confirmed that some of the commuters travelled for about three hours in buses. He said other buses arrived at their destination in the homeland at 11.30 pm.

SOUTH AFRICA

GELDENHUYS HEADS COMMITTEE TO REVIEW FULL MILITARY MACHINE

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY 1: English 14 Aug 85 p 9

[Report by Peter Honey]

[Text]

**M**ORE than 150 organisations and individuals from the business, social, political and private sectors, as well as the military, have been involved with the Geldenhuys Committee since it began work in June last year.

Their input is likely to determine the course of armaments production or procurement, as well as the entire structure and development of the Defence Force, for the next 10 years, according to the leader of the project, Lieutenant-General Jannie Geldenhuys.

No facet of the military has escaped review: national conscription, strategy, logistics, manpower and weaponry needs, financial resources and organisational structures of the South African Defence Force and Armscor are all being evaluated in terms of the country's economic, political and security requirements.

Geldenhuys cautions that this does not mean the defence structure is about to be turned on its head. Present arrangements will be left alone if the committee believes they are likely to meet requirements.

While the slump has had an overriding impact on the committee's work, its effects might not be as dramatic as many people expect.

"The economic and financial situation has played a big role, and has formed the basis of some very deep thought and research by the committee," says Geldenhuys.

"But our assignment was not specifically meant to fit the Defence Force into the economic situation alone. The essence has been to look at the Defence Force and Armscor in the context of the future needs of the country."

A few of the committee's interim findings have already been implemented: reductions in the number of SAAF squadrons, further streamlining of the Navy and Armscor structures, for example, and the appointment of a Chief of Staff for the Defence Force, Lt-Gen Ian Gleeson.

The major impact is likely only after Defence Minister Magnus Malan receives the bulk of the report late this year.

Most of the strategic and weaponry recommendations are classified, and will probably remain so.

**G**eldenhuys was not willing to speak much about the other findings to date but he let slip that the committee has had to consider a recommendation to reduce national service to one intake a year.

Among the 28 organisations and individuals outside of the defence force who have made, or are still to make, recommendations to the committee are: the Chamber of Mines, FCI, Sir Richard Luyt, SA Institute of Race Relations, the End Conscription Committee, political parties and members of the houses of Representatives and Delegates.

**I**n addition 60 representations came from within the Defence Force and Armscor, including the outgoing Defence Force chief, Gen Constand Viljoen.

The Geldenhuys Committee also appointed 21 task groups, involving about 70 people associated with the Defence Force, to research various aspects of military

strategy, weaponry and logistics, manpower, finances, the size and structure of the military establishment.

Some of these groups had to compare the organisational arrangements with established principles of good management.

Others had to evaluate the Defence Force and Armscor's functions and needs in terms of the security arrangements in several countries of Europe, South America, the Middle East and the Far East (Geldenhuys declined to name them).

He said they did not use foreign defence consultants but did receive reports from South Africa's military attaches abroad.

Geldenhuys confirmed that the unrest had influenced the committee: "I would say it had as much bearing on our work as all the other happenings of the last few years — economic, financial, political or otherwise."

He hesitated to give details of how the committee was able to plan effectively while faced with a slump.

Management consultants, he said, had advised that the environment should be studied and then realistic scenarios constructed to work out planning.

He added that this method was not always suitable for an organisation like the Defence Force which was faced with rapid and unforeseen change.

"One should go more for a balance in organisation, which might not be for any specific future situation, but which will gear you for all the possibilities that might crop up."

CSO: 3400/989

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**DEFENCE FORCE SETS UP EMERGENCY RADIO NETWORK FOR CIVILIANS, MILITARY**

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 13 Aug 85 p 5

[Article by Andrew Walker]

[Text]

An emergency radio network for civilians and military commandos in remote or dangerous areas has been set up across most of South Africa and Namibia by the South African Defence Force.

Manned by members of the SADF or police, the infrastructure for the alarm and communications system now covers 75 percent of the country.

**ZIMBABWEAN BUSH WAR**


It can be used to alert the nearest military base for help in the event of attacks or other emergencies in remote areas.

A less sophisticated system was used to some effect by farmers during the pre-independence Zimbabwean bush war.

In some cases the lives of farmers were saved by prompt response by military units to SOS calls sent out from isolated homes under attack by insurgents.

According to the developers, MARNET is part of a programme to increase preparedness for civil emergencies. It is designed as an extension to the civil defence networks which have been established in built-up areas.

"The system has been installed to cater for both military emergencies and civil defence action where prompt reporting and effective communication for co-ordination are essential to reduce the potential loss of life and to minimise damage," said a spokesman for the manufacturers, Barcom Electronics,



An artist's impression of the MARNET network. MARNET provides a two-way communications system for civilian (especially farming) and defence use

tronics, which developed the system under contract to Armscor.

"Examples are terrorist threats, major accidents or bush fires."

Specifications for the system were drawn up by the SADF in conjunction with the SA Telecommunication and Electrical Power Supply Authority.

The system is designed to automatically send out a distress signal at the touch of a single button — either on the radio console or placed anywhere in a building.

SOUTH AFRICA

NEW ROLE FOR AIR FORCE IN URBAN AREAS

Port Elizabeth WEEKEND POST in English 27 Jul 85 p 5

[Text]

THE involvement of the South African Air Force in the role of defence of the country has taken a new role lately — namely involvement in urban operations.

The new officer commanding Air Force Base, Port Elizabeth, Colonel Karel van Heerden, who took over command of the base yesterday, said in his acceptance of command speech the air force would be needed even more in the future in the new role of urban operations in defending the country.

It was also needed in keeping the peace in the East Cape within a so-called revolutionary struggle.

Col Van Heerden said no unit could operate independently from other units nor could it operate in isolation from the public.

He extended an invitation to all parents of national servicemen to visit the base so that he could meet them personally.

Yesterday's parade was unusual in that it involved three distinct phases — handing over of command parade, presentation of medals and wings and a speech to the medal recipients and an acceptance of command speech at the function afterwards.

Col Van Heerden took over command from the acting OC, Commandant C A Buchanan, who has been appointed Ops Co-ordinator AFB PE.

The previous officer commanding, Col C N Breytenbach, HCS, left on December 31 last year and is now officer commanding AFB Ysterplaat.

Wings were presented to Candidate Officers P J de Wet and G F Hargreaves.

Pro-Patria awards were presented to the following: Capt C W Sharp, Capt T R van Teylingen, Flight Sergeant E J Jacobs, Flight Sgt L Q van Wezel, Sgt J H Coleman, Sgt A A Herbst, Corporal D N Dosterhofs and Airman C de Wet.

Mr D J Style accepted a posthumous Pro Patria medal on behalf of his late son, Lance Corporal Peter Style.

Major Frank Daley was awarded a gold medal for 30 years service. Flight Sgt P C Poulton was awarded a silver medal for 20 years service and Lieutenant R B Hobbs a bronze medal for 10 years service.

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

**SBDC APPLICATIONS**—The Small Business Development Corporation's R30-million aid fund received applications amounting to almost \$120-million in the 23 weeks since its inception. Financed by the Government, the fund was set up in March to provide bridging finance for small businesses with cash-flow problems. Between March 5 and August 9, the SBDC received 10,566 inquiries about the fund. There were 2,527 written applications worth R111,7-million chasing the R30-million, which could be added to if President Botha's Thursday-night address is taken into account. More than 90% of the applicants for help have no previous connection with the SBDC. Between April and June this year, the SBDC - a joint venture between the public and private sectors - granted loans of \$14,2 million to 569 applicants. This three-month figure is 56% of the R25-million granted to 1,428 small businesses in 1984. [Text] [Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES [BUSINESS] in English 18 Aug 85 p 3]

**AUSTRALIAN SANCTIONS**—Australia's decision to impose limited trade sanctions against South Africa will not have a significant effect on bilateral trade, say business analysts. They add that sanctions could, however, have a serious psychological impact on Australian consumers and trade unions. "The Australian Council of Trade Unions is meeting shortly and it could take steps against SA which it might not have taken if its (SA) government had not acted in this way," say SA Foreign Trade Organisation spokesman David Graham. "I cannot see economic pressures having much effect. The Australians have more to lose than we have," an Assocom spokesman said. A Department of Foreign Affairs statement said that it was disappointed that "what was in effect a major policy statement with black participation in the decision making process of SA should result in such negative measures". [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 20 Aug 85 p 5]

**BLACK UNEMPLOYMENT**—Just more than half of unemployed blacks are in their twenties, according to Central Statistical Services. Figures show that of the 516 000 jobless at the end of April 324 000 were below the age of 29 - 158 000 of them between 20 and 24 and 105 000 between 25 and 29. Economists and PFP labour spokesmen have claimed the numbers of unemployed and seriously unemployed blacks exceeds 20-million. According to the CSS, black workers registered with the Department of Manpower in April totalled 46 117 - 32 138 of them males. Comparable figures in April last year are 34 184 - 21 977 males. Of a total black population of 18,692-million in April, 5,778-million were economically active. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 20 Aug 85 p 2]

**FOOD SUPPLY VITAL**--The crucial importance of adequate food production as a contributory factor in maintaining a peaceful social environment was stressed by SA Agricultural Union president Kobus Jooste in Pretoria yesterday. He told the National Grain Sorghum conference that farmer's debts since 1975 until last year had increased from R2,004bn to R9,495bn. Higher interest rates and the effects of drought were the biggest factors in the financial plight of farmers. Referring to surpluses of grain sorghum, red meat and sugar, Jooste said South Africa stood before one of its greatest political crises. It could be said that the communists were behind everything, but the fact was that the world was "busy with South Africa" and conditions ahead looked anything but favorable, he said. Jooste said farmers could be thankful that the millions of people on farms were well fed and peaceful. He hoped the fact that there was enough food in South Africa, at reasonable prices, would be a contributing factor to peace and calm. The SAAU watched the situation with concern. The recession had worsened because of international pressure and the weaker rand. This could result in the shrinking of domestic markets and lower producer prices in a time of high inflation. Referring to the debate on citizenship rights for blacks in homelands, and the independent black states, and the effect of land consolidation, Jooste said changes in government policy could have a profound influence over a wide area and on the many farmers. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 22 Aug 85 p 4]

**RAND CURTAILS TRAVEL**--The tumbling rand and related factors have caused a further sharp slump in leisure travel abroad. Tour operators were reported yesterday to have suffered a fall in overseas business of up to 80% compared with a year ago. Peter Botterill, chairman of the Association of Southern African Travel Agents, said in Johannesburg: "We are really feeling the pinch both ways now. "While there was a marked fall in the number of South Africans traveling abroad, particularly to areas with a high dollar content, there is now also a sharp tailing-off in the volume of foreigners visiting this country because of the adverse publicity we are getting abroad. "This is in spite of the fact that on present exchange rate a holiday in South Africa has become a virtual give-away for American and other foreign tourists. "Our hotels have obviously been badly hit by this trend. But on the positive side I would say to South Africans - now is the time to take advantage of the attractive domestic packages being offered." [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 22 Aug 85 p 4]

**TIMBER AGREEMENT THREATENED**--Discontent within the timber industry threatens the collapse of the South African Lumber Millers' Association (Salma) TMA. Sawmillers want Competition Board exemption for their timber marketing agreement (TMA) which regulates the prices they charge merchants. However, Salma can expect to get a "fair" hearing from the board, chairman Stef Naude told millers at their annual meeting in Johannesburg last week. Naude said his board accepted it could not bring in new rules that caused industry-wide disruption. Uncontrolled, discounted sales of industrial timber - 50% of the R300m-a-year market - forced Salma to extend the scope of the TMA this year, establishing minimum prices for a much wider range of timbers. The old TMA controlled the minimum price of structural timber only. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Aug 85 p 6]

**ECONOMIC EMERGENCY**—Christie Kuun, senior GM of Saambou, yesterday called for the introduction of a variety of emergency economic controls on the economy to prevent a further deterioration. Kuun, also vice-president of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, said at a Stellenbosch seminar that unless the authorities intervened and introduced selective economic control measures, South Africa would soon have to contend with an uncontrollable decline in living standards. He said it must be kept in mind that conditions on the capital account were not within SA's control and every possible attempt should therefore be made to increase the balance on the current account. Control measure should include an information campaign to encourage sales of SA products, a ban on the importation of products and an increase in local saving by tax concessions on interest to 13% or, alternatively, all products could be subject to GST and the rate brought down to 10%, Kuun said. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 22 Aug 85 p 2]

**TWO AIRLINES NEEDED**—Two airlines for national and regional routes in Southern Africa will make the air transport industry more efficient, says Jackie Walters of the Department of Transport Economics at the Rand Afrikaans University. "Aviation policy in South Africa dates back to the Air Services Act of 1949 and has resulted in an underdeveloped private sector role," he says. His comments come after an extensive research programme by his department. He suggests local policy should be based on the deregulated airline policies of Canada, Australia and the United States. These countries allow competition between the national and private airlines. "Many of the original objectives in the establishment of SAA have been achieved," says Walters, "and this necessitates a re-evaluation of the role and function of a national carrier." He says deregulation led to more competitive effective aviation systems where smaller carriers had important roles. Innovative fare policies and increased flights also resulted. During the 1983/84, private operators in South Africa carried only 10% of all domestic passengers and 2,6% of air freight. "The general consensus among operators," says Walters, "is that present legislation does not promote commercial aviation, but has an inhibiting effect on the industry. Subsidies for non-profitable routes could be cut by using a secondary airline with specialised equipment suitable for such routes, he says. "This carrier would compliment SAA's services, rather than compete with SAA." [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Aug 85 p 6]

**DENMARK'S EAC TO STAY**—Denmark's largest privately-owned undertaking, the East Asiatic Company, does not plan to end its SA operations. The group's presiding MD, Henning Sparsoe, says the EAC would keep its SA interests despite recent cutbacks in shipping and trade. During a brief visit to the managers of EAC Graphics in Johannesburg, he said the closure of the Danish consulate in South Africa and the Danish government's trade restrictions and "regrettable" investment sanctions against South Africa would have a limited effect on EAC. EAC Graphics is a leading supplier of graphic arts material and equipment to the SA printing trade. Its turnover amounts to 5% of the group's operations worldwide. The group has about R80m invested in South Africa. EAC would stay while commercially viable and welcome in South Africa, says Sparsoe. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Aug 85 p 6]

**LATE RECOVERY FORECAST**--Industrial recovery will be late and short-lived. So says Neville Berkowitz in the latest edition of THE PROPERTY ECONOMIST, a quarterly investment report. He predicts recovery in the manufacturing industry by mid-1987, but that "the cold draught" of the slowing US and world economic growth will be felt in SA later that year. Berkowitz identifies seven areas (with timings) where he says increases are needed: Exports (forecast increase early 1986); Private consumer spending (forecast increase early 1986); Government spending (forecast increase second quarter 1986); Stock levels (forecast increase second quarter 1986); Obsolescence/replacement spending; Mining industry needs; and Investment spending (forecast increase second half 1986). Prospects for improving value and volume of manufacturing exports look promising, says Berkowitz. Grounds for this are the SA Foreign Trade Organisation (Safto) export drive to US markets and government's R170m allocation to encourage exports this year. Increases in consumer spending are dependent on the extent and timing of the drop in interest rates, increase in employment and pay increases after tax and inflation. The improving economy should relieve unemployment by 1986 but the effect of pay increases will be evident from the middle of next year. "The lid on government spending cannot be held down indefinitely," says Berkowitz. He expects renewed spending to occur from the second quarter of 1986. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Aug 85 p 3]

**CIVIL SERVANTS COST**--The rocketing cost of maintaining huge and complex bureaucratic machinery is clearly set out in figures released in Pretoria last week by the Central Statistical Services. The figures, according to economists, stress the urgency of deregulation. This, together with the hinderance of red tape, according to the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry and Finance Kent Durr, is smothering the creation of urgently-needed jobs. According to CSS figures, the 650343 workers in the central government and provincial administrations cost the country R6,145bn last year. During the year, workers in the central government sector decreased by 1 465 to 384 612. Provincial workers during the year also decreased by 3 142 to 259 954. Local government workers, however, increased by 700 to 238 000 and were paid a total of R1,992bn. Staff of "diverse statutory bodies" also decreased, by 279, to 29 797. They were paid R427,6m in 1984. According to the figures, at the end of March, the total number of people employed by government, the provinces' statutory bodies and municipalities reached a total of 912 363. The total paid out in salaries and wages in the four sectors in 1984 exceeded R8,5bn, which was more than 25% of the national Budget. It is pointed out that a large percentage of staff in central government, provincial administrations and local authorities is concerned with administering regulations and that most of them are associated with the government's race policies. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 19 Aug 85 p 3]

**EQUIPMENT FOR SOUTH AMERICA**--South America is proving fertile ground for Delkor Technik's know-how in mineral-processing. The company recently sold a 2 sq m horizontal belt filter to a tin mine in the Peruvian Andes, its 14th order from that part of the world. [Excerpt] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 18 Aug 85 p 4]

**SECRET RED MEAT DEAL**—One man's meat is another man's poison but, in the case of the huge beef surplus, the death of a Soviet president's gave South Africa's meat the chop. The Meat Board confirmed yesterday that it had negotiated the sale of South Africa's meat surplus to the Soviet Union, but that the sale was cancelled after the death of Russian president Konstantin Chernenko. GM Pieter Coetzee said the board was unable to sell its surplus in any of the traditional markets, such as the European Economic Community, which were also overstocked. The board negotiated with Russia and the surplus, which now stands at 37 000 tons, would have been exported at a profit. The deal was cancelled after the death of Chernenko in March. The board announced yesterday it would make the surplus meat available to local consumers at discount prices. It also mentioned the possibility of selling part of the stock direct to the public, Coetzee added. At the moment meat sold at auctions was being supplemented by the surplus in an attempt to keep prices down. "The number of cattle being sent to abattoirs is tapering off," Coetzee said. [Text] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 21 Aug 85 p 3]

**FRUIT EXPORTS**—South Africa's fruit exports are expected to be worth a record R1-billion this year. Fruit farmers are happy about the rand's depreciation. Exporters are pulling in an additional R10-million for every one US cent drop in the exchange rate of the rand. Citrus farmers earned R300-million in foreign currency last year from the export of 30-million 15-kilogram cartons of fruit. This year the same quantity of exports will bring in about R350-million. Deciduous fruit exports last year netted R360-million in foreign currency. The Deciduous Fruit Board estimates that the fall of the rand will increase earnings by another 20% this year. Since that forecast early this year, the rand has slipped and it is expected that deciduous fruit exports could earn R450-million. The export of Cape deciduous will be worth another \$210-million this year. Arend Venter, assistant general manager of the Citrus Exchange, told BUSINESS TIMES: "The favourable climate for fruit exporters caused by the low rand does not mean we can automatically expand output to take advantage of it. "There is a long lead time in fruit production as it takes up to seven years before a tree produces." Freight is the biggest single cost factor, accounting for 30% of the total. Most of SA's fruit is exported. [Text] [Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES [BUSINESS] in English 18 Aug 85 p 28]

**400 LOSE JOBS**—Two companies in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage region have dismissed more than 400 of their employees because of the economic recession. A textile manufacturer at Uitenhage has dismissed 360 workers, and a leading shoe manufacturer in Port Elizabeth has had to dismiss 70 employees. A spokesman for the shoe company said although the decision had been prompted by the recession, an important consideration had also been the black consumer boycott of white businesses. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 22 Aug 85 MB]

**RULE OF PRIVILEGE QUERY**--The time had arrived to examine the fundamentals of the rule of privilege, said advocate Ismail Mahomed SC, in the Rand Supreme Court yesterday when arguing against the "right" of the police to invade the privileged relationship between an attorney and a client. Despite existing interpretations of the law which hold otherwise, he did not believe the police had the legal right to breach the relationship by seizing documents prepared by an attorney for the purpose of a civil action. Consequently, any search warrant purporting to authorise such an action must be invalid, he said. Mahomed was representing the Johannesburg legal firm, Cheadle, Thompson and Haysom, the widow of trade unionist, Andries Raditsela, and Anna Mnguni in their action against the Minister of Law and Order, Louis de Grange, and two police officers. They are claiming the legal costs of an urgent application brought on May 29 in which they requested the return of hand-written notes seized by the police. They also applied for an order declaring the police action unlawful. [Text] [By Linda Ensor] [Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 22 Aug 85 p 3]

**BRAZILIAN REBUFF**--The signing by Brazil's President Jose Sarney of a decree prohibiting arms exports to South Africa indicates that Brazil is or has been exporting military equipment to South Africa, despite the mandatory UN embargo, and despite many denials by previous Brazilian Governments. Brazil's powerful military establishment traditionally maintained friendly links with its South African counterparts. But the growth of trade with black Africa began to make this a risky affair. Some of the arms exports consisted of shipments of spare parts from third countries. Doubtless there have also been direct shipments to South Africa of Brazilian armaments and equipment. Though South Africa's defence industry has expanded greatly, Brazil produces a much greater range of equipment, from small-arms to the well-known Cascavel armoured car and fighter aircraft. Though Sarney has now banned all commercial (notably Brazilian oil) and cultural exports to South Africa, South African mining investments (notably Anglo American and Gencor) in Brazil are unaffected. Brazil's sanctions annoyed the South African Government almost more than the French measures, partly because the Afrikaners have historical links with Latin America. The reasons behind the Brazilian move are three-fold: the greater political sensitivity of the Sarney government to Brazil's black population (there are general elections in Brazil next year); Nigeria, which concluded a big arms deal with Brazil last month conditional on the severance of Brazil's links with South Africa; and the current unrest in South Africa. When a Brazilian naval delegation visited Lagos in February, the South African question was the main obstacle to the implementation of a military cooperation agreement negotiated over a year earlier. The chief of staff of the Brazilian armed forces, Admiral do Amaral Oliveira, called on Nigeria's defence minister, Maj-Gen. Domkat Ball, last month, assuring him that the necessary steps to sever links with South Africa were about to be taken. Nigeria is an important market for Brazil. In 1981 it already accounted for 3.3 percent of Brazilian exports, mostly manufactured goods rather than the usual primary commodities. Despite Nigeria's economic decline, barter deals have increased the value of Brazil's exports to Nigeria. Brazil is regarded as a model by some of Nigeria's military leadership. [Text] [London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 14 Aug 85 p 2]

CSO: 3400/990

ZIMBABWE

ANALYSIS OF ELECTIONS RESULTS

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 17 Jul 85 pp 1-3

[Text]

Robert Mugabe's *Zanu-PF* emerged with an increased majority after Zimbabwe's first post independence election, but the polls reveal a country divided along tribal and racial lines. Although *Zanu-PF* increased its national vote to 77% (up from 63% in 1980) it failed to make any inroads in Joshua Nkomo's heartland of Matabeleland, where *Zapu* won all 15 seats, despite considerable anti-Ndebele brutality on the part of government security forces in the five years since independence.

Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC was, as expected, obliterated. Less expected, however, was the single seat picked up by the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's *Zanu* party (as distinct from *Zanu PF*) in the south-east Chipinge district. Sithole himself remains in exile in Britain threatened with arrest on charges of subversion if he returns to Zimbabwe.

But it was the complete surprise of the white vote for the 20 seats reserved for white candidates under the Lancaster House constitution that caused real consternation, and, according to Mugabe, may yet give rise to the end of "reconciliation". Pundits across the board predicted that the *Independent Zimbabwe Group* (IZG), chaired by Bill Irvine, would gain at least 15 of the reserved seats, with Ian Smith's renamed *Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe* (CAZ), winning the other five. Nobody was more surprised than CAZ itself.

In retrospect IZG made several crucial tactical errors in presenting their image to the white voter. Most of them did not submit to fresh by-elections after crossing the floor from CAZ half way through the last parliament. Because they had their origins as a CAZ breakaway, they were regarded by many whites as turncoats and opportunists, not to be trusted. It was thought that had they won, they might have been persuaded by government either to join *Zanu-PF* or vote with *Zanu-PF* for an early end to the reserved white seats. White voters also fell for a dishonest CAZ election claim that CAZ had good communications with government. In fact Mugabe and Smith have not been on speaking terms

since 1981. Mugabe is now probably kicking himself for not having made it clearer to the whites what the consequences for voting CAZ would be. He held off at the behest of IZG leaders who feared that such statements would turn white voters against them.

The pro-government *Herald* newspaper has been full of letters from anxious whites wishing to disassociate themselves from the CAZ vote. In fact the white vote was not as overwhelming as the seat distribution indicates. Probably only about half the whites eligible to vote did so, and of them only 55% voted for CAZ.

Particularly disappointing for Zanu-PF is the reluctance of minor tribal groupings to accept Shona hegemony. The Tonga voters in Hwange, in the extreme north of Matabeleland, and the Venda voters in Beitbridge in the extreme south were not persuaded to support Zanu in sufficient numbers to prevent Zapu victories in constituencies which are well outside the Ndebele heartland. On the other side of the country the Shona-speaking Ndau registered their defection by inflicting on Zanu its one defeat in Chipinge, where Goodson Sithole, representing the Rev. Ndabiningi Sithole's branch of Zanu beat William Ndangana, former leader of the well-known guerrilla group, the Crocodile gang, but not an Ndau by 16,461 to 15,625. Next door at Chimanimani Simon Sithole of Zanu won by 34,733 to 9,742 in a contest where Zanu strategists would have anticipated a walk-over. The name Sithole, endemic within the Ndau, is also common among the Ngoni in Malawi and Zambia, confirming that the Ndau, sometimes known as Shangani in deference to their Zulu ancestry, are descendents of the celibate impis that made their way north in the middle of the 19th century, marrying the local women whose languages were soon to become the accepted tongue of the next generation.

But the Ndau would not consider themselves Shona, despite the linguistic connection, any more than the Ngoni in Zambia would consider themselves as Cewa. To win them back Mugabe will probably use the stick and carrot approach, the carrot being the use of government patronage to show Ndau leaders where their best interests lie, preceded by something like a visit of the 5th Brigade on local manoeuvres, a consequence less fanciful than might be imagined, as the majority of the Ndau live over the border in Mozambique.

### **Cabinet shuffles**

Mugabe's anger at failing to make inroads into both white and black opposition is reflected in his new cabinet announced on Monday. The two-week delay in its formation, after his promise that it would be announced "within a few days" is an indication of the bitter quarrels over the portfolio shareout.

Despite having promised a new-look "tough" cabinet, it looks much the same as the old one, but without even token "minority" representation. Below are the significant changes:-

Out goes agriculture minister Denir Norman, the only full minister to be dropped, albeit with Mugabe's accolades ringing in his ears. His dismissal, said the prime minister, was in retaliation for the white farming community's overwhelming vote for CAZ. The ministry of agriculture has now been amalgamated with the ministry of lands resettlement, under **Moven Mahachi**, the scourge of white farmers.

For the past five years Norman and Mahachi have played a delicate double act. While Mahachi berated white farmers as interlopers whose forebears stole black land, Norman was quietly reassuring them that they were secure so long as they remained productive.

Mahachi's bite is unlikely to be as strong as his bark. But some white farmers might be jumpy. Certainly Mugabe has served notice that their honeymoon as a charmed white community is over. *Zanu-PF* radicals point out that the country's recent bumper harvest was due as much to the productivity of black peasant farmers as to their more mechanized white colleagues.

The cabinet change with perhaps the most far-reaching effects is the swap between **Emos Nkala** and **Simbi Mubako**. Nkala becomes the new home affairs minister, in charge, among other things, of the police. Mubako recedes to the relative backwater of national supplies. Mugabe's assertion that the swap was at their own request is patently unlikely. Mubako, a British-trained lawyer was an ineffectual home affairs minister with little political clout whose tenure gave the police force a chance to catch its breath after the whirlwind of **Herbert Ushewokunze**.

Behind the change, however, lurks a policy more sinister. Nkala is a mortal enemy of **Joshua Nkomo** and is publicly committed to the death of *Zapu* and the end of Nkomo's political career. Nkala, an Ndebele from Filabusi in central Matabeleland, was yet again humiliated on his home ground by an election defeat by a *Zapu* rank-and-filer. His portfolio comes his way courtesy of his second candidature for the *Zanu-PF* "safe" seat of Kariba, where the deputy minister died on the eve of the election.

Nkala's new office is a clear indication that Mugabe has now decided to go for the "hard option", which Nkala has always promoted, to crush *Zapu* once and for all. Nkala is remembered for his intemperate campaigning at the 1980 elections which caused Lord Soames, as governor, to proscribe him for inciting violence. His temperament came to the

fore once more at a speech he made in Bulawayo in November 1980 in which his inflammatory remarks are widely accepted as causing the subsequent Entumbane battle between enraged *Zipra* and *Zanla* guerrillas camped in the city.

The ministry of women's affairs, like intelligence, is brought under the direct control of the prime minister's office. The importance of *Zanu-PF*'s women's leagues has been growing, as shown by their role as political storm-troopers in the recent township violence where they systematically evicted opposition supporters. For several days anarchy reigned in the townships with police refusing to intervene. The violence followed a speech by the prime minister at which he declared that the time had come to kill the bull, a reference to Nkomo and *Zapu*'s election symbol).

**Callistus Ndlovu**, the urbane Harvard-educated *Zapu* defector, beaten decisively in the election, becomes a senator and moves from mines to industry and technology; **Richard Hove** moves from trade and commerce to mines; **Kumbirai Kangai** goes from industry and technology to energy and water development; newcomer **David Karimanzira** takes over at youth, sport and culture, and the other new face, **Mrs Amina Hughes**, who stood unsuccessfully as a coloured *Zanu-PF* candidate in Bulawayo, is made a senator and deputy minister of transport. **Chris Anderson** stays on as minister of public service and the only white in cabinet, while **John Landau**, who was deputy minister of trade and commerce, is out.

### **The "dissident" factor**

Security in post electoral Zimbabwe continues to be a major concern for the government. *Zanu-PF* claimed that the *Zapu* victory in Matabeleland was due to "dissident" intimidation of voters. The government continues to give publicity to "dissident" attacks and atrocities, and these are duly reported in the western media. But the real culprits behind the government's "dissident" statistics are often more difficult to identify. The Inyathi shootings probably the bloodiest incident this year, illustrates the information problem which obscures the entire "war" in the south/west.

The Inyathi shooting was first reported in the *Herald* of 13 April 1985, which stated that "seven people were killed and seven injured when dissidents opened fire on a packed restaurant in Inyathi district..." Among those killed, reported the *Herald*, were the two children of the restaurant owner **Micah Bhebe**. The *Herald*, however, failed to mention that Bhebe was a member of *Zapu*'s central committee and played a large part in securing *Zapu* successes in local government elections in the area. The *Herald* quotes only one informant in its description of the attack during which gunmen apparently opened fire on the restaurant complex from point blank range, firing over 70 rounds. However, it transpires that

two days before the shooting, the police support unit set up a camp about 200 yards from the complex. The attack itself began with a warning shot and prolonged hooting from the direction of the police camp. Immediately before the shooting armed members of the support unit were mingling with the drinkers but none of them returned fire and they "disappeared" during the attack. During the shooting, which turned the restaurant into a bloodbath, an armoured Police truck moved through the complex picking up the gunmen as they moved off into the bush.

The Inyathi incident highlights the confusion between attacks by rebel forces and "pseudo-operations" by government forces. Soldiers from the 5th Brigade are now to be seen in Police Support Unit uniform, without their give-away red berets.

Zimbabwe's security troubles may soon spread further afield. At a security summit held in Harare on 13 June, Mozambique's President Samora Machel requested military assistance from senior military commanders and security minister from Zimbabwe and Tanzania. He is asking for an increase in Tanzanian and Zimbabwean forces currently serving in northern and central Mozambique, guarding the Beira to Mutare pipeline and other key installations against MNR guerrillas. He also wants Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops to extend their hot-pursuit activities (currently limited to about 10 miles) and become fully involved in the war. Machel has been fully backed in his request by Tiny Rowland, whose company *Lonhro* has just made massive investments in Mozambique, including the *Polana* hotel in Maputo, and hotels and tourist spots in Beira and elsewhere, as well as agricultural estates. None of this investment will begin to pay until the war is brought under control.

But any Zimbabwean involvement in the Mozambique war may well activate the MNR threat of reprisals along the long common border. The south-eastern Ndaou people, whose majority live in Mozambique, and some of whom number among the ranks of the MNR, showed their disaffection with Zanu-PF government by becoming the only non-Ndebele group to vote against the ruling party. In the event of Zimbabwe being sucked into a growing Mozambican conflict, the Ndaou could well become a significant security risk.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

September 26, 1985